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Proposing melodrama as an aesthetics of victimhood, my dissertation examines the 
intermedial itineraries of notable feminist Halide Edib’s Vurun Kahpeye [Strike the Slut]. 
Originally serialized in 1923 and published as a novella in 1926 in Ottoman Turkish, Vurun 
Kahpeye was translated into modern day Turkish in 1946. The melodramatic story was then 
adapted for screen three times in 1949, 1964, and 1973, respectively, by Ömer Lütfi Akad, 
Orhan Aksoy and Halit Refiğ. With the circulation of these films on TV, the title Vurun 
Kahpeye has since the 90s morphed into an idiom designating the unjust treatment of the 
innocent.  
The persistent repetition of Vurun Kahpeye across media, I suggest, signifies 
melodrama’s aesthetic durability due to its affective excess: its efficacy in making a 
disaffected public experience its own victimhood. Thus, my dissertation provides an 
archeology of melodrama as a political technology through a reading of each of Vurun 
Kahpeye’s media iteration as embedded in its socio-historical context. In this account, the 
affective medium of cinema emerges as the main site for the formation of a secular mass 





And yet, the affective excess of melodrama, I demonstrate, renders Vurun Kahpeye’s 
normative project unstable and uncontainable with each iteration. At different moments in 
time, Vurun Kahpeye is a queer text exposing the heteropatriarchal nature of secular 
nationalism; lays the infrastructural, spectatorial, and aesthetic foundation of the classical 
cinema of Turkey; and serves as the project of a social realist, counter-populist, and anti-
Western theory of cinema. Therefore, this dissertation traces the conflicting projections, 
aspirations, and feelings central to Turkish republican modernity that congeal and clash in, 
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INTRODUCTION: MELODRAMA AS AN AESTHETICS OF VICTIMHOOD 
A world compartmentalized, Manichaean and petrified, a world of 
statues… 
(Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth) 
 
I base this on their conduct, not on what they say, and this means that they 
have become, in themselves, moral monsters. 
(James Baldwin, I Am Not Your Negro) 
 
 
Upon returning from his eleven day long North African trip to a country shaken 
now by nationwide unrest on June 7, 2013, the then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan began to address a crowd of supporters in a series of rallies organized in 
response to the Gezi Park protests beginning from the airport. In his typically vehement 
oratory, “They attacked my veiled girls, my veiled sister,” said Erdoğan, his wife Emine 
Erdoğan approvingly nodding next to him, soliciting jeers from an enraged audience in 
condemnation of the assailants.1 Erdoğan was referring to an incident that the pro-
government media outlets would soon widely circulate as part of a campaign of 
                                                
1 An example of one of these speeches, which took place at the Esenboğa airport when Erdoğan arrived in 
Ankara on June 9th. “Başbakan Erdoğan Havaalanında Halka Seslendi,” Hürriyet, June 10, 2013 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/basbakan-erdogan-havalimaninda-halka-seslendi-23470929. Unless 





disinformation, which was based on a testimony of a veiled woman and allegedly 
documented in an unpublished video footage.2 According to this narrative, publicized as 
“the Kabataş attack,” approximately a hundred shirtless male protestors wearing 
bandanas physically harassed a woman with a six-month-old baby in Istanbul. Since then, 
Erdoğan continued to mobilize the Kabataş incident in various contexts with his oft-
repeated “They attacked my veiled sisters” proclamation turning into a slogan. What the 
deployment of this narrative achieves in the context of the Gezi Park protests is evident: 
as a competing account of victimization obscuring and even obliterating the state 
violence that initiated and increased the protests, “the Kabataş attack” serves as the living 
proof corroborating that the protests are violent agents of a purely ideological revolt by 
recasting the roles of the victim and aggressor. The figurations of these characters, 
namely a pious mother marked by her veil and the hysterical mob marked by their lack of 
clothing pointedly executes this translation. But Erdoğan does more than activate a moral 
                                                
2 Erdoğan kicked off this campaign in his party’s group gathering with the suggestion that the protestors 
dragged the daughter in law of one of his acquaintances on the street on the same day he returned to 
Turkey. The press picked up on the incident, and on June 13th, the newspaper Star released an interview 
with the alleged victim, Z. D., the daughter in law of the JDP mayor of İstanbul’s Bakırköy district. In this 
interview, Z. D. asserts that she was surrounded and beaten by 70-100 shirtless men wearing black 
bandanas and leather gloves cursing her, her veil, and Erdoğan and yelling that they were making a 
revolution as the real owners of the nation. Z. D. also implies that she was also urinated on, claiming to 
have awoken to a stench or urine aster he received a concussion from the attack. “‘Yerlerde Sürüklediler,’” 
Star, June 13, 2013 http://www.star.com.tr/guncel/basbakan-erdoganin-yerlerde-suruklediler-dedigi-anne-
stara-konustu-haber-762093/. Z. D.’s narrative was endorsed by many members of the press, including the 
interviewer Elif Çakır, journalist Balçiçek Pamir who affirmed to have seen the body marks from the 
attack, and columnist İsmet Berkan who claimed to have seen a security camera footage documenting the 
attack. The alleged attack took a life of its own dominating the national mediascape with the press 
promoting Z. D.’s narrative in support of Erdoğan. For a timeline of the Kabataş incident, see “Kabataş’ta 
Aslında Ne Oldu,” Hürriyet, October, 25, 2015 http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/kabatasta-aslinda-ne-
oldu-40005830. Another significant component of this campaign, also repeatedly alluded to by Erdoğan 
this speech onwards, is a report alleging that the protestors entered into the Dolmabahçe Mosque with shoes 
on their feet and beer bottles in their hands. Later refuted by the mosque’s imam and muezzin, the report is 
a reimagination of the recorded scenes of protestors taking shelter from the police violence and turning the 
mosque into a makeshift dispensary. Both the imam and the muezzin were later deposed elsewhere.    
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crisis around the violated female figure by evoking a sensational account of violence. He 
further implicates himself as the subject of this violence by declaring his kinship with the 
victim, promoting himself as the injured guardian of the violated woman in the role of a 
brother. Consequently, the victimized female body embodies Erdoğan’s own injury, as he 
creates for himself a space in a shared victimhood with his constituency, his kin by 
injury, as a long-disenfranchised politician of the militantly-secularized political arena. 
“The Kabataş attack” then exemplifies how the discourse of victimhood participates in 
what Wendy Brown describes as the moralization of politics as a result not of the appeals 
of the socially subordinated but of the state from the perspective of the injured with the 
power to injure, as the uncompromising suppression of the protests would subsequently 
prove.3 
For Brown, moralizing politics “fixes the identities of the injured and the injuring 
as social positions, and codifies as well the meanings of their actions against all 
possibilities of indeterminacy, ambiguity, and struggle for resignification or 
repositioning.”4 Brown’s description echoes the statues that embody the fixity of the 
social positions of the oppressor and the oppressed in the colonial world that Fanon 
characterizes as Manichean.5 As the word implies, a shared world-making project that is 
essentially melodramatic permeates these three dissimilar contexts. In effect, through an 
orchestration of a mise-en-scène, a concoction of a narrative, an allocation of roles, and 
                                                
3 Wendy Brown, “Introduction: Freedom and the Plastic Cage,” States of Injury, 26-7. 
 
4 Ibid., 27. 
 




an appeal to emotions, what is Erdoğan’s invocation but a recreation of a melodramatic 
world divided between the good and the evil? To be more precise, I am suggesting that 
Erdoğan relies on the efficacy of melodramatic aesthetics in producing a series of affects 
that translates the victim into an agent whose innocence and consequent righteousness 
can no longer be questioned. Eight months after the “Kabataş attack,” the released video 
footage from security cameras at the site showed neither bare-chested men in the vicinity, 
nor a sign of an attack; the alleged victim crosses the street with a stroller without being 
physically targeted by anyone.6 Despite this evidence, Erdoğan has not abstained from 
invoking the incident, a commitment that could only speak for the efficacy of the 
melodramatic projection of the world even in the face of documented actualities. What 
we also observe here is therefore the melodramatization of politics –an aesthetic practice 
itself in the most straightforwardly read Rancièrian terms of aesthetic as arrangement, 
distribution, and organization of the sensible, a word, as will be discussed, that has a 
great import for melodrama.7 Not incidentally, the sensational narrative of gendered 
victimhood that “the Kabataş attack” stages harks stunningly back to Vurun Kahpeye 
[Strike the Slut], originally serialized by notable feminist Halide Edib between 1923 and 
1924.8 Set in a small rural town during the War of Turkish Independence, the story 
recounts the lynching of Aliye, a recently-appointed teacher working for the nationalist 
                                                
6 Both the police reports on and the video recordings of the incident disproved the interview with some of 
the journalists coming out to apologize for having been misled. “Released Footage Shows No Physical 
Attack,” Hürriyet Daily News, Feb 14, 2014 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/released-footage-shows-
no-physical-attack-on-headscarf-wearing-woman-during-gezi-protests-62479.  
 
7 See Jacques Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, 2004. 
 
8 Vurun Kahpeye was originally serialized Ottoman-Turkish in the newspaper Akşam between December 




struggle. Incensed and mobilized by the town’s leading clergyman who slanders her as a 
whore, the locals publicly lynch Aliye to death. Indeed, the so-called Kabataş attack 
seems to cite and rework Vurun Kahpeye: Eighty-seven years later, Erdoğan adopts the 
same narrative structure and a similar plot line, only now inverting the political 
ideologies of the hero and villain by refashioning the female figure as a pious subject. 
The parallelism between these two scenes vividly captures the literary lineages of 
political rhetoric in Turkey today. Despite the extensive political background that frames 
this dissertation, The Melodramatics of Turkish Modernity is not about a melodramatic 
modulation within a political grammar, a variation of what Elizabeth Anker terms as 
“melodramatic political discourse” that she observes in the post-9/11 political climate in 
America.9 Anker’s methodical analysis of the rhetoric of “The War on Terror” era 
construes melodrama as an agitating political discourse in service of its fantasmatic telos 
of “sovereign freedom.”10 It is through a melodramatic mode that the unquestioned 
legitimacy injury generates becomes justification for agential and often violent political 
subjectivity for the sake of a better future. Anker’s study provides a brilliant model of 
scholarship to articulate the melodramatization of politics in Turkey –which, as will be 
shown, is premised upon a vengeful will that cites history as its telos– a project that is 
needed but this dissertation does not promise to engage in. The Melodramatics of Turkish 
Modernity instead historicizes the literary and cinematic legacy of melodrama –through 
an examination of the extended social life of Vurun Kahpeye– demonstrating how the 
                                                






idioms and images of melodrama foundationally delimits the horizon of our political 
imaginary. Taking the cue from Linda William’s proclamation that “[w]hat counts in 
melodrama is the feeling of righteousness, achieved through the sufferings of the 
innocent,”11 I define melodrama as an aesthetics of victimhood that bridges innocence 
and righteousness. Melodrama’s availability for our political unconscious lies in its 
efficacy in making a disaffected public experience its own victimhood, thus mediating, 
translating, and at times even registering politics as feeling through the affect of 
victimization. To put it simply, melodrama activates political affects that are then 
reconstituted as political affiliations by producing the terms of politics at the level of 
feeling. Thus, rather than adaptable or deployable for political discourse delineating an 
outside, melodrama is always already political precisely because of its affective excess, 
which guarantees its aesthetic durability especially in a social context whose political 
rationality, as I will show below, is structured as much by feelings and attachments as 
ideas or pragmatics.  In the case of Turkey then, melodrama does not only lend itself to 
political discourse, but further structures a particular political rationality.  
The persistence and repetition of Vurun Kahpeye is a form of self-
melodramatization that is symptomatic of a historical condition, which I would venture as 
a broader psychic formation that not only configures state politics, but also impacts 
national subjectivities at once. I contend that the modern Turkish national identity is 
rooted in a feeling of injury, in a sense of victimhood, and in the figuration of a victim. In 
other words, the experience of Turkish modernity is overdetermined by a modern 
                                                
11 Linda Williams, “Melodrama Revised,” Refiguring American Genres, 62. 
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sensibility of victimization that legitimizes both collective and individual existence 
through a reactionary sovereignty, that is, to borrow from Brown, “in reaction to 
perceived injuries.”12 In his center-periphery cleavage theory, sociologist Şerif Mardin 
intimates the significance of the experience of injury within a milieu that translates social 
difference into cultural division between the secular-urban hegemonic forces and the 
religious-rural populations in modern Turkey.13 I propose to accentuate the affective 
underpinning of the intimation of his analysis not simply in terms of its scale, but also its 
scope, designating an encompassing sense of victimization originating in the demise of 
the Ottoman Empire that the Republic inherits. Similar to Walter Benjamin’s “angel of 
history” launched in reverse into the future while facing a perpetually growing debris of 
the bygone times before its eyes,14 the Turkish identity negotiates the loss of a long 
glorious imperial past in its young Republic.15 Betrayed and victimized by history, by the 
West, and by the non-Turk, the Turk continues to tend the open wound of the past within 
a melancholic modality defined as hüzün in a literary tradition that extends from Ahmed 
                                                
12 Brown, “Introduction,” 7. 
 
13 See Şerif Mardin, “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?” Daedulus 102, no. 1, 
(Winter 1973): 169-190. 
 
14 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” Illuminations, 257-8. 
 
15 One must invoke Fatma Müge Göçek who locates the essence of modern Turkish identity in a “collective 
trauma” rooted in the Treaty of Sèvres, which partitioned the defeated Ottoman Empire amongst the Allied 
Powers. What she calls the “Sèvres syndrome” signifies “individuals, groups and institutions in Turkey 
who interpret all public interactions –domestic and foreign– through a framework of fear and anxiety over 
the possible annihilation, abandonment, and betrayal of the Turkish state by the West.” Fatma Müge 
Göçek, The Transformation of Turkey, 110. Sèvres might be the pinnacle of this trauma, but the trauma can 
be traced back to the separatist nationalist movements that shook the empire since and even before the 
Balkan Wars. The other within, the non-Muslim and the non-Turk had long served as the source of anxiety. 
Regardless of the origin of this trauma, it is noteworthy that Göçek’s account intimates a preemptive and 
paranoid mode of self-victimization that marks the Turkish national psyche. 
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Hamdi Tanpınar to Orhan Pamuk.16  
 The most prominent recent manifestation of this psychic condition is nowhere 
more visible than in the Turkish political landscape with the domination of the Justice 
and Development Party (JDP) since 2002. If, like M. Hakan Yavuz, we read the modern 
history of Turkey as “the story of the tensions between the state’s attempt to modernize 
and the peripheral forces seeking to redefine the state,”17 the JDP can be considered as 
the most successful counterhegemonic political formation in Turkey. To follow Yavuz, 
the JDP “has looked towards reconfiguring alliances and redistributing political power; it 
has sought ways to create new institutions and new values, more importantly it has 
attempted to overthrow the ingrained Kemalist mode or pattern of progressive and elitist 
thinking.”18 While this broad conceptualization of the ideological mission of the JDP still 
stands to reason, the perplexing political transformation that the party has undergone in 
sixteen years complicates this picture. Indeed, the JDP of today is not the same JDP of 
the early millennium that Yavuz effectively analyzes.19 It is hard to believe that the JDP 
was once a beacon of hope and freedom for a pluralistic society, having defined itself as a 
conservative democrat party whose political success lied in the marriage of a liberal 
                                                
16 In the novel form, Tanpınar is one of the first writers to consciously aestheticize the anxiety that emerges 
out of the cultural revolution of the Republic that pits modernity against tradition in affective terms. See, 
for instance, Tanpınar, A Mind at Peace, 2011. A legacy derived from Tanpınar, hüzün is also a prominent 
element of Pamuk’s writings and the lens through which he filters the imbricated stories of his life and 
İstanbul in his memoir. Pamuk, İstanbul: Memoirs and the City, 2017. 
 
17 M. Hakan Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey, 33. 
 
18 Ibid., 13. 
 
19 For a more recent critical analysis of the JDP-ruled Turkey in English, see Simon A. Waldman and Emre 




Islam with neoliberal market economies towards the ultimate goal of European Union 
membership. Today, however, the JDP, fueled by an anti-Western and neo-Ottomanist 
nationalist aspirations, has turned into a mere vehicle for implementing the transition 
from a parliamentary system to an executive presidency, an autocratic one-manship with 
diminished checks and balances in an increasingly majoritarian state. Considering the 
JDP’s radical metamorphosis within the span of a mere decade, how can we make sense 
of its sustaining of the majority of the votes election after election? In other words, how 
is that the JDP convinces its voters to secure victory in the electorate despite its 
paradoxical teleology?  
The striking case of the JDP points to a distinct political rationality unique to 
Turkey and elsewhere in which politics “has become the conflict and competition over 
different lifestyles and value systems.”20 In this context, politics, I would further, is not 
understood as representation, but is rather felt as attachment, a phenomenon that could 
explain the cult of the individual as forming the basis of belonging to a political 
enterprise. Here, political performance and discourse take precedence over policies or 
ideologies as primary means of identification. If politics is structured around affective 
attachments, how the JDP has made its way into, as it were, the hearts of the masses 
cannot be viewed as an analysis disembodied from real politics, but instead as an element 
constitutive of that thing we call real politics. It is in this spirit that I consider victimhood 
as a central invariable analytic making intelligible the JDP’s long-standing electoral 
success. In the JDP’s triumphant story, the identity of the victimized emerges as the 
                                                




nexus merging not only the diverse social bodies that make up of its electoral base, but 
also this heterogenous constituency with the party as embodied in the persona of Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan. Since its conception, the JDP has promoted itself as the platform for the 
oppressed and the marginalized, bringing together the victimized Erdoğan of an unjust 
political system and the victimized masses of a corrupt political and unjust social order. 
In a country hit by successive devastating financial crises at the hands of a venal coalition 
government since the turn of the millennium, both the economically and the socially 
disenfranchised –the squatters, the Kurds, the pious, and the middle-class– found in the 
victimization of Erdoğan their mirror image. Indeed, Erdoğan had to reinvent himself, 
giving up Islamism, but he was still the mağdur [victim] and mazlum [wronged] of the 
secular establishment. In March 1999, Erdoğan had received a ten-month prison sentence 
due to his recital of a poem, a modified version of the acclaimed pan-Turkist Ziya 
Gökalp’s “Asker Duası” [“Soldier’s Prayer”].21 His rendering of the poem, especially the 
verses “The mosques are our barracks, the domes our helmets/The minarets our bayonets, 
the faithful our soldiers,” was adjudged to be an incitement to violence and religious or 
racial hatred under the article 312/2 of the Turkish penal code.22 Erdoğan’s conviction led 
to the forfeiture of his position as the mayor of Istanbul, his imprisonment for four 
months, and his political ban from the following general elections. In fact, Erdoğan could 
not immediately become the prime minister due to this ban after the JDP won its first 
                                                
21 The poem Erdoğan recited is an adapted version of Gökalp’s poem published in 1913 during the Balkan 
War, framed by an added quatrain –the lines that put Erdoğan into trouble– and freed from a cinquain 







election by a landslide in 2002. In short, the injustice Erdoğan experienced found a social 
resonance that accorded the JDP a social currency, consolidating in its support, on the 
one hand, the disappointed masses and the European Union, liberals, and the left, on the 
other. 
To go back to the questions raised earlier, the JDP and Erdoğan years of Turkey 
have witnessed a proliferation of a discourse around victimhood that keeps afresh the 
memory and the spectacle of their victimization in service of the legitimization of their 
being, rule, and actions. As an emotive mode of persuasion corresponding to Aristotelian 
pathos,23 the discursive activity around the notion of victimhood repeatedly cites the 
injustices of the past in terms of paid prices to legitimize the present. What I call the 
discourse of victimhood is therefore by far the chief and most consistent amongst the 
JDP’s rhetorical and performative strategies for not only sustaining its social legitimacy 
but asserting its political legitimacy as well. As an unwavering instrumental constant for 
political capital, it has served a vital role in the JDP’s increasing populism, rationalizing 
the ruling party’s contradictory trajectory of what it once promised and what it has 
eventually become. Key to this discourse is a historicization of the political victimization 
of the right to which the JDP subscribes itself and within which the past gets perpetually 
reproduced. The cadres of the JDP themselves have experienced coups and the shutting 
down of their parties emerging from the Islamist Millî Görüş [National Vision] under the 
secularist militancy of the establishment.24 And yet, the JDP conceives itself as an heir to 
                                                
23 See Aristotle, On Rhetoric, 2007. 
 
24 Millî Görüş refers to the first explicitly Islamist political movement led by Necmettin Erbakan on the 
national level in 1969. As the biggest and oldest Islamist political tradition of modern Turkey, it has 
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a larger political tradition inflicted with coups, bans, and assassinations that dates to the 
Demokrat Parti [Democratic Party] (DP) the political legacy of which the JDP also 
alleges to carry.25 Concomitantly, the JDP also continues to lay claim to positions of 
victimhood in the present as Erdogan’s now hackneyed and oft-mocked aldatıldık and 
kandırıldık statements attest to. By confessing that “they were cheated” and “deceived,” 
Erdoğan has a recourse to a victimization that eliminates his responsibility and restores 
his innocence in the wake of failed collaborations with dire political consequences. Such 
has been the case in Iraq with Masoud Barzani, in Syria with Barack Obama, and at home 
with his long-lived and firm partner in power, Fethullah Gülen, the leader of the Gülenist 
                                                                                                                                            
spawned a succession of parties beginning with the Millî Nizam Partisi [National Order Party] (1970-1). 
While some of these parties even came to power within coalition governments, most of them were 
disbanded and banned either by law on the grounds of constitutional violation or by the junta regimes 
following military coups. As one of the contemporary representatives of this genealogy alongside Saadet 
Partisi [Felicity Party], the JDP came into being as a result of the split between within the cadres of Fazilet 
Partisi [Virtue Party] after their banning in 2001. The same year, the younger generation of politicians 
Abdullah Gül, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Bülent Arınç parted ways with Erbakan and his hard anti-
western and Islamist ideology to found the conservative democratic JDP, while Erbakan founded the 
Felicitiy Party at the end of his political ban. For a brief account of this historical overview, see Fulya 
Atacan, “Explaining Religious Politics at the Crossroad: AKP-SP,” Turkish Studies 6, no. 2 (2005): 187-
199. 
 
25 The Democratic Party was the winning party of the historic 1950 elections, the first multi-party general 
elections of the Republic ending a twenty-seven-year-old single-party regime of the Cumhuriyet Halk 
Partisi [Republican People’s Party] (CHP), the founding party of the Republic established by the founding 
father Mustafa Kemal in 1923. As opposed to the top-down politics of Westernization of the hard secularist 
and statist CHP, the DP developed an Islamic populism by expanding its political base into the rural 
populace with an anti-establishment rhetoric and a liberal economic agenda. The party was overthrown 
from power by a military fraction in the army in a coup in 1960 on account of the increasing 
authoritarianism of its leader Adnan Menderes that was threatening the founding principles of the Republic. 
The coup resulted in a junta regime under which not only the party was suppressed but also Menderes and 
two other party were hanged members by a military court in 1961. The JDP inscribes itself into the 
genealogy of the moderate right –with its defining conservative populist nationalism and liberal economic 
policies– that extends from the DP, to its successor Adalet Partisi [Justice Party] (1961-1981), itself subject 
to two coups, and to the neoliberal Anavatan Partisi [Motherland Party]. See Chapter III for a longer 




movement who is the alleged mastermind of the July 15 coup attempt in 2016.26   
 In an era marked by “the inflation of victimhood,” to borrow Tanil Bora’s 
phraseology,27 victimhood has emerged as a salient component of popular vocabulary 
mostly in the form of a social critique under the rubric of mağdur edebiyatı [the rhetoric 
of the victim].28 In response to the vulgarization of the discourse of victimhood of the 
JDP, the disparaging expression mağdur edebiyatı cynically calls into question the 
credibility not of the claimed status of victimhood, but rather of its deployment for 
entitlement. Mağdur edebiyatı, in other words, challenges the bridge between innocence 
and righteousness that the discourse of victimhood builds by fingering at the rhetoricity, 
the affectedness of victimhood that one crafts for oneself. The viral user-made videos 
juxtaposing Erdogan’s “we have been deceived” announcements with the footage of his 
and his aides’ singing the praises of Gülen despite the oppositional protests of their 
complicity frame the JDP as engaging in mağdur edebiyatı. Meanwhile, a more popular 
and yet more complex instantiation of mağdur edebiyatı took place in the T.V. comedy 
                                                
26 A Muslim preacher and an imam in self-exile in the United States since 1999, Gülen is the founder and 
leader of the transnational Gülen Movement, also known as Hizmet –“service” in Turkish– a combination 
of a religious community, a social service organization, and a business network model consisting of 
Gülen’s disciples and followers. Viewed as the utmost danger to the secular state, Gülen and his movement 
were accused of having a secret Islamist political agenda of which they were in pursuit by infiltrating state 
institutions. The JDP and Gülen partnership resulted in the movement’s gaining not only financial but also 
political power. As the international voice of the project of moderate Islam during the JDP’s rise to power, 
Gülen and his movement was the proponent of the JDP. In exchange, the JDP favored Gülenist businesses 
for state projects and promoted its charities, while redesigning the state and planting Gülenists into key 
positions especially in the bureaucratic, legal, and military domains. 
 
27 Tanıl Bora, “Mağdur,” Birikim, November 21, 2017. 
http://www.birikimdergisi.com/haftalik/8618/magdur#.W4yexC3MwUE. 
 
28 The literal translation of the phrase amounts to “the literature of the victim.” Literature, however, can 
partake somewhat of a negative connotation, as expressed in the idiom edebiyat yapma, which can be 
roughly translated as “cut the nonsense” or “cut it short.” In such contexts, literature comes to convey any 
contrived, prolonged, and unnatural discourse that I rendered in terms of rhetoric.  
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series Yahşi Cazibe with the character Simge whose refrain “mağdurum da mağdurum” 
became a catchphrase that to this day echoes in popular discourse.29 Yahşi Cazibe tells 
the story of an insolvent man, Kemal, stuck in between two women: Cazibe, an Azeri 
immigrant whom he marries in exchange of a payment, and his girlfriend Simge, who is 
his boss’ daughter. The comedy revolves around the struggle to fake the arranged 
marriage for Kemal’s detective neighbor and to keep it secret from Simge, as Cazibe 
masquerades as Kemal’s wife and maid at once. Unlike Cazibe, Simge is an 
undomesticated Westernized Turkish woman born to money who is clumsy and yet 
haughty and obnoxious, all stereotypically marked by her blond hair. With her broken 
Turkish, she owns a dog named Paris and uses the kettle to cook. A caricature of a victim, 
Simge provides a satiric parody of mağdur edebiyatı as she again and again announces 
her victimization with her motto in the most mundane, random, and improbable situations 
seeking Kemal’s attention. Indeed, the recurrent proclamation subtly references to his 
scheme in which he unexpectedly falls for and develops an affair with Cazibe and yet 
continues to date Simge for material concerns. Against this backdrop, Simge’s hyperbolic 
declaration of victimhood in the face of trivial matters does not simply spotlight her 
stupid or spoiled nature, but also provides a rich commentary on victimhood. Simge 
allows us to see that we are always already victimized by forces unbeknownst to us and 
that owning victimhood is subjective, relative, and performative, inherently running the 
risk of upstaging the other’s suffering. Affected, victimhood, to return to Bora, points to 
“an economy/market of victimhood augmenting the invisibility and inaudibility of real 
                                                




victimizations, horrific victimizations as a product of atrocious cruelty.”30 
To be clear, the question is not what counts as injury such that it defines the real 
victim, but rather whose injury counts in the definition of the real victim. Reframed as 
such, the discourse of victimhood –the identity-injury forgery– must be situated within a 
larger matrix of power relations. Obviously, the question becomes thornier when the 
injured, the victim are those who are in power, those who have the means and 
mechanisms not only to designate the terms of the injury that qualify the injured as the 
victim, but also to address the injury itself from the position of the injured. This is the 
point at which the victim begins to assume heroic qualities, acting in the name of an 
injury to be redressed. The sovereignty that the injured seeks, however, is predicated 
upon the defeat of an entity –a person, a group, an organization, a country, or even a 
coalition of these entities– responsible for the injury. Now a subject of Nietzschean 
ressentiment, the injured yields to two paradoxes, to follow Brown’s discussion, that 
inhere in the reactionary nature of the freedom this subject envisages. Firstly, the freedom 
based on the vanquishing of an enemy is “always constrained by and potentially even 
require[s] the very structure of oppression that freedom emerges to oppose.”31 Stuck 
within a revanchist framework, the injured performs “mirror reversals of suffering 
without transforming the organization of the activity through which the suffering is 
produced and without addressing the subject constitution that domination effects.”32 
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Secondly, as previously mentioned, the horizon of this freedom is curbed by the past that 
haunts the present as “a threat that works as domination in the form of an absorbing 
ghostly battle” even after this freedom is institutionalized.33 The specter of unfreedom, 
the phantom of the enemy, the threat of history dominate political life “as a form of 
political anxiety,” not only justifying the transfigured order of oppression and suffering, 
but also preempting “appreciation of the new dangers to freedom posed by institutions 
designed to hold the past in check.”34  
A snake eating its own tail, Turkish modernity, recursive and regressive, inheres 
in such a vicious cycle in which political practice is structured against an enemy and a 
past kept alive that block a vision of a better future. Brown’s account makes intelligible 
the way in which yesterday’s victims turn into today’s perpetrators, the moral monsters of 
Baldwin,35 not unlike in a Fassbinderian world, establishing a regime of victimhood of 
the sort we currently observe in Turkey. In the mouths of a political party that claims to 
be the “guardian of the rejected, the voice of the silenced,”36 discourse of victimhood 
does not simply signify proliferation of a rhetoric around injury, but it also serves as the 
basis for what Fethi Açıkel identifies as the “psychopathology of the sacred 
wrongedness,” diagnosable in the tradition of the right including the JDP.37 How else to 
                                                




35 I Am Not Your Negro, dir. by Raoul Peck, 2016.  
 
36 “Kimsesizlerin kimi, sessizlerin sesi olmak” is a slogan frequently reiterated by the JDP members, 
including Erdoğan, on many platforms since its foundation to formulize its mission.  
 




make sense of the post-coup attempt environment of current Turkey run by purges, 
arrests, imprisonments and administered by decrees under the state of emergency rule? 
The victim-hero that the JDP is perpetuates the structure of oppression that once abused 
itself for revenge through the institutions that legitimize and secure its own tyranny on 
the pretext of a fight against the adversary now coded as FETÖ.38 Indeed, the JDP even 
advocates for a strong presidency model with expanded power across branches of 
government because of the relentless threat of an amalgamation of enemies of Turkey 
inside and outside: FETÖ, the West, Asad, and the Kurds. The real, the potential, and the 
almost victim, the JDP renders its suffering absolute and its reparation imperative 
through a figuration of an enemy to be vanquished. Now reproduced not only 
discursively but also practically, injury, suffering, and victimization operate as a 
technology of power with the emergence of the enemy, which accounts for the radical 
shift in the mission of the JDP. 
The paradigmatic moment of the JDP’s radical shift towards “the politics of 
ressentiment” was the Gezi Park protests of 2013.39 Just to recap the unfolding of the 
unrest,40 the only and small green space situated in Istanbul’s renowned Taksim Square, 
Gezi Park was a target of a redevelopment plan to build luxury residences and a shopping 
mall in the shape of a resurrected late-Ottoman military barrack. The protests began as a 
                                                
38 FETÖ stands for the Fethullahist Terrorist Organization, a term used by the government designating the 
Gülen Movement as a terrorist organization culpable for the attempted coup of 2016. FETÖ has also 
become the moniker replacing Fethullah Gülen’s name and thus functions as an act to reformat social 
memory by creating a discursive rupture that blots out the previous intimacy between Gülen and the JDP. 
 
39 Brown, “Introduction,” 27. 
 
40 I borrow the following timeline from my article on the protests. See Baran Germen, “Of Parks and 
Hamams,” Assuming Gender 5:1 (2015), 111-137. 
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small-scale local environmentalist resistance with sleep-ins at the park on May 27. At 
dawn on May 30, Turkish riot police made a foray against the Park to oust the civilians 
camping in the park in protest of the government’s enforcement of the park’s demolition. 
The police force, along with a team of construction workers, furtively trapped civilians 
by setting fire to the tents in which they were sleeping. The subsequent public reaction to 
the vicious police crackdown on the peaceful participants was unexpected and 
unprecedented. Many flooded into the park in support of the environmentalists, only to 
face ever-increasing police violence. As the size of the protests grew, so did police 
brutality, which included abusive attacks on civilians with truncheons, tear gas, pepper 
spray, and water cannons. By the last day of May, the park’s boundaries could no longer 
confine the demonstrators. The protests gradually spread nationwide and shook the 
country for about a month with aftershocks that still reverberate today. The protests had 
not taken an anti-government twist until the then prime minister Erdoğan backed the 
municipality against the protesters in the belief that this was an attempt to overthrow his 
government –a possible defensive reflex in the immediate aftermath of the Arab Spring 
that inspirited the revolutionary aspirations of the people in the region. In a backlash 
against the regional democratic ethos with which the Gezi Park protests could connect, 
Erdoğan framed the strife as a conflict between a democratically elected government and 
çapulcular, marauders, as graphed onto each side of the main fissure of Turkish society: 
the modern seculars and the conservative masses. For Erdoğan, the last had become the 
first, and the protesters consisted of the bitter secularists who cannot stomach the rule of a 
conservative government. The ballot box was the site of democracy that rendered the 
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street illegitimate, and the uprising was an effort to realize what they could not in the 
elections. It was thus Erdoğan, the JDP, and its constituents that were actually targeted by 
the protestors illegitimately and illicitly. Justified through an alternative account of 
victimization, state violence came to act as a shield for democracy. 
The Gezi Park protests marks a turning point in the rhetoric of the JDP. 
Victimhood no longer accounted for the past but became a disciplinary instrument within 
the practices of power. The primary example of the new inflection in the JDP’s discourse 
of victimhood indicative of the drastic reorientation of its politics is the so-called Kabataş 
attack that mimics the melodrama of Vurun Kahpeye. The deployment of narratives of 
victimhood may have been instrumental in the rise of Islamic conservatism and its 
politics of ressentiment in Turkey in the new millennium, as the “Kabataş attack” 
exemplifies. But Vurun Kahpeye shows us that melodrama has in fact been undergirding 
the secular imaginary of the nation all along since the birth of the Republic not least 
thanks to its cinematic afterlife. A grand narrative of national genesis rendered mythic as 
the foundational text of the Republic through its successive cinematic interpretations, 
Vurun Kahpeye brings the nation to life through a story of gendered martyrdom by which 
statehood is implicated in victimhood. If a narrative of victimhood is necessary for a state 
to emerge and exist, the female protagonist’s suffering at the hands of religious 
orthodoxy serves to justify the formation of the secular state. 
The Melodramatics of Turkish Modernity investigates melodrama as a political 
technology of affect by focusing on the many media mutations of Vurun Kahpeye, which 
originates in Ottoman-Turkish in the form of a serialization between 1923 and 1924. It is 
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published as a novella in the same script first in 1926 and later again in 1943 as 
transcribed into modern day Turkish. The story is then serially adapted and remade in 
subsequent decades by the popular film industry in 1949, 1964, and 1973. Today, it 
survives idiomatically as a shorthand for unjust victimization describing the lynch 
mentality in the vernacular and popular media. Considering Vurun Kahpeye’s fifty-year 
life span across languages and media, I find the conditions that keep this melodrama 
relatable –in both discursive and emotive senses of the word– worth thinking. Vurun 
Kahpeye’s transmediality first and foremost depends on its remediatability precisely 
ensured by its affective excess that renders its normative project unstable and 
uncontainable. Always in excess of the limits it prescribes itself, melodrama opens itself 
for reinterpretation as demonstrated by many iterations of Vurun Kahpeye. In the western 
tradition, melodrama is understood as a restorative project thanks to the historical roots of 
the form examined in the authoritative study of Peter Brooks.41 In this account, 
melodrama’s emergence as a form is in response to social anxieties about a moral crisis 
in the wake of the French Revolution. Melodrama, in other words, arrives post hoc to 
manage the upheaval for modernity, offering a surrogate secular moral order upon the 
loss of a previous one embodied by the monarchy and the church. Vurun Kahpeye’s 
itineraries demonstrate, however, a different temporality in which melodrama partakes: 
each incarnation to arrive is antecedent to a conflicting project via the interchangeable 
plot lines, as crystallized by the kinship between Vurun Kahpeye and “the Kabataş 
attack.”  
                                                
41 See Peter Brooks, The Melodramatic Imagination, 1995.  
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Thus, offering a melodramatic template viable for the secularist and Islamic 
imaginaries alike, Vurun Kahpeye embodies the shared idiom and imagery of the 
traditionally opposed ideological camps of Turkey around victimhood, most saliently 
evinced in the manipulation of gender in the self-dramatization of the state. The 
Melodramatics of Turkish Modernity illuminates the seminal role the early cinematic 
iterations of Vurun Kahpeye and the cinematic medium itself play in the making of the 
modern, secular subjectivity and public through a configuration of gender in its 
melodrama. The first two adaptations of Vurun Kahpeye promote an idealized female 
subjectivity –the desexualized and dedicated woman of Turkish modernization– as 
opposed to the uncanniness of the veiled woman. Most of all, however, evoking 
sympathy and outrage through a melodramatic identification of victims and perpetrators, 
the mutilated female body becomes a key agent through which a secular public with a 
sensorium very much conditioned for the threats of Islamism is formed –providing the 
aesthetic backbone to the secularist social anxieties and fears about the Islamists that 
were mapped onto gender, as analyzed by Yael Navaro-Yashin, following the 1994 local 
elections resulting in Erdoğan’s mayoralty in İstanbul under the Islamist Refah Partisi 
[Welfare Party] of Erbakan.42 The persistence and recurrence of Vurun Kahpeye’s scene 
of lynching within cultural memory, which takes place on account of the female 
protagonist’s transgression of traditional Islamic wardrobe, feeds the stereotypical social 
fantasies about the Islamists coming after “our women.”  Thus, through a close analysis, I 
demonstrate that the cinematic afterlife of Vurun Kahpeye results in the sedimentation of 
                                                




secular victimhood in the national imaginary and of a secularist paranoia about the pious 
Muslim subject, strikingly without any state support.  
As intimated, The Melodramatics of Modernity privileges the site of cinema as 
one particularly “affective media,” to borrow from Weihong Bao, for melodrama “as a 
manufactured environment enfolding the individual subject, a virtual space (itself highly 
mediated) mediating between the prepersonal and the social.”43 Cinema’s centrality to 
melodrama in Turkey is due to specific historical conditions postponing the emergence of 
a mass readership that in turn advances cinema as one of the primary loci of a mass 
culture for heightening “affect as a shared social space in commercial and political mass 
publics.”44 And yet, the journey of Vurun Kahpeye points to melodrama’s transmediality, 
demanding cinema to be situated within a broad range of aesthetic regimes, media 
technologies, and cultural discourses that participate in the production of an affect of 
victimhood. Thus, as Bao points out, “the affective medium is larger than a singular 
media technology as we conventionally understand it,”45 and The Melodramatics of 
Victimhood takes seriously the historical, aesthetic, institutional, and technological 
discourses and practices that inform cinema. 
Unlike the other cinemas of the global South, especially those in the Middle East, 
Turkish cinema has lacked state funding until very recently. Neither an anti-colonialist 
instrument nor a technology for nationalist modernization, cinema in Turkey, neglected 
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by the state, develops as a makeshift industry in the hands of a number of impresarios. 
Through the case of Vurun Kahpeye, The Melodramatics of Turkish Modernity chronicles 
the institutionalization of a secular and to that extent a statist cinema that becomes the 
main site for the formation of mass publics. This is nowhere more visible than in the 
injury the first Vurun Kahpeye film directed by Ömer Lütfi Akad occasions within the 
Islamist circles, as analyzed in Chapter III.46 The aesthetic history of a cultural 
production that this dissertation provides allows us to see how cinema cultivates 
collective sentiments –namely the secularist paranoia and the resentment of the pious. 
Melodramatic aesthetics then shapes political sensibilities on both the secularist and the 
Islamist camps of Turkish modernity, engendering affects around victimhood, e.g., fear, 
injustice, injury, vengeance, etc. And yet, the lack of state interest in cinema ensures the 
formation of an industry that can accommodate alternative circuits interrupting the 
secularizing drives of cinema. Such is the case when director Halit Refiğ revisits Vurun 
Kahpeye to execute his theories on a national cinema that would inspire an Islamic 
cinema to emerge.47 As Chapter IV discusses, Refiğ’s Vurun Kahpeye is an attempt to 
reconcile Islam and the secular state against the West as the common enemy whose 
popular success does not live up to its stylistic mastery. 
All in all, Vurun Kahpeye represents the first cluster of historical films in which 
the nation imagines itself mostly in the vein of melodrama. In these War of 
Independence-themed films, the Turkish identity originates with the birth of the 
                                                
46 Vurun Kahpeye, dir. by Ömer Lütfi Akad, 1949. 
 
47 Vurun Kahpeye, dir. by Halit Refiğ, 1973. 
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Republic. From mid-60s onwards, popular film industry develops another strand of 
historical fiction that rethink the Turkish identity through a reimagination of historical 
figures in the pre-Republican past. Adapting the comics of mass popularity, the film 
series like Malkoçoglu, Tarkan, Battal Gazi, and Kara Murat Turkify the Ottoman and 
pre-Ottoman past in the genre of action film, and in the case of Tarkan, sometimes with 
fantastic elements. This is the genealogy that we provides the background to the 
contemporary historical dramas that get entangled in the neo-Ottomanist fantasies of the 
state, captivating the imagination of a populace disenchanted with modernity across the 
Middle East, North Africa, Latin America and the Indian Subcontinent. The global 
circulation and popularity of these recent shows across television networks and online 
have as much to do with the growing media industry in Turkey as the governmental 
sponsorship of some of these productions. Thus, the media archeology of Vurun Kahpeye 
that this dissertation performs also puts in perspective the way not only the nation but 
also the state conceives itself through cinema. 
The Melodramatics of Turkish Modernity deploys an archeological method to 
unearth the historical contingencies of the cultural mythology of the female martyr of the 
secular state. As Roland Barthes essentially argues, myths dehistoricize, that is, conceal 
the history of, meanings that are always historically produced.48 The mythification of 
Vurun Kahpeye’s martyrdom narrative congeals in its title’s metamorphosis into an idiom 
designating the unjust treatment of the innocent. The righteousness that the idiom grants 
to its subject rests upon the figuration of a secular gendered subject punished for her 
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fantasized excessiveness. Thus, every time it gets cited, the idiom verbalizes a tension 
between the purportedly progressivist and backward social forces of the nation, namely 
the secular moderns and the religious masses, thereby keeping timeless the myth of 
secular martyrdom within national consciousness in the quotidian. By reading each of its 
media iterations as embedded in its socio-historical context, the following chapters follow 
its affective potency as its melodrama crystalizes in a structure of feeling of secularist 
paranoia  
The Melodramatics of Turkish Modernity historicizes the intermedial itineraries of 
Vurun Kahpeye that reveal Vurun Kahpeye’s mythification as a foundational text for the 
Republic in the national imaginary is predicated upon the eroding of the gender politics 
of Edib’s novella. Chapter II, entitled “Vurun Kahpeye and the Melodrama of Halide 
Edib’s Queer Feminism,” recovers and revises Halide Edib’s feminism through a reading 
that is counterintuitive to Vurun Kahpeye’s reception in the popular imaginary as a 
secularist manifesto. I argue that as a melodrama Vurun Kahpeye affords an effective 
vehicle for Halide Edib’s feminism that defies the demands of both secular modernism 
and Islamic conservatism. Grounded in a neglected dream sequence that stages a lesbian 
kiss, my reading defines Edib’s feminism as queer in its revelation of the opposing 
Islamist and Kemalist projections of the nation state as heteropatriarchal at the moment of 
its foundation. The chapter provides this reading against the backdrop of the history of 
the Ottoman-Turkish women’s movement that originates within the emerging print media 
infrastructure and network in the 19th century. Situating Edib’s feminism in this history, 
Chapter II discusses melodrama as the perfect form to capture Edib’s feminist praxis that 
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lies in the inconsistencies of its discursive and performative articulations. While the 
narrative of victimhood Vurun Kahpeye introduces becomes a metaphor for the 
marginalization of the Ottoman-Turkish feminism within Kemalist modernization, its 
structural melodramatic excess embodies a feminist vision transcending the fractures of 
the nation. 
Chapter III, entitled “Vurun Kahpeye (1949): Cinema and the Infrastructures of 
Secularism,” demonstrates how cinema, during its institutionalization as industry proper, 
mediates the project of secularism strikingly without state ownership or sponsorship by 
providing a history of the 1949 cinematic adaptation of Vurun Kahpeye. Moving away 
from the understanding of secularization as a mode of governmentality, this chapter 
provides a model of secularization grounded in media and affect as rendered available by 
a cinematic infrastructure put together by the co-producers of the film. A novel form of a 
distribution system allows for the film’s mass popularity, introducing Edib’s story to a 
public to which it was otherwise unavailable before. Thus nationally celebrated in 
unprecedented terms, the film occasions many milestones within the history of Turkish 
cinema, paving the way for the emergence of Yeşilçam.49 This chapter, however, turns to 
the injury that the film’s representation of the turbaned subject, hadji, as the treacherous 
villain causes in the pious subjects of the nations within the Islamist circles. Juxtaposing 
the affective reactions that the film engenders in its audience through a media survey, this 
chapter then argues for 1949 as marking the moment of cinema’s emergence as a modern 
                                                
49 Literally translated as The Green Pine, Yeşilçam, named after the street on which the first production 
companies and studios were based, is the metonym that refers to the cinema of Turkey. More specifically, it 
refers to the classical era of this cinema between 1950s and 1970s. 
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medium whose representative force has high stakes for the public it experiences it. While, 
for the first time in the history of Turkish modernity, moving images came to matter and 
became worth fighting for, the history around Vurun Kahpeye plays out the narrative of 
national genesis in which the religiously marked body is deemed improper, unworthy, 
and obsolete with respect to the nation state. 
Chapter IV, “From a Populist-Popular to a National-Popular Aesthetics: The 
Remakes of Vurun Kahpeye in Yeşilçam and Through National Cinema,” approaches 
Halit Refiğ’s Vurun Kahpeye (1973) as an experiment of his theory of National Cinema, 
an anti-Western cinema that would essentially embody and promote the Turkish identity 
within a social realist register. The chapter begins with the 1964 adaptation of Vurun 
Kahpeye by Orhan Aksoy as representative of the prevalent filmmaking practices and 
aesthetics of Turkish cinema Refiğ criticizes in his writings.50 Aksoy’s Vurun Kahpeye 
epitomizes the industrial characteristics of Yeşilçam, a star-driven populist cinema whose 
aesthetics is overdetermined by the market demands mediated by distributors. After a 
reading of Aksoy’s remake as a pompous melodrama responding to the rising tension in 
Cyprus, the chapter proceeds with the examination of Refiğ’s theory. His ideologically 
infused national cinema pursues a national-popular visual grammar within a populist-
popular cinematic culture challenged by the elite-popular propensities under the influence 
of the western art cinema. I situate his discussion of cinema amidst the cultural debates 
around the film industry and its relationship with the state. I then provide a reading of 
Refiğ’s Vurun Kahpeye in light of his theory, arguing that Refiğ reconciles the 
                                                
50 Orhan Aksoy, Vurun Kahpeye, 1964. 
 
 28 
antagonistic elements of the film through the merging of Muslim and Turkish identities. 
Furthermore, Refiğ’s social realist interpretation relocates melodrama, very much like 
Edib only without her feminist critique, in the conflict between the personal and the 
social as conveyed by the theme of the love rendered impossible under the material 
circumstances of the War of Independence. All in all, this chapter demonstrates the 
traveling of the melodramatic affective excess that brings about an unlikely outcome in 
the wake of its iteration. Aksoy’s remake generates Refiğ’s stylistic reconciliatory project 
in Vurun Kahpeye. Despite the latter’s subsequent circulation in the demotic medium of 
TV, Vurun Kahpeye nonetheless emerges as an idiom within popular discourse 
entrenching the political antagonism Refiğ’s project wants to erase. 
Overall, through the examination of Vurun Kahpeye’s itineraries and their social 
life, The Melodramatics of Turkish Modernity offers a media archaeology of melodrama 
as an aesthetics of victimhood –one that accounts for its durability and its efficacy in the 
Middle East as a political machinery of affective excess. The entanglements of aesthetic 
forms, the social impact of cultural systems and networks, and political formations that I 
record in this dissertation allows us to rethink the affective medium of cinema as the 
main site for the formation of mass publics. At this site, Vurun Kahpeye becomes the 
centerpiece in, through, and around which contesting projections of the nation 
dialectically interact with each other generating structures of feeling rooted in 
victimization, suffering, and injury –namely, paranoia and resentment– that characterize 
these publics. Thus, The Melodramatics of Turkish Modernity illustrates that the study of 
melodrama’s role in culture is key to understanding the political efficacy of the affect of 
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victimhood. In bridging aesthetics and politics, my dissertation performs interdisciplinary 
work that recognizes cultural objects and their transmission across time and circulation in 
different media as vital to understanding the mechanisms of modernity in Turkey and, 
potentially, in other Middle Eastern contexts. Consequently, I argue that the waning of 
secular nationalist movements, the global rise of religion, and the turn to populist 
authoritarianism in places like Turkey –so long considered to be a moderately Muslim 
model nation– cannot be fully grasped without studying these aesthetic transformations 





VURUN KAHPEYE AND THE MELODRAMA OF HALIDE EDIB’S QUEER 
FEMINISM 
There is a pivotal moment at the heart of Halide Edib’s story Vurun Kahpeye 
[Strike the Slut],1 an instance of a modernist rupture –of the sort we note, say, in Virginia 
Woolf’s The Voyage Out or E. M. Forster’s A Passage to India– which first arrests the 
linear progression of the narrative, and then throws its story into chaos. This moment 
appears in a dream sequence, an erotic replay of the scene of separation between the 
protagonist Aliye and her fiancé Tosun Pasha: As Tosun leaves Aliye at the door of her 
house to rejoin the National Struggle,2 “his big head,” to Aliye’s excitement, “begins to 
lean on her tiny face.”3 And yet, when Aliye comes to her senses with a cold touch on her 
lips, she realizes that the kiss belongs not to Tosun but instead to that nameless outcast 
                                                
1 Vurun Kahpeye was originally serialized in Ottoman-Turkish in the newspaper Akşam between December 
16, 1923 and January 29, 1924. It was published as a novella in the same script first in 1926 and later again 
in 1943 as transcribed into modern day Turkish. It is worth noting that, in this history of translations, the 
text did not undergo any major changes either in style or in content. My references to the text are from its 
modern Turkish transcription of the 1926 publication. Halide Edib, Vurun Kahpeye, 2015. Vurun Kahpeye 
has not been translated into English. My decision to translate the title as Strike the Slut out of various 
available possibilities is based on two reasons, each accounting for each of my word choice. While Vurun 
can also be rendered as Hit, my selection of Strike is simply due to its alliterative quality. Less subjective of 
a choice, Slut, however, derives from Edib’s own rendering of the word Kahpe in a scene that appears in 
her memoirs in both Turkish and English both penned by herself. Compare Halide Edib, The Turkish 
Ordeal, 207 and Halide Edib Adıvar, Türk’ün Ateşle İmtihanı, 163. This is not to disregard the puzzling 
and significant differences between these two texts, especially the diminishing of Edib’s criticism of 
Mustafa Kemal. Closely examining both ideological and stylistic divergences between the two texts, 
historian Y. Hakan Erdem argues that the translation of The Turkish Ordeal into Türk’ün Ateşle İmtihanı 
was possibly censured without Edib’s control. For Erdem, although Edib is the attributed translator, she 
played a minimal role during the translation after her dictation of the text due to her illness leading to her 
death. Y. Hakan Erdem, Tarih-Lenk. 2008. 
 
2 Millî Mücadele, also referred to as the National Campaign, designated the Turkish War of Independence 
(19 May 1919 – 24 July 1923) fought against the proxies of the Allies after the Ottoman Empire’s defeat in 
World War I.   
 




widow she has encountered in the mosque early on that evening. As though in ecstatic 
trance, while panting and her big eyes strangely twisting, the woman whose “cold and old 
lips” now kiss Aliye begins to repeatedly call her “slut.”4 Scandalized, Aliye wakes up in 
fear and shock only to be further traumatized by the growing uproar signaling the Greek 
campaign in town. As such, the text haphazardly interweaves Aliye’s sexual crisis with 
national crisis. 
The shattering effect of this moment ripples beyond the frame of the story when 
we consider the fact that this scene stages same sex desire, as phantasmagoric and 
ominous as it may be, in a work written about and at the birth of the Republic –being 
published only six months after the end of the Turkish War of Independence. By this, I 
emphasize not so much the contemporaneity of the representation of homosexual desire 
with the newborn nation state as the incongruity of the materialization of non-normative 
desire in a story of national salvation, an out-of-placeness imputed by dismissive critics 
who remain blind to this exceptional instance. In a heterosexual romance set against the 
backdrop of national conflict and nationalist warfare, the flickering of this lesbian kiss 
flashes as jarring, inappropriate, and irrelevant, in short, a queer event par excellence, 
unworthy of mention as a textual aberration even for its literary function as a 
foreshadowing technique within the grand narrative of the story.   
 And yet, despite the critical silence around this moment, I am tempted to consider 
the supposedly marginal dream about female homosexuality as a gateway to a bed of rich 
hermeneutic possibilities, a punctum, as it were, that would complicate the schematically 
                                                
4 Ibid, 89. 
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dichotomous make-up of Vurun Kahpeye, a text far too quickly understood as a 
straightforward exploration of the everlasting conflict between the religious and secular 
bodies of the Turkish nation as early as 1923.5 As Barthes’ imagistic coinage implies, this 
moment, however, sticks out transcending the presumed oppositional structure of the text, 
pointing to a politics beyond the celebratory reception of the text as the manifesto of the 
triumphant secular body of the Turkish nation state. Rather, in my reading, this instance 
intimates an underlying feminist critique that points to the heteropatriarchal nature of not 
only the Islamist imaginary but also the nation-building project of secularist modernism 
at the moment of its realization. Taking the unrealized homosexual dream to the fore of 
my analysis, in this chapter, I will expound Edib’s unacknowledged critical feminist 
vision in Vurun Kahpeye by pursuing the question of what makes this moment an 
(im)possibility, one that can only be conveyed through the structure of excess unique to 
the melodramatic mode. 
 This chapter views the homosexual kiss rendered in the form of a nightmare as the 
symbolic manifestation of the suppression of the homosocial bond Aliye strives to 
establish with the widow through a feminist interpretation of Islam. Insofar as this 
Muslim homosocial alliance is a projection of an “affective community,”6 it embodies all 
the contradictions that feminism poses for the nationalist project as the site of excess. Just 
                                                
5 Punctum, along with studium with which it coexists, defines the constitutive affective element of the 
photographic image. While the latter is the average affect an image produces through a conscious general 
human activity or participation, punctum “is this element which rises from the scene, shoots out of it like an 
arrow, and pierces me… [It] is that accident which pricks me (but also bruises me, is poignant to me).” 
Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida. 26-7. 
 
6 Here, I invoke the title of Leela Gandhi’s study of transnational anticolonial networks of friendship during 




as the way the text renders this kiss and thus this community excessive and unthinkable, 
so too the Kemalist nationalist project renders the pre-Republican stages of Ottoman-
Turkish women’s movement parenthetical.7 Kemalism configures and reproduces for 
itself a narrative of guardianship and genesis through which the legacy of the past is 
selectively distilled from the perspective of the originator-protector.8 As another 
patriarchal political formation, “Kemalism,” to quote Tanıl Bora, “wanted to become the 
founder, regulator, inventor of the liberation of women too.”9 I contend that Vurun 
Kahpeye anticipates the process by which the nation state overrides the contradictory 
desires that historically congeal around women in its own version of women’s movement 
and idealized femininity. Thus, I read Aliye’s narrative of victimhood as an allegory of 
the abjection of the history of the Ottoman-Turkish women’s movement, agency, and 
explorations, struggles and negotiations around the complex question of how to be 
Muslim and modern at once.  
 As time proves, Halide Edib, herself a fervent Ottoman-Turkish feminist, was 
forced to exile by Mustafa Kemal due to her dissentient vocal critique of the new 
Republic in 1926. And yet, my reading of Vurun Kahpeye is not extensively anchored to 
her biography. Instead, taking the cue from Hülya Adak’s recent study on her political 
                                                
7 Generally speaking, Kemalism, which derives from the founder of the Republic Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
(1881-1938), is the founding ideology of the Republic of Turkey. The six foundational principles of 
Kemalism, represented by the six arrows adapted to the flag of the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi [Republican 
People’s Party] (CHP), are republicanism, populism, laicism, reformism, nationalism, and statism. These 
principles are the motor of Turkish modernization that attempts to severe the ties of the Turkish state from 
its Ottoman predecessor to become a part of the Western civilization.  
 






biography,10 I want to take seriously Edib’s versatility as a protean writer publishing 
works in many forms, genres, and mediums by approaching Vurun Kahpeye primarily as 
a melodrama. The portrait Adak draws is not only that of a complex intellectual whose 
thought fluctuates as per the changing social and political conditions in which she lives. It 
is also that of a dramatist who pens the prototypical examples of absurd theater long 
before the term was coined.11 Inspired by this reorientation in Edib scholarship, my 
generic critique of Vurun Kahpeye complicates the standard reception of Edib’s literature 
in general and her undermined national struggle novels and their ideals of femininity by 
turning to the aesthetics of melodrama they deploy. This reading frees the text from a 
kind of “mimetic anxiety”12 prevalent around Edib’s literary work whose primary 
paradigm for evaluation is the extent to which the text mirrors or departs from the 
author’s political self. This vein of literary criticism brought about a typological analysis 
categorizing Edib’s heroines as gendered national bodies. By focusing on the structural 
possibilities and limitations melodrama offers for Edib, I am drawn to explore Vurun 
Kahpeye’s complexities beyond the scope of a typological critique. I find this method 
more productive for the work of a figure like Edib, given the discrepancy between her 
discursive and performative self-making projects. As her life affirms, Edib’s feminist 
agency exceeds the limits prescribed by her feminist discourse. Thus, I want to think of 
the literary field, more specifically, the world of fiction, especially melodrama, as the 
playground for this tension underlying Edib’s feminism.      
                                                
10 Hülya Adak, Halide Edib ve Siyasal Şiddet, 2016. 
 
11 Ibid., 151-162. 
 
12 Sangita Gopal, “Bourgeois Extreme: Genre and Global Flows,” 2018. 
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With this plan in mind, I will divide this chapter into three sections. In the first 
section, I will provide the historical trajectory within which the Ottoman-Turkish 
women’s movement came to fruition. Here, my emphasis will be twofold: First, I will 
deliver the stages of this movement as framed by larger socio-political transformations 
within which the women question emerges. Then, I will link this movement to the 
emergence of a media infrastructure and print culture out of which it grew. I will relay 
the process in which women took so enthusiastically to print because it allowed them 
access to a public sphere prior to and in preparation for their actual physical movement 
into it. In the next section, I will present Halide Edib as the product of this history as 
demonstrated by her feminist negotiations of Islam and secular modernity. Then, drawing 
attention to the distinction between fictional and nonfictional forms of writing through 
which Ottoman-Turkish feminist movement came into being, I will describe a model of 
intimacy between literary forms, gender performance, and political activism conducive 
for a melodramatic reading of Vurun Kahpeye. In the final section, I will provide a 
reading of Vurun Kahpeye as a text that exemplifies melodrama as a political technology 
effectively mediating Edib’s feminist vision that resists political Islam and Kemalist 
secularism.  
 
The Ottoman-Turkish Women’s Movement 
We could analyze the Ottoman-Turkish women’s movement along an axis of 
modernization that extends from the Tanzimat [Reorganization] reforms (1839-1876), 
through Abdülhamid II’s rule between the two Meşrutiyet [Constitutionalist] Eras (1876 
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and 1908) and the II. Meşrutiyet [Constitutionalist] Era (1908-1918), to the Turkish 
national movement and the Republican Era (1918-1935)13. In the first three stages of this 
axis, modernization operates as an apparatus for different political projects whose 
common goal is to halt the Empire from its decline through a series of legal, institutional, 
and social reforms. After World War I, however, modernization itself takes the shape of a 
dispositif distributed through the institutions and structures that would establish and 
organize the Turkish state. This is the trajectory in which an Islamic multinational empire 
dissolves into a secular nation state, a process that has a huge bearing on the handling of 
the woman question. As Deniz Kandiyoti suggests, this trajectory entailed “a progressive 
distancing from Islam as the only form of legitimate discourse on women's emancipation, 
in favour of a cultural nationalism appropriating such emancipation as an indigenous 
pattern.”14 Thus, the woman question cannot be divorced from the historical conditions 
within which Turkish nationalism developed, and I will explore below the central role 
that media come to assume in this process.   
 The Ottoman-Turkish women’s movement took place within the context of a 
modernization project geared to address a political urgency, namely the waning of the 
Ottoman Empire fueled both by economic capitulations given to Western powers and the 
                                                
13 This historical trajectory is clearly in conversation with Yaprak Zihnioğlu’s periodization of the 
Ottoman-Turkish women’s movement in her meticulous study on Nezihe Muhittin and Ottoman-Turkish 
feminism. Zihnioğlu defines the period between 1869 and 1935 as the first wave of feminism within the 
Ottoman-Turkish feminist movement, and she divides it into three periods: “Early Ottoman Women 
Movement (1868-1908),” “The Ottoman Feminism of the II Constitutionalist Era (1908-1922),” and “First 
Wave of Republican Feminism (1923-1935)”. While I subscribe to Zihnioğlu’s delineation and the 
periodization of the first wave feminism, I also recognize the need to highlight the political contexts that 
shape Edib’s feminism. Hence, my predilection to situate women’s movement within the changing political 
frameworks of the era. Yaprak Zihnioğlu, Kadınsız İnkılap, 21. 
 




separationist movements within the ethnically heterogenous territories of the Empire. As 
modernist reformers sought ways to reverse imperial decline, gender too emerged as a 
site in need of reformation.15 Both men and women demanded the social advancement of 
gender on the basis of the amelioration of the condition of the state. The emphasis on 
kadınlık mefkuresi [womanhood ideal] expressing self and public recognition of women’s 
worth in the writings by women in the late Tanzimat period, for instance, partakes in the 
same vocabulary of progress and enlightenment defining for national ideal. And yet, the 
discourse around womanhood is far from unified, for the woman question emerges as a 
stage on which debates around tradition and modernity get played out. As modernization 
meant westernization, the anxieties about the scope and extent of westernization weighed 
heavily on the woman question for both men and the women throughout the history of 
Ottoman-Turkish modernization both in the Empire and in the Republic.  
 Feminist scholarship on the Middle East, however, has long cautioned against 
taking such reified binary categories as East/West and traditional/modern for granted.16 
Rather, as is the case in various contexts, gender here too provides the discursive site in 
which these categories get perpetually defined, contested, and negotiated. As Kandiyoti 
reminds, the West with its distinct politico-philosophical traditions was never a 
monolithic entity for Ottomans.17 More significantly, the West was subject to processes 
                                                
15 Kandiyoti notes that discourses on and efforts of reforming or remaking women were in fact about “the 
wholesale refashioning of gender and gender relations.” Deniz Kandiyoti, “Some Awkward Questions,” 
Remaking Women, 280. 
 
16 See, for instance, Lila Abu-Lughod, Remaking Women, 1998. 
 




of selectivity “in response to local dilemmas that became the subject of political 
contestations” amongst factions with diverse visions of an ideal society.18 By the same 
token, Ottoman and Turkish reformers looked for native roots for their ideals while 
making references to “a ‘tradition’ that better approximates their modernist vision than do 
the current arrangements in their societies.”19 A case in point, as Kandiyoti also points 
out, is the primary theorist of Turkish nationalism Ziya Gökalp for whom the pre-Islamic 
Turkish past already encompassed the democratic ideals of Turkish nationalism, 
including feminism, that were degenerated by Arab and Persian influences.20 Thus, the 
women question and the shifting gender relations are conditioned by the constructionist 
and deconstructionist discourses and attitudes of the modernist reformers vis-à-vis the 
West and an assumed, an imagined, and even an idealized past that afford contested and 
conflicting definitions of the modern.  
 The ambivalence around women and gender cathected by modernization rife with 
struggles, negotiations, and contestations necessitates reassessing the understanding of 
Ottoman-Turkish modernization in terms of imitation or adaption. Drawing attention to 
the inadequacy of the theories of Turkish modernization in these terms, Şerif Mardin 
invites us to consider modernization as a mode of looking at “ourselves” through the gaze 
of the other.21 Mardin’s bifurcation of the self through a disembodied gaze finds an even 
                                                
18 Ibid. 
 








more complex articulation in Meltem Ahıskalı’s notion of Occidentalism that centers on 
this fantasized Western gaze. According to Ahıskalı, Occidentalism describes “the set of 
practices and arrangements justified in and against the imagined idea of ‘the West’ in the 
non-West.”22 It “refers to a field of social imagination through which those in power 
consume and reproduce the projection of ‘the West’ to negotiate and consolidate their 
hegemony in line with their pragmatic interests.”23 Reimagined, reinterpreted and 
moderated, the West mediates the project of modernization while serving as a 
disciplinary tool. An identification with this phantasmagoric West suggests a 
displacement of the threatening influence of the West. As Ahıskalı discusses, the ruling 
elites invested in Republican modernization “by assuming a guardian role that 
modernizes but at the same time protects the ‘less civilized’ and ‘infantile’ population 
from the ‘dangers of too much Westernization’.”24 
We observe a similar process within the Ottoman modernization with respect to 
the situation of women in society. For the reformers of the period, the danger of too much 
Westernization loomed most dangerously around women who were viewed as the 
custodians of traditional morality. The ethos of modernization undeniably granted a 
public voice and a space for social activity for women of the Empire, but such gestures 
were always attended to with a great anxiety and never occurred at the same pace as 
institutional reforms. A perfect example of this is the continued maintenance of the 
                                                
22 Meltem Ahıska, “Occidentalism: The Historical Fantasy of the Modern,” South Atlantic Quarterly 102, 







Sharia-based civil code of the Empire, which stayed in effect for three years after the 
foundation of the Republic, after which it was replaced by the adaption of the Swiss civil 
code. To sum up then, the modernization project up unto the formation of the Republic 
and even beyond that remained hesitant and uncertain with regard to the condition of 
women and gender. The woman’s movement was thus shaped by this foundational 
anxiety surrounding gendered modernization, and in what follows, I will briefly delineate 
the vicissitudes of the women’s movement in each of the above-mentioned periods. I will 
later trace the meanderings of Edib’s feminist thought in light of this history that frames 
the various stages of her feminism. Edib’s feminism carry the legacy of this history, 
especially with regards to her negotiations of such categories as traditional/modern, 
Eastern/Western, and Islam/secularism. Because Edib’s ever-changing political 
affiliations largely determine her approach to feminism, describing the melodramatic 
turns and twists that Edib’s politics takes is essential to understand the development of 
her feminism. 
 
The Tanzimat Era (1838-1876) 
As the name suggests, the Tanzimat Era encompasses a series of reforms that aim 
to reorganize imperial governance at the hands of a new generation of Westernized 
bureaucrats, beginning with a set of pragmatic applications in the early 1800s and 
gradually turning into a constitutionalist and thus anti-monarchic movement towards the 
end of the century. This period produces Ottomanism as an ideology in response to the 
constant declining of the Empire and a concomitant attempt to retain its existing 
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territories. Committed to the idea of the Empire, the reformists of the era invented 
“Ottoman” as a political identity.25 In this regard, the Edict of Gülhane (1838)26 promises 
equity amongst the Ottomans, i.e., all the subjects of the Empire irrespective of their 
religion. The Reform Edict of 1859, is the first official document to use the term 
“citizen”27 and it goes on to fulfill the promises of the Gülhane Edict by implementing 
laws that ensure this equity. Such bureaucratic and administrative changes point to a 
radical rupture in the long-established system of the Ottoman state apparatus, as concepts 
integral to modern political thought gradually enter into the social lexicon of the Empire.  
We can read this rupture within two headings: democratization and secularization. 
Firstly, the ideology of Ottomanism overrules the ruler and subject divide and the 
compartmentalization of the population into millets –semi-autonomous non-Muslim 
religious communities of the Empire– by ensuring equality before law for all of its 
citizens.28 As Mardin suggests, in this era, “a type of democracy emerges prior to the 
Republic.”29 Indeed, such notions as justice, equality, and citizenry point to the 
emergence of a democratic polity in the Empire’s legal lexicon, intellectual world, and 
social life. Furthermore, the democratization of the social field occurs within a secular 
                                                
25 Mehmet Ö. Alkan, “Resmi İdeolojinin Doğuşu ve Evrimi Üzerine Bir Deneme,” Modern Türkiye’de 
Siyasi Düşünce, 385. 
 
26 Selçuk Akşin Somel refers to this edict as the Magna Carta of the Ottoman modernity. Selçuk Akşin 
Somel, “Osmanlı Reform Çağında Osmanlıcılık Düşüncesi (1839-1913), Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi 
Düşünce, 93. 
 
27 Ibid., 96. 
 
28 Ibid., 97. 
 




framework: Ottoman identity gets defined not through a loyalty to religion but legal 
criteria outside of religion. As Somel argues, Ottomanism removes of inter-millet 
differences, bringing about a unison around a central point of loyalty and the 
development of a social identity outside religion.30 
 The Tanzimat was spearheaded by a reactionary group of elite administrators, 
otherwise known as the Young Ottomans [Yeni Osmanlılar], in response to the exposure 
and the effects of the extreme Westernization of the Ottoman bureaucracy. Inspired by 
the ideas of the French Revolution such as liberalism, the Young Ottomans themselves 
believed in the urgency of institutional changes, as evinced in their relentless push for a 
constitution, in order to prevent the separationist movements within the Empire and to 
restore the Empire to its glory. And yet, they were as much concerned and adamant about 
keeping intact and upholding the Islamic state. Thus, their reformism was both 
circumscribed and empowered by an Islamic discourse reshaped by them. Mardin’s 
authoritative monograph on Young Ottomans paints the picture of a diverse collective 
torn across the divisions of the East/the West and the past/the future that they try to 
negotiate by a commitment to the notion of progress derived from the “material advances 
of Europe” on the one hand and to the nostalgia for “the harmoniousness of an imaginary, 
ideal, Islamic state.”31 Elsewhere, Mardin reflects on the understanding of the Tanzimat 
as the period of the “new:” the emergence of new institutions and discourses never meant 
                                                
30 Somel, “Osmanlıcılık Düşüncesi,” 102. 
 
31 Şerif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought, 402. 
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a rejection of the past or of tradition. 32 On the contrary, this was a paradoxical period 
“that combined within itself the elements of modernity and tradition.”33 As the Young 
Ottomans leaders turned to the West and Islam, they reflected on, discussed, and drew the 
lines of the changes they were ready to promote, to follow Jale Parla, “within a 
worldview hegemonized by the Ottoman norms and culture,” 34 all the while redefining 
and transforming what the West and Islam meant. 
 Perhaps one of the most critical developments of this era is the establishment of a 
new media network in which the Tanzimat thinkers functioned as buffers facilitating this 
process of appropriation. It is in this era that we can speak of the growth of print 
capitalism proper for the first time in the Empire. The Tanzimat thinkers exchanged, 
discussed, but also disseminated their ideas across an emerging media infrastructure that 
presupposes a community to and about which they spoke. Terms like hey’et-i ictimaiye 
and hey’et-i mecmua, terms equivalent to the French société, began to emerge in the 
writings of this era, signifying the first instantiation of an imagined collective identity.35 
The most significant channel in the making of this prototypical understanding of a civil 
society was Ibrahim Şinasi’s newspaper Tasvir-i Efkar (Illustration of Ideas) that began 
to be published in 1862. Using a simplified Turkish, and circulating among a readership 
of 2000-3000, the paper became the primary vehicle for the Young Ottomans in the 
                                                
32 This is in reference to the yeni of Yeni Osmanlılar, the Turkish wording of the Young Ottomans. Mardin, 
“Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesi,” 43. 
 
33 Ibid., 51. 
 
34 Jale Parla, “Tanzimat Edebiyatında Siyasi Fikirler,” Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce, 223.  
 




dissemination and communication of Tanzimat ideas.36  
In addition to the press, the thinkers of the Tanzimat Era resorted to literature to 
express their views, and to that extent the literary field became a political platform –a 
development that was especially significant, as we shall see, for the women’s movement. 
As Parla notes, it is not merely that the main focus of Tanzimat literature is politics, but 
that this literature is almost political to a degree that we might call non-literature.37 In 
Cemil Koçak’s words, “the press, along with any literary or non-literary style that could 
address the public, provided a field and an opportunity for the thinkers of this era to 
declare their political ideas.”38 The intimacy and overlap between what we might 
conventionally view as the press or news media and the literary domain is a notable 
aspect of the media world of nineteenth century Turkey and as such is fully entangled 
with the reformist project.  
 This was the social framework in which the Ottoman-Turkish women’s 
movement had its roots. The woman question appears as a site where the reformist and 
the conservative tendencies of Tanzimat collided. As Kandiyoti makes clear, “the first 
outspoken would-be reformers of women's condition were not the Tanzimat Westernists, 
but the Young Ottomans, whose position could best be defined as a modernist 
Islamism.”39 The Young Ottomans justified their demands for the betterment of women 
                                                
36 Mardin, “Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesi,” 45. 
 
37 Parla, “Tanzimat Edebiyatında Siyasi Fikirler,” 223. 
 
38 Cemil Koçak, “Yeni Osmanlılar ve Birinci Meşrutiyet,” Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce, 78-9. 
 




for the sake of society with an eye to tenets of Islam. The condition of women was 
debated mainly within this religious framework as women began to appear as objects of 
social discourse in the media world of the era.  
For these male thinkers of the period, the woman question emerged primarily in 
the context of the institution of marriage, an institution that was in need of modernization. 
In the literature of the period, topics like the styles of marriage, attitude towards women, 
the institution of concubinary are selected as social issues to be criticized.40 Concomitant 
with this progressive discourse around social relations between genders is a heightened 
anxiety about the role of women in the family. Serpil Sancar notes, for instance, the 
parallelism between a strong home and a strong nation already in the writings of Namık 
Kemal (1840-1888), one of the most inspirational Young Ottomans for Turkish 
nationalism.41 This comparison designates women as the central nexus connecting the 
family unit and the Empire. Consequently, the period bears witness to a cultivation of an 
epistemology around motherhood to which both men and women subscribe for the 
betterment of the family and thus the nation. In the following periods, women would 
demand, and justify their demands for, social progress, the right to education, as mothers.  
Nicole Van Os understands this early phase of Ottoman Muslim women’s 
movement mainly in terms of a “familial feminism.”42 This feminism conforms to the 
                                                
40 One routinely cited paradigmatic example is İbrahim Şinasi’s Şair Evlenmesi, the first modern Turkish 
play written in Turkish in 1859, which criticized in its comedic form the practice of arranged marriage. 
İbrahim Şinasi, The Wedding of a Poet, 1981. 
    
41 Serpil Sancar, Türk Modernleşmesinin Cinsiyeti, 86. 
 




roles of women within the existing gender regime without challenging the public private 
divide that governs the lives of these women. While this may be true to a large extent, 
educational reforms for women paved the way for women’s participation in professional 
life. Despite the modesty of legislative reforms, Kandiyoti highlights the variety of 
schools opened for the education of women “beyond the barest rudiments of religious 
instruction at the primary level.”43 Another noteworthy phenomenon is the participation 
of women in the making of the civil society in the world of letters. By sharing their 
opinions in newspaper, journals, and magazines, women were able to start breaking down 
the public private division at least via print. One of the pioneering women writers and 
putatively the first Ottoman woman novelist, Fatma Aliye, for instance, gives the 
definition of a “good Muslim-good mother-good wife” in her work, 44 a project that she 
continues to practice in the following period with the culmination of her manifesto-like 
treatise Nisvân-ı İslâm [Women of Islam].45 Aliye, in her novels, “tries to describe the 
respectable position of woman,” and accordingly, “created characters that defended 
monogamy and the right to rebel against male infidelity,”46 always from Islamic 
perspective. The publication of the first journal for women, Terakki-i Muhadderat 
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[Progress of the Virtuous Women] in 1869, testifies to the recognition of women as 
members of civil society. Similar to Fatma Aliye’s project, the writings in the journal 
defend the congruence of women’s rights and Islam.47 
Overall, before the increasing nationalist, Westernization, and secularist 
movements and currents of following eras, the Tanzimat period set Islam as the earliest 
paradigm in reference to which critiques of women’s condition could be articulated. Far 
from doing away with Islam in favor of modern ways, both men and women of this 
period intimately and seriously engaged with Islam. While such negotiations indeed 
tested the limits of and at times pushed back against the religious norms of the time, these 
conservative reformists nonetheless strived to legitimize their vision for progress as 
compatible and harmonious with religious dictates. It was this part of the history of the 
Ottoman-Turkish women’s movement that would get abandoned in the Republican 
narratives of feminism. As I anticipated earlier, the modernist Islamist feminism of this 
era would take a very different form in Edib, as it haunts, across time, the present in the 
form of the nightmare of a lesbian kiss the present. It is the melodramatic form that 
functions as the technology of excess for expressing a supposed political contradiction –
Islamist feminism– in Vurun Kahpeye. 
 
The Abdülhamid II Rule (1876-1908) 
The Young Ottomans would realize their goal of political reform by bringing 
Abdülhamid II to power on the condition of the adoption of a constitution and declaration 
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of constitutional monarchism. The first constitution of the Ottoman Empire, Kanun-i 
Esasi [The Fundamental Law] was promulgated on December 23, 1876, and the first 
Ottoman parliament, Meclis-i Umumi [General Assembly] convened on March 19, 1877 
after the first general elections of the Empire in that year. What would come to be known 
as the First Constitutional Era, however, would not last long. Abdülhamid closed the 
parliament and suspended the constitution on account of the social unrest engendered by 
the Russo-Turkish War (1877-8). The devastating loss in the war resulted in the loss of 
the majority of the European lands of the Empire as well as further capitulations given to 
Western powers. Abdülhamid addressed this moment of crisis with an authoritarian rule. 
The experience of constitutional monarchism would be short-lived, ending with the 
absolute power of Abdülhamid who reclaimed his sole position of loyalty as the Sultan of 
the Empire and the Caliph of Islam.48  
Modern historiography following the Abdülhamid Era has since given the name 
istibdad [despotism, tyranny] to the period. While Abdülhamid imposed absolute 
prohibition on political expression and organization supported by a surveillance 
infrastructure, as routinely noted by many scholars, he nonetheless carried on the project 
of modernization of the Tanzimat. Orhan Koloğlu proposes that Abdülhamid was a man 
of Tanzimat and indeed an Ottomanist, one who professed a traditionalist version of 
modernization, as, in Koloğlu’s words, “a proponent of restoration through reform.”49 
What distinguishes him from the Young Ottomans is his refusal of constitutionalist 
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liberalism in favor of the Islamic law. Abdülhamid resorted to Islam in order to keep the 
empire together through the restoration of his power as the Sultan. It is in this period that 
Islamism, in addition to the Ottomanism of the Tanzimat, emerges as an ideology, one 
that was expected to provide the long needed political and social unity to the Empire.  
 As a pragmatist and modernist autocrat, Abdülhamid valued science and 
education in his belief in progression. A significant transformation that the Tanzimat 
enabled was the removal of the institution of education from the monopoly of a religious 
authority.50 The Tanzimat reformers saw education as a vehicle to cultivate a 
consciousness of Ottoman citizenship. Girls of the Empire were given the chance to 
attend schools, learn reading, arts, and skills as citizens of the Empire. Similarly, 
Abdülhamid too understood the significance of education, using it “as an institution that 
would allow absolute monarchy to reproduce itself.”51 No wonder then it was under his 
rule that the greatest numbers of schools were opened in the history of the Empire. As the 
official ideology and history of the Empire were systematized and institutionalized 
through education, religious courses and service were rendered obligatory in schools. 
Abdülhamid promoted himself as the Caliph of Islam meriting unconditional loyalty, and 
to this end, the independent institutions of Islam, were replaced by an official Islam 
reproduced at the university under the complete control of the state and the Sultan.52 The 
severing of Islam from the hands of such autonomous institutions as the ulema points to 
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the shifting notion of Islam within the singularity of the Ottoman modernity with effects 
reaching into contemporary Turkey.53 As Deringil’s analysis demonstrates, the Islamic 
conservatism of Sultan Abdülhamid II was grounded in a state-centered and subsumed 
Islam that significantly lost its autonomy.54 Likewise, Mardin also notes that de-linking 
the discourse of Islamic theology gradually gave way to a populist Islamic voice that saw 
the seeds of political Islam.55 
Despite increased level of policing of women’s activities and wardrobe, 56 the 
growth of women’s print culture continues.57 If Tanzimat provided the forum for the 
women question around which mostly the reformist men and small number of elite 
women of the era converged, we discern the democratization of this field as more non-
elite women began to actively participate in the conversation of the topic through the 
press and literature that reached to a wider readership across the empire.58 Claiming a 
voice in the general public through writing, women of the era tried to prove their self-
worth and worth for society at large. As might be expected, women’s publications 
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inevitably reflect the effects of the spirit of the autocratic Islamicization distinguishing 
the Hamidian epoch. In line with the ethos of the era, Islam yields a recourse for 
arguments for women’s (self-)worth. Zihnioğlu, for instance, takes note of the figuration 
of the woman of Islam within Fatma Aliye’s writing, a virtuous femininity that embodies 
“an enlightened/progressive Islamic tradition/culture.”59 In the women writings of the era, 
women were donned with such qualities as “virtue, chastity, and high morality” with an 
Islamic hue.60 In this regard, we could argue that the project of Tanzimat, the 
reconciliation of modernity/West and tradition/Islam, continues to animate the self-
conceptualization of women with a reinforced Islamist substratum.  
 An important print archive that sheds light on women’s activity in press from the 
era is Hanımlara Mahsus Gazete [Journal Special to Ladies], published between 1895 
and 1908 for 614 issues as the longest running women’s journal to this day in the 
Ottoman-Turkish national history. The journal had the support of women from various 
backgrounds and covered topics ranging from “women’s issues, family, society, business 
life, educations, health, fashion,” informing its readers on women’s rights and 
movements across the world and in the West.61 In its first issue, the goal of the journal is 
stated as twofold: “to serve in every way to expand the knowledge and raise the 
consciousness of our women” as well as “to showcase Ottoman women’s natural 
                                                








abilities.”62 Recognizing women as “mothers of humanity,” it draws an explicit parallel 
between women’s situation and that of the nation because their schooling and education 
ensures the state of happiness of society in the future.”63 Thus, maternity continues to be 
the principle rationale for the calls and demands for the education of women within a 
conservative framework. As Efi Kanner puts it, “[Hanımlara Mahsus Gazete] attempted 
to frame the social debate on gender relationships within certain limits that would be 
acceptable to the imperial authority.”64 Under a despotic regime, the journal embraced the 
ideology of the theocratic Ottoman monarchy, its writers expressing their loyalty to 
Abdülhamid and support for his reforms towards women’s education,65 as demonstrated 
in the editorial of the first issue of the journal.  
A commonly held view is that the journal participates in the making of good 
Muslim Ottoman wives and mothers. Kanner, for instance, designates the journal’s 
feminism as “moderate” rooted in the “[d]efense of Islamic imperial values” that 
arguably characterizes the feminist discourse of this period.66 Significantly, this discourse 
develops within an anti-Western rhetoric that idealizes the moral superiority of Islamic 
civilization. From the appearance of the news of Western women’s progress on the 
journal’s pages, one could sense the process of selection being in effect in women’s 
relationship to the West in forging, in Frierson’s words, “a patriotic identity for women in 
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their domestication and mastery of the foreign.”67 In this respect, for Muslim Ottoman 
woman, the western woman emerges as the referential other, one of the most salient 
expressions of which can be seen in Fatma Aliye’s Nisvân-ı İslâm.68 As Frierson goes on 
to suggest, “[t]he women’s press shows how the aims of encouraging motherly, wifely, 
and religious virtues expanded into the far more ideologically charged enterprise of 
redefining Ottoman womanhood for a consciously modernizing age.”69 
 Noteworthy here then is how quickly and thoroughly the women’s movement 
adapted to the shifting political conditions when expressing their progressive demands, as 
it got absorbed by and spoken through an expanding print culture. As a result, Hanımlara 
Mahsus Gazete was able to expose the significance of gendered modes of everyday life 
and women’s social potential, cultivating in women the belief and aspiration that they 
could be successful in various aspects of social life.70 More significantly, as women 
began to actively take advantage of the media infrastructure to debate and delineate the 
terms of their activism, they began to establish a women’s print tradition by which 
“feminism’s ideological and intellectual foundations were laid.”71 The materialization of 
a conceptual vocabulary indicative of a common and shared life amongst reformist 
women attests to the fact that the Hamidian Era represents a watershed moment in the 
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Ottoman women’s movement.72 As we have seen above, media’s political and pedagogic 
capabilities were at the forefront of Ottoman reformism, and the drive to modernization 
cannot be imagined apart from this kind of communicative modernity embraced by 
various factions of reformers including women.  
 
The II. Meşrutiyet Era (1908-1918) 
 The turbulent Second Constitutionalist Era originated with the Young Turk 
Revolution, a military uprising that spread from the periphery, the Balkan provinces, into 
the center of the Empire. The Ottomanist Young Turks, organized secretly under a 
committee called Ittihat ve Terakki [Committee of Union and Progress] (CUP) against the 
despotism of the Sultan, forced Abdülhamid II to restore the constitution, declaring 
hürriyet [freedom] on 23 July 1908. In less than five months into CUP’s victory in the 
general elections, the coup of the Young Turks produced its countercoup in support of the 
Sultan by conservative reactionaries on 13 April 1909. The countercoup was suppressed 
eleven days later by Harekat Ordusu [the Army of Movement] from Thessaloniki in an 
event known as 31 March incident, as a result of which Sultan Abdülhamid was deposed 
and his brother Mehmet V was put on the throne. While the ensuing constitutional 
changes ensured the independence of the parliament from the Sultan’s reach, CPU did not 
hold complete power due to internal conflicts within the party and to the strong 
opposition of the rival party Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası [Freedom and Accord Party] 
(FAP). In the coup of 1913, CUP would overthrow the Grand Vizier of FAP government 
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in what is known as the Raid on the Sublime Port, which allowed CUP to hold absolute 
power until the end of World War in 1918 when the party disbanded itself.73 
 The chronology of these events provides the framework for the conditions within 
which Turkish nationalism increasingly soared in the empire especially after the loss in 
the Balkan Wars and formed the basis of Republican nationalism. The celebration of the 
enactment of the constitution as freedom against the tyranny of Abdülhamid, the fear and 
demonization of the insurgence of sharia supporters as backwards, and the anti-dhimmi 
(anti-non-Muslim) ethos following the Balkan Wars anticipate the revolutionary, secular, 
and ethnocentric tendencies of the military-dominant Republican nationalism of the next 
period. It is essential to note, however, that in this era, Turkish nationalism conjoins 
Ottomanism and Islamism as the last ideological resort to save a flagging empire to no 
avail. Kerem Ünüvar therefore argues that CUP’s ideology oscillates between 
Ottomanism –especially in the spirit of hürriyet during the early days of the constitution– 
and Islamism to consolidate and mobilize the Muslim peoples of the Empire, and yet also 
implements nationalist policies from the beginning of its absolute regime in 1913 and  
onwards.74 The growing nationalism from this point on accelerated by World War I 
horrendously leads up to the Armenian Genocide of 1915 organized and executed by the 
CUP. As argued by Masami Arai, by the end of the war, the available strands of Turkish 
nationalism of the era –the one that dreams of an Ottoman nation and the other that 
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dreams of a pan-Turkish nation independent of Russia– fail.75 However, the nationalism 
of the era paves the way for the Republican nationalism by activating the long-lost 
national consciousness of the Ottoman Turks and Turkish pride. 
 The exchange of power between the Sultan and the CUP meant the shifting 
ideological reconfiguration of the state through the ongoing process of modernization. 
Key to this transfer of power was redefinition of sovereign power which was no longer 
held by the Sultan; rather, the dedication and loyalty of the subjects –now citizens–76 was 
to be directed towards vatan [patria], nation, and state.77 The social and legal reforms of 
this era aim to accord sacredness to these and such notions as “constitution, parliament, 
legislation, court, [and] citizen” that were in disuse in the Hamidian era,78 but now began 
to be widely disseminated, constituting the novel values of the public domain. Foremost 
among these reforms is the freedom of the press enabling what Üstel designates as “the 
civilization of politics,” 79 forging a new public sphere for a participatory political culture. 
The CUP gives utmost attention to education in the making of this sphere through 
indoctrination as education becomes not only the state’s but also the party’s ideological 
apparatus. Both in the press and in schools, for instance, Abdülhamid’s regime was 
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registered as despotism against which the people stood up in the Young Turk 
Revolution.80 Similarly, the counter-revolution that was quelled with the 31 March 
Incident was framed as both backward and anti-people.81 In the meantime, the move 
towards secularization in the previous era –secularization as understood to be the state’s 
control of religion– continues.82   
 This period bore witness to the first serious attempts of integration of women into 
public life within the secular-nationalist framework. In its earlier days, the CUP met the 
demands of women for public visibility mostly through educational reforms. For 
instance, elementary education became mandatory for girls once the primary and middle 
schools were integrated, and teacher schools even in higher education for women were 
opened. 83 Women therefore women emerge into the workforce as teachers in 
concentrated numbers. Despite these fundamental reforms in education, however, the 
civil code remained within the weakened sway of sharia law. While women’s right to 
divorce was expanded, polygamy, though largely disdained as an institution and rarely 
exercised in practice, still remained legal for men,84 indicating the heightened level of 
anxiety about traditionally defined gender hierarchies. 
The spirit of freedom in the early days of the restoration of the constitution 
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encouraged women to vocalize their demands –both existing and new– more robustly. In 
a sense, it is arguable that women began to form a counterpublic in the medium of print 
for the first time from the heyday of the 1908 revolution onward,85 developing a language 
and an imaginary that challenge more explicitly the hegemonic patriarchal norms by 
deploying the very terms patriarchy establishes its hegemony. A case in point is the 
frequent citation of kadın inkılabı [women’s revolution] used to express the radical 
aspirations of women in a variety of women’s periodicals. The conservatism of the 
previous era as epitomized by Hanımlara Mahsus Gazete yields to a more liberal 
discourse that, as Kanner suggests, “argued for women’s education and employment on 
equal terms with men, improvement of their legal status in the family and even the 
abolition of the veil” with a renewed attitude to the foreign other, including the 
suffragettes.86 Despite the fusion between Turkish nationalism and feminist movement, 
the rhetoric of kadın inkılabı afforded Turkish Muslim women to view themselves as 
related to non-Muslim women both in and outside the imperial boundaries.87 Clearly, the 
liberal atmosphere of the Constitutional Era presented the context for women to imagine 
and create a different world through which they recalibrated their relationship with both 
men and women. In the more than two hundred issues of the journal Kadınlar Dünyası 
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[World of Women] (1913-21), we catch many glimpses of this desire to create a new 
world for women.88 Openly embracing the term feminizm [feminism], the journal 
emerged as the most powerful representative of women pushing forward a feminist 
agenda, using the very concepts –liberty, equality and progress– through which the CUP 
had legitimized itself. However, they applied these terms to mount a sustained challenge 
to patriarchal norms within existing social, legal, and political contexts. Writing in 
women’s journals as well as daily newspapers, women appeared as active agents shaping 
the public discourse while persistently demanding rights that would allow their social 
integration into public life.   
Public debates around “the woman question” and women’s subsequent 
participation in defining what gendered modernization would look like had been largely 
confined to print culture. However, one of the most distinctive phenomena of this period 
in the context of the Ottoman women’s movement was the establishment of social 
organizations formed by women ranging from philanthropic to feminist ones that gave 
women the means to restructure gender roles and relations within Ottoman society. 
Osmanlı Müdafaa-i Hukuk-i Nisvan Cemiyeti [“Ottoman Society for the Defense of 
Women’s Rights”], the official organ of which was World of Women, was the most 
influential amongst them for women’s movement of this period. Founded in 1913, the 
society’s goal was to “realize the integration of women into social life [and] the 
participation of women into work force.”89 The society fought against traditions and 
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restrictions that created inequality between men and women and kept women uneducated, 
calling for the reorganization of gender relations within family and society.90 Demanding 
a social transformation, it also insisted on the right to divorce for women, the banning of 
polygamy for men, and discouraging arranged marriages.91 This emphasis on the 
transformation of the familial and social lives of women rather than a quest for political 
rights is a crucial difference between Ottoman feminist movement and its counterpart in 
the West, which at this time was insistently demanding voting rights. Ottoman feminism 
embraced a conscious progressivism rather than the radicalism that characterized the 
Suffragettes, for instance. 
Through these journals and organizations, Ottoman women assumed and 
promoted new identities –as writers, thinkers, feminists, editors, printers, social workers, 
teachers, etc.– beyond the roles of mother and wife, a development furthered by the 
socio-historical conditions of the period. Kandiyoti draws attention to the joint effect of 
“the rise of Turkism as a dominant ideology” and “the requirements of a war economy . . 
. on the social and economic policies of the CUP,” which allowed women to emerge into 
workforce in even more diverse positions. The CUP already incorporated women’s 
employment into its agenda for establishing a Muslim middle class, but it was the effect 
of the wars that intensified such mobilization activities. The Balkan Wars and the World 
War I provided a milieu conducive for women to take a more active role in public life 
and break down the separation of spheres of private and public life. With the advent of 
                                                





the Balkan Wars, for example, women began to work alongside men in the Turkish 
nationalist organizations and to get trained to serve as nurses, traversing the homosocial 
division of Ottoman life.92 The loss of male labor during the Great War led to the need 
for the labor of women. During this period, “[t]he growth of female employment did not 
remain confined to white-collar jobs in post offices, banks, municipal services and 
hospitals but involved attempts at wider mobilisation throughout the Anatolian 
provinces,” as women were called upon the workforce as workers.93 A corollary 
development worth mentioning is that women’s emergence into profession made them 
the targets of “first pro-natalist policies of the empire.”94 
To a large extent, the women’s movement folds into and aligns with the thriving 
Turkish nationalist movement of the epoch. This reorientation points to once again the 
versatility of the Ottoman-Turkish movement, proving its artfulness in, to invoke 
Kandiyoti’s acclaimed term, bargaining with patriarchy as per its ever-changing political 
composition. At this juncture, we must take into account the manifestation of the 
distinctions between the first and the second generation participants of the Ottoman-
Turkish women’s movement. In addition to their socio-economic dissimilarities recorded 
by Kanner, we must realize the methodological variations that characterize the respective 
projects of each generation. Clearly, liberal discourses and social activism engendered 
first by the revolution and then the patriotism and the war economy of the constitutional 
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era stand in stark contrast to the calculating Islamic conservatism of the previous period, 
a difference indicative of the rich terrain of feminist engagement.95 More broadly, the 
ideological reorganization  of  this  period in its melodramatic ups and downs begins  to  
define  the  two  polarities –of secular and conservative strands of politics– as  opposed  
and  deadlocked. The implications of this for Vurun Kahpeye are evident and provide the 
background against which Edib’s punctum gains a critical force.   
 
The Republican Era 
 With the defeat in World War I in 1918, the Allies –British, French, and Italian 
forces– occupied Istanbul, an incident that triggered the Turkish nationalist movement in 
Anatolia led by Mustafa Kemal. This movement was a turning point in a century long 
struggle to restore a disintegrating empire. The movement rallied around misak-ı milli 
[national pact], the declaration of national self-determination, passed by the deputies 
from the last term of the Ottoman parliament in 1920 that was unrecognized by Allied 
forces that shut down the parliament. Mustafa Kemal announced the opening of the 
Grand National Assembly in Ankara, a call that channeled the supporters of the 
nationalist movement including deputies to flee Istanbul. The partitioning of the Empire 
with the Treaty of Sevres signed between the Allied forces and the then Sultan Mehmed 
VI and rejected by the nationalists defined the anti-imperial –in both senses of the word 
as against the Ottoman Empire and against the Western imperial forces– nature of the 
Kemalist movement that led to the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923) with the 
                                                




Allies and their proxies, chiefly Greece. Upon the beginning of peace talks, the new 
Grand National Assembly as the sole representative of the Turkish nation declared the 
abolition of the Sultanate in 1922 before the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne that ended 
the Turkish War of Independence. 
With the proclamation of the Turkish Republic on October 23, 1923, the efforts of 
modernization that were once a means for imperial reformation became a wholescale 
campaign in the building of the nation state. As Ünüvar suggests, “Kemalizm ideologized 
modernization” with a series of radical reforms that aimed to modernize the society 
through the authoritarianism of a single-party state.96 Under the totalitarian rule of 
Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası [Republican People’s Party] party-state, the Kemalist regime 
passed a succession of laws whose goal was to establish a mode of western secular life. 
Some landmarks worth mentioning are the abolition of the Caliphate and of the Sharia 
law in 1924, the laws banning religious insignia between 1923 and 1934, including the 
famous Hat Law of 1925; the ban on the institution of religious covenants and dervish 
lodges in 1925; the introduction of the new penal law modeled after the Italian penal code 
and of the new civil code modeled after the Swiss civil code; adoption of the international 
time and calendar system in 1925, the Latin alphabet replacing the Perso-Arabic script in 
1928, and the international unit system in 1933; and the passing of the Surname Law in 
1934.97 
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 The War of Independence intensified women’s patriotic activities, as exemplified 
by the establishment of the Anadolu Kadınları Müdafaa-i Hukuk-ı Vatan Cemiyeti 
[Anatolian Women’s Association for Patriotic Defense] that led the mobilization of 
women from diverse walks of life.98 Halide Edib herself become the female face of the 
national struggle not only at home but also abroad by running its propagandist campaign 
for the Western world. With the republic’s foundation, the Ottoman-Turkish women’s 
movement was completely subsumed under the republic’s project of secular 
modernization. In Kandiyoti’s words: “the woman question became one of the pawns in 
the Kemalist struggle to liquidate the theocratic remnants of the Ottoman state,” leading 
to a discourse on and the project of “the new woman” in line with the Kemalist 
citizenship protocols.99 While Edib was an active voice in these discussions, she did not 
subscribe to this project, which was instead taken on by Mustafa Kemal’s adopted 
daughter Afet İnan. In The Emancipation of Turkish Women, İnan advocated republican 
feminism as an emancipatory return to the egalitarian pre-Islamic Turkish social 
identity.100 The official Kemalist discourse on women has been a narrative of 
emancipation from their captivity under the repressive Ottoman rule under Arab and 
Persian influence, while dismissing the Kemalist regime’s belatedness in granting full 
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100 Afet İnan, The Emancipation of the Turkish Woman, 1962. İnan’s place in the new republic has been 
examined in comparison to Edib in many studies. Ayşe Durakbaşa, for instance, identifies Edib as the 
“rebellious daughter of the republic,” as opposed to İnan’s domestication in service of the Kemalist 
patriarchal order. Ayşe Durakbaşa, Halide Edib: Türk Modernleşmesi ve Feminizm, 148. Further, Sancar 
views İnan as providing a role model for republican femininty in the form of a “child woman.” Sancar, 
Türk Modernleşmesinin Cinsiyeti, 173. 
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enfranchisement to women until eleven years after the founding of the republic. Thus, 
within what Kandiyoti names as “the paternalistic benevolence of the Kemalist era,”101 
the new woman represented a break from a particular past with which the secular republic 
wanted to sever its ties.  
The forging of the new woman suggests that feminism was now under the 
monopoly of the state. This state-owned feminism has two broad implications. The first 
of these pertains to a kind of historical erasure. While recent studies on the history of the 
Ottoman-Turkish women’s movement have revealed a longer history of feminist activism 
that dates back to –and even before– the Tanzimat,102 in a rhetoric of genesis, the earlier 
phases that I have outlined above were entirely effaced by Kemalist historiography 
declaring the republic’s ownership of women’s struggles. Women’s active participation 
in self-determination and definition via the expanding mediasphere of print and 
associational life is entirely obscured by the Kemalist elites who position themselves as 
saviors of Ottoman-Turkish women.103 The ingenious ways in which Ottoman women 
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102 A significant contribution to this scholarship is Didem Havlioglu’s recent work on the poetry of Mihrî 
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103 Afet İnan is one of the leading figures in this historical erasure, becoming, in Sancar’s words, “the 
mouthpiece for state feminism.” Sancar, Türk Modernleşmesinin Cinsiyeti, 174. In Atatürk ve Türk Kadın 
Haklarının Kazanılması [Ataturk and Gaining Turkish Women’s Rights], İnan weaves a narrative of 
genesis for women’s political rights that begins with Mustafa Kemal, arguing that women in fact did not 
fight for political rights. Afet İnan, Atatürk ve Türk Kadın Haklarının Kazanılması, 1964. İnan took part in 
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negotiated the tensions amongst Westernization, nationalism, and Islam under shifting 
patriarchal regimes lose their significance in the uniformist feminism of the Republic. 
Inevitably, the traditionalist and conservative strand of feminism branching from the first 
generation of feminists would become significantly peripheral to this project.  
Further, the state-owned feminism, as Kandiyoti implicates, hindered “women’s 
autonomous political initiatives.”104 A case in point is Kadınlar Halk Fırkası [Women’s 
People Party] –later Kadınlar Birliği [Women’s Union]– a suffragist group defending the 
political involvement of women in the making of the nation, as meticulously documented 
by Yaprak Zihnioğlu.105 With a telling title, Kadınsız İnkılap [Revolution without 
Women] maps the patriarchal exclusions of Republican ideology through the example of 
Nezihe Muhiddin, the founder of Kadınlar Halk Fırkası. The first ever political party to 
be proposed for the new republic, Kadınlar Halk Fırkası transforms into, Kadınlar 
Birliği, a civil society organization fighting for the full political rights of women 
following the refusal of its application between 1923 and 1924. Like other independent 
social organizations, Kadınlar Birliği would be asked to close on account of the 
redundancy of civil society under the single party rule, while women would have to wait 
until 1934 to be granted political equality with men. Identifying a conflict between the 
early Republican feminists and the Kemalists, Zihnioğlu tracks this history by which the 
feminist movement got repressed, Muhiddin personally disreputed, Kadınlar Birliği 
suppressed, and women jettisoned from the political arena. As the Republic “realized the 
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women’s rights revolution without women,”106 Muhiddin was eventually rendered as a 
subaltern, a fate to be shared by many leading Ottoman-Turkish women including Fatma 
Aliye, and even Halide Edib, who would be lucky enough to speak out in exile.  
Below, I will position Edib as an Ottoman-Turkish feminist and closely look at 
her feminist literature representative of the above-explained historical trajectory. As we 
shall see, however, Edib’s feminism does more than assiduously bargain with patriarchal 
hegemonic structures. As her biography demonstrates, she does not shy away from 
transgressing the boundaries dictated by these dominant formations. Hence, her eventual 
excommunication from the Republic due to her loyalty to an Ottoman-Islamic heritage 
critical of Kemalist secularism and a fierce commitment to full enfranchisement, 
contradictory, untimely, and impossible attachments within the purview of the republic. I 
propose to read Edib’s fictional writing as a site to explore not only her negotiations or 
contestations but also her transgressions of normative patriarchal boundaries. Thus, 
Vurun Kahpeye’s lesbian kiss that opens to a feminist Islamic utopia becomes the very 
expression of these transgressive attachments. A symbol of Edib’s pivotal position 
striving to mediate Ottoman and Turkish feminisms, the kiss points to the problems posed 
by the authoritarian project of women’s revolution without women, namely the gifting of 
rights that not only fails to collaborate women, but also abjects them when necessary.  
 
Halide Edib As an Ottoman-Turkish Feminist 
In the genealogy of the Ottoman-Turkish women’s movement, Halide Edib 
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arrives as an heiress to the legacy of Fatma Aliye, marrying the women’s movement with 
the nationalist movement that took precedence over Ottomanist imperialism. As a 
second-generation member of this struggle, Edib carries on the project of negotiating the 
Ottoman/Islamic tradition with modern/Western sensibilities within the ongoing 
nationalist project of modernization, even as the figure of the woman of Islam gradually 
morphs into that of the Turkish woman in public discourse. With a life span that extends 
from the Abdülhamid Era to the Turkish Republic, Edib embodies the unfolding of 
Ottoman-Turkish feminism in both her writing and life, each uncannily mirroring the 
other, as she travels across the shifting patriarchal hegemonic formations. Again, we 
notice how critically the construction of a feminist subject relies on an expanded media 
infrastructure that at once publicizes the woman question and helps women assemble a 
gendered counterpublic to challenge this revolution without women. Edib’s translations, 
essays in women’s and nationalist journals, opinion pieces, articles, and interviews 
chronicle the (trans)formation of the Ottoman Turkish women’s personal, social, and 
political subjectivity. In her publications on women, Edib’s appeals to motherhood in the 
Hamidian Era provides the basis for her to calls for women’s education. After the 1908 
revolution, Edib advocates for women’s participation in national life, gradually inviting 
women to conjoin men in the work towards national progress. Finally, Edib becomes 
vocal in her demands for women’s full political rights after the founding of the republic. 
 
Hamidian Maternity and Demands for Education 
Edib first appeared in print with her translation of John Abbot’s The Mother at 
 
 69 
Home at the age of thirteen in 1897.107 This translation, Mader,108 earned her the Order of 
Charity presented by Sultan Abdülhamid II, a token of her feminism’s relevance to 
Hamidian ideology. The preface, which includes a dedication to the Sultan, sheds light on 
Edib’s interest in motherhood, an interest that defines the focus of her feminist 
engagement in this Era. The first paragraph of the preface delineates a social theory of 
motherhood that explains Edib’s investment in the question: “Children are the hope of the 
future! The ones who give the first lesson, the first discipline to them are the mothers. 
That is why motherhood is a big, a very big duty. If a child grows deprived of discipline, 
society will receive not benefit but harm. But, who would be responsible in this case? Of 
course mothers!”109 Through their duty to raise children, mothers serve as the crux 
connecting the individual with society. This dimension of motherhood as social 
reproduction confers to what might otherwise be regarded as a personal and familial 
matter a social functionality. For it is through motherhood that women gain their worth as 
human beings, commanding public respect. Abbot’s text is a guidebook for mothers and 
reflects Edib’s conceptualization of child rearing as a science –as captured by the title of 
her newspaper article “Fenn-i Etfal” [Science of Children] that she would write in 
1909.110 This meant that mothering was not an innate quality of womanhood but required 
knowledge and a set of skills and practices to be learned and professed. With this 
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translation, Edib imports and adapts a piece of literature around the epistemological field 
of child-rearing for Ottoman women. 
 The understanding of motherhood in terms of a science serves as the ground on 
which demands for women’s education could be carried forward in the liberal atmosphere 
of the 1908 revolution. It is in this period that Edib emerges as a hyperactive intellectual 
and social reformer both in the letters and on the ground, first in the context of education 
and later nationalization. In an article emblematic of Edib’s arguments on women’s 
education in this period entitled “Beşiği Sallayan El Dünyaya Hükmeder” [The Hand that 
Rocks the Cradle Rules the World”], “Schools to us! Schools! Schools!” declares Edib.111 
Edib argues that men should stop treating women as figurines imported for voyeuristic 
pleasure or as maids to ensure their comfort, for there is more important work for women 
to perform: it is only women who can provide the disciplining of conscience and morality 
needed by society, but in order to do so, they need education themselves.112 Furthermore, 
women need education in the same matters as men so that their minds get used to 
“judgment, imagination, truth, and beauty,” and thus affect “the decisions they will give 
in their lives, their impact on their husbands at home, and the discipline they will give to 
their children.”113 She sums up her point with an emphatic proclamation: “Men will fix 
this nation, but it is women who will fix men.”114 Edib, therefore, makes a case for 
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women’s education with reference to their renewed domestic duties with national 
significance. By this point in her writing, nation, a unitary idea of the empire, began to 
prominently figure, as Edib defends equal education for both genders because there are 
no distinctions under the umbrella term of Ottoman identity.   
In an essay written for the women’s journal Mehasin [Beauties], Edib argues that 
mothering should be the centerpiece of all calls for women’s rights. While “history, 
health, social sciences, science, and even mathematics are as useful [to women] as the 
sciences of family management and childrearing,” women should not neglect their 
“authentic duties.”115 She is wary that as “women shout ‘our rights’ today, they need to 
remember that this is not for themselves but for them to be able to provide the discipline 
necessary for their children.”116 Women need to learn the same topics as men and need to 
be able to translate them into the language of children “because they need to raise 
children who are free from false thoughts, with honest judgment.”117 She lectures women 
that “[a] woman is first an Ottoman, a patriot, the nation most unique, most profound 
point of worship in her. The nation’s rights are a thousand times more important and 
more honorable than women’s rights,” 118  speaking for and to the nationalist Ottomanism 
of the period. Edib’s calls for greater access and opportunity for women were oriented 
not towards autonomy or sovereignty but rather so women could be better equipped to 
                                                










serve their highest function –materially and morally instructing the nation’s future 
citizens. As a result of the increasing nationalization of the women question, Edib was 
recruited by the cadres of the CUP to lead, first, the development of the educational 
structure for women in Istanbul and, then, the reorganization of the schools for minorities 
in the Levant.119 Though motivated by the need to make better mothers, the project of 
women’s education paradoxically enabled women to assume a social identity beyond 
motherhood, an identity Edib embodied in her many roles including reporter for, 
inspector of, and teacher in various educational institutions.  
 
Marriage of Turkish Nationalism and Women’s Movement 
 In the meantime, Edib became a prolific and productive woman of letters, writing 
poems, short stories, novellas, while participating in the political debates around the 
growing nationalism of the era. Edib got under the influence of Turkish nationalism 
between 1910 and 1912 due to the uprisings in the Balkans, gradually leaving behind an 
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Ottomanist nationalism. By 1912, she was already publishing in Türk Yurdu [Turkish 
Home], the official organ of the Türk Ocakları [Turkish Hearth],120 having gained 
prominence amongst the Turkish nationalists. In 1913, on the other hand, she founded, 
“the first women’s organization … with a feminist orientation,” Teali-i Nisvan [The 
Elevation of Women].121 Targeting the social uplift of women, the society caused “an 
impact immeasurable by the number of its members.”122 We can consider the founding of 
this society as the first instance of Edib’s efforts to merge women’s progress with that of 
the nation’s beyond the previously prescribed roles of wife, mother, and teacher. Edib’s 
advocacy of women’s public visibility in rejection of the assaults by the Sultan’s 
supporters in the early days of the revolution evolves into a push for women’s integration 
into the workforce within the nationalist project.123 In “Türk Kadınları Hakkında” [On 
Turkish Women] dated 1919, Edib champions “the new Turkish Muslim woman’s 
position next to the man within her national life,” taking pride in those women who work 
honestly to feed their children, who walk for days with a kid and soldier’s food on their 
shoulders, who toil silently and determinedly on the field, at home, and in trade to sustain 
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123 Written in between the revolution of 1901 and the 31 March Incident, in “Kadınlar İçin,” Edib, assumes 
an aggressive voice, a rare case in her oeuvre, in defense of women’s public presence amidst attacks against 
them that are overlooked by the police. She even argues for the need for women’s self-defense with 




the Turk’s life.124 She labels those who are critical of the working women as enemies of 
Turks and Muslims aligning with the European orientalist vision, given how Turkish 
women unprecedentedly reconciled Islam and modernization.125  
 Edib would become a central figure, and by far the most important female one, for 
the national struggle towards independence, joining, in 1920, the resistance movement 
rallied by Mustafa Kemal in Anatolia. The new conditions instigated by the empire’s loss 
of World War I –its partitioning by the Allies, especially the Greek occupation of İzmir in 
1919, as well as the submission and complacency of Sultan Mehmed VI– definitively 
drove Edib towards an anti-imperialist militant nationalism defending the right of an 
independent Turkish nation to exist.126 This new phase in her politics was marked by a 
series of public speeches she gave in Istanbul under occupation. Her oft-cited historic 
speech at the Sultanahmet Square before an audience of approximately 200.000 attendees 
speaks for the active role Edib played in mobilizing masses now on a larger scale through 
these public demonstrations.127 Sentenced to death by Sultan Mehmed VI, Edib moved to 
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Ankara and took an active role in the front, mainly serving, amongst other duties, as the 
chronicler and the propagandist of the Turkish struggle for the Western media. Her 
contributions in the army would eventually be recognized by her decoration as a sergeant. 
With such milestones challenging the traditionally defined gender segregation of the 
Ottoman society –to an extent to infiltrate the all-male institution of the army–  Edib, 
from 1919 onwards, set precedents for women in redefining their social status amidst 
national mobilization efforts. It would be on the premise that the Turkish women had 
already completed their social integration throughout the national struggle that Edib and 
other feminists would push their agenda for full political rights with the foundation of the 
new republic to no avail. 
 
Edib’s and the Ottoman-Turkish Movement’s Predicament: State Feminism  
 Before we delve further into Edib’s predicament in the Republican Era, it is worth 
mentioning how Edib herself historicizes the Ottoman-Turkish women’s rights 
movement in order to assess her rationalization of women’s political demands. Edib 
retrospectively reflects on this movement in her conferences and articles in English in the 
1930s, casting its history in what we may call an evolutionary narrative, “slow up to 1908 
and accelerated within the last twenty two years,” thereby providing a “steadier and more 
serious” account of all the recent radical reforms of the Republic.128 She argues that 
                                                                                                                                            
renowned statement “Governments are our foes, peoples our friends, and the rightful rebel in our hearts is 
our strength,” which draws a distinction between political institutions and ordinary citizens could be 
interpreted as a feminist intervention in conventional nationalism’s totalizing masculine aggressiveness. 
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women’s involvement in social and educational domains had a long history, while 
politics was a new arena. For her, the most significant characteristic of the women 
movement in Turkey is that it has been an organic part and parcel of the movement for 
national salvation, “an integral part of Turkish reform,” which provides a universal model 
for the East.129 This marks a stark methodological difference between the more 
democratic means of “the gradual emancipation of Turkish women and their evolution as 
useful and beneficial social units” and Western feminism that is “a revolt of one sex 
against the other’s domination.”130 According to Edib, Western feminism did not take 
root in Turkey owing to two main reasons: first, unlike their Western sisters, “Turkish 
woman has never been under economic tutelage” as per the property rights given by the 
Islamic law.131 This meant that “her entire struggle for freedom and equality [was] on 
social lines.”132 Second, the constant urgent and critical conditions within which the 
nation found itself rendered “women’s service in progress as a necessity,” a consensus 
shared across political differences.133  
 Edib’s uneasiness with feminism as understood to be a Western mode of an 
aggressive sex war accounts for her segregation of the emancipation of Ottoman-Turkish 
women from a global feminist movement. Her writing career at home demonstrates this 
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uneasiness with a globalized feminism symptomatic within the Ottoman Turkish 
women’s writing of the era. Edib’s definition of feminism seems to be rooted in her 
unfavorable impression of the suffragettes during her visit to England in 1909. The 
militant methods they employed against men in their struggle were understandably too 
alienating for “a Turkish woman who had as yet no public experience.”134 Edib saw these 
methods as incongruent to the shape and form the Ottoman-Turkish women’s movement 
took. On the contrary, the particularity of this movement required a co-dependence of 
sexes under the same national goal, whereas feminism would “sow discord between the 
feminine realm and the male realm.”135 In a gesture that emblematizes her promotion of 
dialogue between sexes in recognition of their interdependence in the nationalist struggle, 
Edib advises women not see men as an impediment to what women want to achieve; 
instead, women should stand to benefit from their good will.136 As Ayşe Durakbaşa 
explains, for Edib, feminism that privileged one sex was too specific and too insignificant 
in the context of a broader movement.137 Edib’s feminism was secondary to her 
commitment to a vision of a free and strong nation. This future could only be built with 
the participation of everyone irrespective of gender, and thus the nationalist movement 
could not yet afford feminism. 
 At least, this was the case until the independence of the new Turkish nation. Edib 
henceforth became a firm believer that women’s contributions to the national struggle 
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merited their recognition as equal citizens under the new regime. Although the adoption 
of the new civil code in 1926 brought new improvements to women’s familial and social 
status, women’s political rights would prove to be the field in which the new rulers were 
to remain by far the most hesitant and cautious. In a period of rapid and drastic social and 
political transformation and reforms, the founding fathers clearly did not want to 
reorganize the gendered field of politics. This full-paced modernization project 
engineered by the patriarchal state was indeed in disregard of the organic social evolution 
epitomized by women’s movement and favored by Edib. The paradox posed by the 
radicalness of these reforms with respect to the Ottoman-Islamic heritage and their 
conservativism vis-à-vis the new woman drove Edib away from Mustafa Kemal towards 
political alternatives. Edib was gradually linked with the first opposition party of modern 
Turkey, Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası [Progressivist Republican Party] (PRP), 
founded by a group of reactionaries to Mustafa Kemal’s increasing absolutist rule, 
including Edib’s husband Adnan Adıvar in November 1924. She would deny the news of 
her affiliation with either political party in protest of their refusal to recognize the right to 
vote for women in their programs, citing lack of democracy due to lack of equal 
citizenship.138 Assuming a distinctly oppositional stance against the men dominating the 
world of politics, Edib engages in the sex war version of feminism she once repudiated 
while using her public persona to promote women’s rights. 
 Shortly, Edib would side with the PRP on account of the increasing dictatorial 
propensities of Mustafa Kemal’s ideology. The regime’s reaction to the first large scale 
                                                




social revolt against the secular republic, the Sheik Said Rebellion, a Kurdish-based pro-
Caliphate uprising, would be harsh, culminating in the implementation of the first martial 
law, Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu [Law on the Maintenance of Order], and the resuscitation of 
the court-martials İstiklal Mahkemeleri [Independence Tribunals] to secure power and 
punish perpetrators. Edib would become a vocal critique of this process, describing the 
martial law as dictatorship,139 a term with which she would identify the Kemalist regime 
in her exile. In June 1925, after the suppression of the revolt, the PRP would be banned 
on grounds of triggering religious sedition. Right before many members of the party 
would be court-martialed and imprisoned along with the hanging of six deputies under 
the pretext of an alleged assassination attempt targeting Mustafa Kemal in June 1926, 
Edib and Adivar left the country to live in self-exile until Mustafa Kemal’s death in 1938. 
From then on, Mustafa Kemal would initiate Edib’s denigration campaign, slandering her 
as mandacı [American mandate proponent], an ongoing stigma damaging her heroic 
service in the Turkish War of Independence.140 Ad hominem attacks would ensue, 
especially after the publication of her memoirs Turkish Ordeal in which she criticizes 
Mustafa Kemal, alleging her unrequited desire for Mustafa Kemal and even her 
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promiscuity with soldiers on the front. 141  
 If Edib was able to recuperate at least some of her reputation, it was because she 
would use her intellectual credentials to reinscribe herself into the part of the history from 
which she was being effaced through lectures, conferences, interviews, and most 
importantly her memoirs during her years in exile. For Edib in exile, writing in English to 
the world, becomes a mode of resistance to the patriarchal state that denied her and the 
women the respect they deserved. Throughout these years, she was vocally critical of the 
radicalness of the Kemalist reforms, especially in its effacement of the Ottoman legacy, 
all the while refraining from granting complete political rights to women until the 1930s. 
Edib’s writing from this period demonstrates her issues with the new regime as a Muslim 
Ottoman-Turkish woman through three focal points: the deferral of women’s voting 
rights, laicite that ensures state control of religion, and the cultural amnesia the Kemalist 
reforms engender.142 
 Edib’s fall out with Mustafa Kemal has larger implications for her feminist 
agency rooted in a in Edib’s feminism. Thus far, with attention to women’s presence in 
print media, I have conceptualized the development of the Ottoman-Turkish women’s 
movement and Edib’s feminism in the context of ever-changing patriarchal bargains, “set 
rules and scripts regulating gender relations, to which both genders accommodate and 
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Court, 242-60. In these writings and her interviews in English, Edib harshly criticizes the Kemalist regime, 




acquiesce, yet which may nonetheless be contested, redefined, and renegotiated.”143 
Edib’s biography, however, is rife with instances of resistances to, defiance of, challenges 
against the parameters determined by such patriarchal bargains limiting the horizon of her 
futuristic vision in a way that outdo the premise of her writings. In her everyday life, we 
see a woman who pushes against and, if needed, circumvents the patriarchal 
circumstances that delimit her feminist subjectivity. 
 The gap between her discourse on womanhood and her gender performance is 
most visible in Edib’s public image, an image that also varies before Western and local 
audiences.144 It is plausible to suggest that despite her vehement advocacy of motherood 
on which most of her feminist demands were predicated, Edib’s public profile overall 
was far from that of a quintessential maternal figure featured in her writing. Having sent 
her two sons abroad at a young age, she in fact led most of her life remote from them. 
Instead of projecting an idealized mother image, she strikes us as a pioneering woman 
taking unprecedented initiatives within almost impossible situations. Just to name a few, 
Edib, in her childhood, secretly attended American College for Girls and graduated from 
the missionary school in 1901 as the first Muslim woman to do so. Very unusually for her 
time, she divorced her first husband because of his marriage to a second wife. Given the 
lack of educational infrastructure for women, she sought assistance from British 
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144 This split in Edib’s profile between two mediaspheres proves Edib’s awareness and use of media’s 
potentialities in reaching masses with the recognition of varying public sensibilities.  Reviewing Edib’s 
long-lived presence in the Western press, one can see how Edib was conscious in fashioning a particular 
feminine image, an effort that was most effective during the years of national struggle. Edib was not shy in 
channeling the image of a female warrior, embodying in her persona the progressivist claims of Turkish 
nationalism to render the fight for independence more sympathetic for Western audiences. Edib’s self-




pedagogue Isabelle Fry in a letter she sent to the journal Nation in 1908, an act that sow 
the seeds of a lifelong transnational friendship.145 Add to this Edib’s active involvement 
in the field of politics contesting, as we have seen, gender segregation and hierarchies in 
male dominated social circles and public sphere as an administer, orator, and soldier. 
Indeed, Edib’s dissident nature cannot be divorced from her transgressive gender 
performance. Blacklisted by the Sultan, parting ways with the CUP,146 and deposed by 
Mustafa Kemal, Edib experienced adversity with every form of Turkish authority; her 
feminist praxis is embedded within her transgressive acts in each of these epochs and her 
reactions to these clashes as much as within her writings.  
 I emphasize the disagreement between Edib’s discursive and performative self-
making projects as a productive site to approach her complex feminism. The split we 
observe in Edib’s persona itself already complicates the notion of feminist subjectivity by 
rendering it bifurcated and even inherently contradictory. Edib acts almost like a double 
agent, but this double agency refers more broadly to the inherited woman question itself, 
a question that is shot through not only with one challenge: how to remain a Muslim and 
become modern and how to contest and cooperate with patriarchy. However, very soon 
women’s explorations and negotiations would get co-opted by the nationalist project that 
would coerce them to take part in a revolution of women where their own (double) 
agency is mandated. Thus, the homosexual kiss is the punctum of these structuring 
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binaries rife with contradiction and yet straightened out by the Kemalist regime and a 
literary critical apparatus developed in relation to it.  
In this, I propose the field of fiction as the ideal site to read Edib’s incongruous 
feminist subjectivity for reading practices that would complicate the simplified 
understanding of her feminism. At this juncture, it is worth remembering Talal Asad’s 
critique of Benedict Anderson for focusing merely “on the significance of newspaper 
reading for imagining the nation as a community” in developing his notion of print 
capitalism.147 When Asad draws attention to “the simultaneous growth of serialized 
novels published in periodicals and the enormous expansion in the market for imaginative 
‘literature’ –both prose and poetry– that mediated people’s understanding of ‘real’ and 
‘imagined,’”148 he assigns literature a sense of imaginative autonomy from informative 
and communicative modes of journalistic writing. I find it necessary to extend the generic 
distinction that Asad draws within a national mediasphere also to the subgenres of 
imaginative literature when approaching so protean writer as Edib who explores 
multifarious modes and genres of literature in her oeuvre. Thus, as I turn to Vurun 
Kahpeye, I primarily read it as a melodrama, one that presciently allegorizes the reversal 
of fortune that allows us to relate to women now as partly victims –embodied by Edib’s 
downfall from a sergeant whose name would be written on ballots by voters to a traitor 
whose statue at Sultanahmet gets dynamited.149   
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The Melodrama of Vurun Kahpeye 
As mentioned, the spectrum of Halide Edib’s fictional works spans a wide range 
of genres and styles. For the purposes of this chapter, I will briefly lay out a 
categorization of her fiction in prose, based on literary historian Berna Moran’s 
classification of her bibliography and its feminist reception. Edib’s earlier novellas 
published between 1909 and 1913 represent a body of work that can be grouped as 
“psychological love” stories.150 Revolving around psychologically complex characters 
mostly approached by the male narrators with a masculine focal point, these novels have 
abundantly been subject to feminist criticism especially around the characterization of her 
female heroines. This emphasis on Edib’s figuration of female protagonists has been 
central to the reception of her work from her second phase that has a national outlook, 
including Yeni Turan [The New Turan] (1912), Vurun Kahpeye and Ateşten Gömlek 
(1923),151 the last two of which are subsumed within the movement of National Literature 
and the genre of National Struggle novels. Traditionally, these texts are considered to 
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150 These novellas are: Raik’in Annesi [Raik’s Mother] (1909), Seviyye Talip (1910), Handan (1912), and 
Son Eseri [Her Last Work] (1913). Berna Moran, Türk Romanına Eleştirel Bir Bakış, 118. 
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exemplify Edib’s portrayal of a sublime femininity that perfectly balances modernity and 
tradition; instead of foregrounding individual matters, the heroines of these novellas 
prove their virtue in their dedication to the national cause. For Moran, “this woman-
image” (of the new Turkish woman) is Edib’s particular contribution presented to its 
Turkish readers: Westernized and yet dedicated to national values, educated and 
independent and yet virtuous.152 The phase that begins with the publication of Sinekli 
Bakkal (1936)153 marks a turn in Edib’s fiction. More philosophical than ideological, her 
fictional prose following this period has a more modernist outlook and composition.154 
Belonging to Edib’s second phase, Vurun Kahpeye has not been as critically 
acclaimed in secondary literature as its counterpart Ateşten Gömlek, which became even 
more popular at home thanks to its 1923 cinematic adaptation and abroad thanks to its 
translations into various languages including its two English versions. 155 The first novel 
based on the Turkish War of Independence, the latter has occupied a canonical place 
within Turkish literature as a well-written sophisticated text. 156 Overshadowed by the 
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155 Produced by Kemal Film and directed by Muhsin Ertuğrul, Ateşten Gömlek was one of the earliest, if 
not the first, War of Independence themed film of Turkish cinema. Enginün mentions finding in the 
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Hollywood production of Ateşten Gömlek exists. Enginün, Halide Edib Eserlerinde Doğu ve Batı, 70-1n77. 
For information on its English translations, see note 151 above. 
 
156 In the most extensive monograph written in Turkish on Edib’s work, İnci Enginün describes Ateşten 
Gömlek as “the most vivid and beautiful book of the National Struggle” in 1978. Enginün, Halide Edib 
Eserlerinde Doğu ve Batı, 69. Thirty years later, Azade Seyhan repeats the same view, defining the novel 
as “arguably the best novel of the Turkish War of Independence.” Azade Seyhan, Tales of Crossed 
Destinies, 18.  
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interest in Ateşten Gömlek, Vurun Kahpeye appears mostly in feminist criticism only in 
passing with reference to “the ideal woman” that protagonist Aliye represents in a line of 
characters within Edib’s fiction. Deniz Kandiyoti, who traces the representation of 
women in the Turkish novel, remarks on these patriotic novellas as embodying  “[t]he 
self-sacrificing comrade-woman [who] is also an asexual sister-in-arms.”157 For her, “the 
love of [these] heroines transcends individual, sexual love and represents a meeting of 
minds in the nationalist ideals.”158 The same idea is reiterated by Nazan Aksoy who 
considers these characters as “patriotic activist women” fighting for the greater social 
cause sacrificing their sexuality.159 Finally, Hülya Adak expands on the deficiency of 
asexuality argument by suggesting that these women cannot express their sexuality 
because they prioritize the nationalist cause.160  
Except for this typological criticism, Vurun Kahpeye to a large extent is shrouded 
in silence. Despite the critical silence around it, however, the novella has not been silent 
at all, leaving its mark within Turkish cultural modernity with three cinematic 
adaptations, its affective potency eventually culminating in the idiomatic coinage of its 
title that signifies unjust victimization. This disconnect between the public disinterest in 
the novella and its extended social life within popular imaginary, I would argue, is 
precisely due to Vurun Kahpeye’s melodramatic potency that purportedly renders the 
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meaning of the text straightforward, explicit, and taken for granted. And yet, 
melodrama’s structural excess is a receptacle containing tensions and contradictions that 
at the same time complicate the literalness of its meaning. In the case of Vurun Kahpeye, 
this literalness is expressed in the typological criticism of Aliye as representing of ideals 
of femininity. In what follows, however, I will present a reading of Vurun Kahpeye as a 
melodrama whose aesthetics undermines not only its own literacy but also its own 
normativity by turning to the surfacing of homosexual desire in a dream sequence that 
opens this chapter. It is with the reference to this queer moment that I want to explore the 
scope of Edib’s feminist vision beyond the representational. 
Let us begin with the summary of the story. Indeed, Vurun Kahpeye reads pretty 
much like a melodrama, as the female body transpires as a stage on which the competing 
politics of secularism and Islamism violently clash. The story describes protagonist 
Aliye’s new life in a small western Anatolian town as a young idealist teacher at the peak 
of the national struggle against the Greeks. Her arrival in town immediately animates the 
existing tensions between the secular nationalists and the Islamist antinationalists. On the 
one hand, we have Aliye, her recently adopted parents, and her fiancé Tosun, a militia 
leader in the National Forces. Against this familial grouping, the text places the leading 
figures from the gentry and clergy whose waning power is further threatened by Aliye’s 
democratizing force in the school and in town. The power struggle between the emerging 
new order and the dying regime materializes in the persona of Aliye and Hadji Fettah 
Effendi who provokes the public against Aliye on account of her immodest public 
appearance as a Muslim woman, for she does not cover her face. Hadji Fettah eventually 
 
 88 
conspires against the nationalists by secretly inviting the Greeks into town in the absence 
of Aliye’s fiancé Tosun. The Greek invasion of the town necessitates that Aliye assume 
the role of a secret agent to help Tosun save the town. Once the town is cleared of the 
Greeks, Hadji Fettah takes advantage of the chaos ensuing and provokes the locals to 
engage in a moral cleansing. This leads to the lynching of Aliye whom he slanders as a 
whore. The story ends with a reference to the Independence Tribunals at the end of which 
Hadji Fettah is hanged. 
In the afterword complementing the most recent edition of the novella, novelist 
Selim İleri refers to Edib’s “schematic” approach to Vurun Kahpeye, as opposed to her 
“analytical” approach to Ateşten Gömlek,161 which helps us understand the construction 
of the text as melodrama in its deliverance of female victimization. For him, this scheme 
determines the division between the progressivist and the reactionary as graphed onto the 
opposition between the enlightened teacher and the fundamentalist clergy against the 
décor of the War of Independence.162 Just like a true melodrama, Vurun Kahpeye 
registers its Manichean world in oversignification. From the naming to the 
physiognomies and physical attributes of its characters, the text somatically literalizes the 
intrinsic qualities of the characters to deliberately render legible the world divided 
between the good and the evil. Aliye (sublime), Tosun (young bull), Gülsüm (the name of 
prophet Mohammed’s mother), Ömer (namesake of a caliph) are marked against Hadji 
Fettah Effendi and Tall Hüseyin Effendi whose bodily disfiguration undermines their 
                                                





virtuous names highlighting their hypocrisy. The terms İleri uses to describe the formal 
structure of the novella –schema and décor– further point to the melodramatic make-up 
of the story episodically staged by a narrator in a theatrical fashion.  
The silence about Vurun Kahpeye may have something to do with this literalness 
that renders the text’s meaning superficially self-evident. This melodramatic literality is 
accentuated with the assumed socio-historical documentary value of the text, if we 
consider the context out of which the text materializes. As mentioned previously, Vurun 
Kahpeye first appeared as a serialization in the newspaper Akşam between December 
1923 and January 1924. Its readers would see the story framed within the news on the 
freshly founded republic. In fact, during this period, the pages of Akşam are dominated 
with the updates on the recent trials of the first Independence Tribunals of the republican 
era, the very courts referred at the end of the novella. Originally founded to prosecute 
antinationalist activities during the War of Independence, these courts were reactivated to 
prosecute the caliphate supporters in the second month of the republic. If these courts 
served as the crux anchoring the text to its moment, its author who had already published 
Ateşten Gömlek based on her experiences within the national struggle gave another 
reason for Vurun Kahpeye’s literacy.  
We must recall that Edib’s novel belongs to a longer tradition of media-use 
outlined above where the distinctions between news, polemics, and literature are 
constantly blurred during a period of rapid political and social transformation. This 
assumed proximity between fact and fiction folds well into an easy ideological 
interpretation of the text as depicting the harsh realities of the War of Independence 
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fought not only with the foreign enemy but also with the enemy within. In the anti-
caliphate ethos in which it appears, Vurun Kahpeye reads as a secularist manifesto 
legitimizing the regime with an account of female victimization. To invoke Peter Brooks’ 
account of melodrama, Vurun Kahpeye appears at the right moment, in the immediate 
aftermath of the foundation of the Republic, soothing the anxieties around a post-
revolutionary secular world.163 There could be chaos, but the moral order would be 
restored, the message of the text could be easily read.  
Yet, as we have seen above, such “easy” readability is a hallmark of the novel as a 
direct form of politics seeking to both reflect the stakes of ideological conflict and 
provide the frames through which this conflict is to be read so that the reader can be 
recruited to the right side. We need to locate Edib’s work as a melodrama in this highly 
rhetorical mediaspace. Melodrama as a political technology grants a legibility in the form 
of victims versus villains, but its structural excess can undercut this legibility and return 
us to inherent contradictions that the legibility supposedly seeks to manage. In this 
respect, the nightmare of the lesbian kiss upsets the secularist heteropatriarchal femininity 
that Vurun Kahpeye ostensibly promotes. It is undeniable that Edib identifies the ongoing 
sociopolitical conflict between the secularists and the conservatives undergirding the 
experience of Ottoman-Turkish modernity as foundational for the republic. While 
anxieties about modernization and gender –namely, the feminine body, its visibility in 
public, or more precisely, the degree of its public visibility– acts as the catalyst in this 
conflict, Edib’s gender politics exceeds this political antinomy. Edib’s overarching 
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critique of patriarchy is apparent at the beginning of the novel as we find out that Aliye’s 
predecessor has left the town having been slandered as a slut by no other than the 
Superintendent himself for not sexually submitting to him. In fact, Ömer Effendi 
volunteers to host Aliye in order to save her from his predation, but Tall Hüseyin 
replicates the same gesture by collaborating with Hadji Fettah following Aliye’s rejection 
of him. Thus, Edib’s critique extends also to the old and degenerated secular institutions 
of the Empire –bureaucracy and the gentry– as represented by these figures.  
More significantly, Aliye’s predicament, that is, her melodramatic victimization, 
has also a lot to do with Tosun and the nationalism he represents: Aliye is in love with a 
man who loves his nation more than his fiancé. As a matter of fact, Aliye confesses that 
she loves Tosun more than she loves her nation.164 And yet, when Tosun is cornered in 
his secret visit to Aliye, he regrets jeopardizing a more sacred mission for a caprice of his 
heart, for “this selfish love” for which he imperils his nation, his army and thousands of 
Turks.165 Upon realizing Tosun’s frustration, Aliye is emotionally manipulated and guilt-
driven to the idea of sacrifice not for the nation but for the man she loves, offering to 
manipulate the Greek commander’s feelings for her, risking her chastity, and even her 
life. Aliye’s resentment is palpable in the narration of this scene, as well as her 
recognition of the true nature of her deed: “This hopeless girl was doing the very same 
horrible sacrifice she defied six month ago for his love of nation that rivals her in his 
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heart.”166 Tosun welcomes this decision by saying that he does not know any soldier 
more heroic than Aliye, introducing another discursive category attached to Aliye 
especially after her death: hero. Aliye’s heroism would lead to her lynching in the name 
of Islam as Hadji Fettah distortedly publicizes her amorous sacrifice as immoral treason. 
Stuck in between two labels, slut and hero, Aliye, Vurun Kahpeye demonstrates, cannot 
develop her subjectivity and agency based on personal desire, something that is further 
emphasized by the mere number of epithets that name Aliye. Between slut and hero, 
Aliye is also called Emine by her adopted parents with reference to Prophet 
Mohammad’s mother and their deceased daughter and nicknamed “the devil’s daughter” 
by the Greek commander Damyanos. Vurun Kahpeye thus exposes the discursive hold of 
patriarchy that repeatedly cites the female body as a “slut” or a “hero” irrespective of its 
political predilection. 
It is via this patriarchal critique that I wish to revisit the nightmare of the lesbian 
kiss.  The scene of the homosexual fantasy builds on Aliye’s encounter with that 
unnamed widow earlier in the mosque. Along with the all the residents of the town, Aliye 
goes to mosque to attend the Mevlid ceremony performed by a Dede from İstanbul 
traveling through the town.167 Starting from the inspirational performance of the 
                                                
166 Ibid., 178. 
 
167 Mevlid refers to the recital of “Mevlid-i Şerif,” a poem written in Turkish by Süleyman Çelebi during 
the fifteenth century narrating the birth of the Prophet. Traditionally, Mevlid is a ritual observed to 
commemorate the deceased during funerals and death anniversaries in Anatolia. In Vurun Kahpeye, Mevlid 
is arranged by a father for the martyrs of the War of Independence on behalf of his two sons. Dede, on the 
other hand, is a religious rank in both Mevlevi and Bektashi orders. The Mevlid episode provides an 
alternative account of Islam with folkish and Sufi inflections to the Sunni orthodoxy represented by Hadji 
Fettah, as explained by Aliye: “The Dede’s profound face, beautiful voice shook her with the ecstasy of a 
saint. However, only a couple days ago, another man, a religious man of virtuous duty, had her experience 
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beginning section entitled Veladet [birth] praising Prophet Mohammed’s mother Aminah, 
Aliye is transported with tears, “understanding for the first time like a woman the 
sacredness of womanhood, the suffering and happiness of birth which is the most 
profound omen of life and nature.”168 As she continues to experience “the greatest secret 
of the soul, of the body of the woman and the mother” in her bones169 in a transfixed 
unison mediated by the recital, she catches a glimpse of the widow who has been outcast 
by the other women of the town. The widow, Gülsüm reports, has been stigmatized as a 
whore due to her pretty face after her husband’s death, called to dance in festivities in 
town. Aliye witnesses that even at the mosque, she is not served the candy that has been 
passing around. In the spirit of the moment that fills her with an “infinite compassion and 
tolerance,” Aliye, who finds this exclusion at odds with that very spirit, walks up to the 
woman and hands her the candy herself to the bewilderment of the rest of the women.170 
This display of public act of affection honoring the woman shamed by the rest of the 
believers in the room is reciprocated when the widow kisses Aliye’s hand in gratitude and 
out of respect outside her house. 
Thus, the lesbian kiss takes place between two marginalized women, which is 
underscored by the Mevlid episode where Aliye acts out of compassion to the widow in 
front of other women who are not like them. As such, Edib redefines heroism by linking 
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it with compassion as an Islamic virtue. “Our Prophet begged for his sinful community 
on the night he was born, are you greater than our Prophet,” demands Aliye, suggesting 
that judgement belongs to none and redemption is for all.171 Aliye’s heroism is about 
extending compassion to a socially rejected woman even discriminated under the roof of 
a mosque. In this respect, Edib’s feminism can be said to wage for a particular group of 
women, those who are single or widowed and victimized merely for that reason. In a 
novella set in Turkish War of Independence, Edib brings to focus of the nation the 
otherwise socially abject, pointing to an affective alliance of social outcasts categorized 
under the rubric of the whore lie Aliye, her predecessor, and the widow. 
The affective bonding between the two women captures a feminist utopic vision, 
an ephemeral vision pivoted around the figure of Amina, that transcends the patriarchal 
limitations imposed on these women. Strikingly, the text presents this vision almost as a 
substitute to Tosun’s love marked with absence and impossibility. Similar to the timing 
of the lesbian kiss that displaces Tosun’s expected kiss in Aliye’s dream, the widow 
materializes as soon as the prospect of maternity with Tosun emerges as an impossibility: 
“With a strange and mental and perhaps solely spiritual lucidity, she thought of the 
impossibility of the actualization of this exquisite feeling.”172 Without further reflection 
and right after this sentence, the focal point shifts to the widow Aliye notices kneeled 
against the wall behind the lines of women preceding Aliye’s act of compassion. 
Considering the sequentiality in the narration, the text advances Aliye’s gesture enabling 
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the social recognition of the widow as almost expanding the notion of birth, as 
compassion rivals procreation.    
The same pattern is repeated at the end of the novella as Edib dedicates Aliye’s 
last vision to the same woman right before she dies during her lynching. Edib, through 
Aliye’s stupor, stages this violent scene as a scene of sacrifice set in the Feast of Sacrifice 
as Aliye is described as a lamb. While some members of the crowd attempt to halt the 
killing, some support it by yelling “Chop her, chop her; for the nation, for the penance of 
the town chop her.”173 With this, Aliye’s thoughts are driven to Tosun, for “the nation 
was Tosun,” and Aliye reckons with death, as “good might be born like a child out of 
torment, sacrifice, and death.”174 It is at this juncture that the vision of the widow 
appears, telling Aliye “do not fear” against the backdrop of a quatrain from Mevlid 
performed by the Dede175. With this, “Tosun and the thousand delicate and beautiful 
things Tosun represents flickered in her soul and took off”176 Once again, the widow 
thwarts narration at the most unexpected moment when Aliye envisions death as birth 
enabled by the widow.  
But what does this pattern mean? Clearly, Edib envisions Aliye’s melodrama in 
terms of an impossible love overdetermined by social conditions that render Tosun 
emotionally unavailable for Aliye. Just to reiterate, Aliye loves a man who loves his 
                                                










nation more than Aliye. And yet, alongside this impossibility, another impossibility 
strikes us: a feminist alliance that lies not only beyond available political realms and 
outside the conditions of possibility of the novella’s world. The dream that immediately 
follows the Mevlid episode only emphasizes this impossibility through the lesbian kiss. 
What renders the homosexual kiss an impossibility is not different from what makes this 
friendship unviable within the strictures of patriarchy. In Vurun Kahpeye, Edib unveils 
the workings of heteropatriarchy in curbing female agency and solidarity, a project to 
which not only Islamist but also secularist ideologies are indebted as heteropatriarchal 
projects. We have seen this with how alliance towards national independence has been 
forged on women’s labor but with the goal of excluding them. The patriarchal quarantine 
of the site of politics was a collaborative project between the political fractions of the 
nation. 
In conclusion, it is the melodramatic mode that allows Edib to point to a feminist 
vision beyond the patriarchal order in which she is entangled, a vision of excess that is 
close to her gendered performance that cannot find its place discursively outside of the 
fictional space of literature within the media network. It is melodrama as a gendered 
genre of excess that accommodates Edib’s vision. Melodramatic excess can be found not 
solely in the body of its subjects or the visceral reactions of spectators,177 but first and 
foremost in the very structure of melodrama that always creates its own abject through its 
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the audience’s body elliciting physical reactions. See Linda Williams, “Film Bodies: Gender, Genre, and 




dialectics. Jonathan Goldberg calls this the “queer contradiction” inherent in melodrama, 
a situation that cannot be translated into and resolved within the Manichean world of 
melodrama.178 The unnamed widow and the fantasy of the lesbian kiss denote that very 
field, marking the queerness that Edib’s feminism embodies in its resistance to the 
(hetero)patriarchal imaginaries of the nation state. Thus, on the one hand, Vurun Kahpeye 
anticipates the melodrama that awaits Edib two years before her disposal from the 
national stage by Mustafa Kemal. And yet, it also hints at Edib’s feminist praxis that 
outdoes the “law of the father” in its imaginings through writing. On the other hand, Edib 
lends a queer melodrama to the nation that continues to live in many forms and formats 
within the experience of Turkish modernity always in excess of its normative framework. 
 
                                                




VURUN KAHPEYE (1949): INFRASTRUCTURES OF SECULARISM 
In his seminal Formations of the Secular, Talal Asad arrives at his definition of 
secularism via a discussion of the work of media: 
The modern nation as an imagined community is always mediated through 
constructed images. When Taylor says that a modern democracy must acquire a 
healthy dose of nationalist sentiment he refers to the national media –including 
national education– that is charged with cultivating it. For the media are not 
simply the means through which individuals simultaneously imagine their 
national community; they mediate that imagination, construct the sensibilities that 
underpin it. When Taylor says that the modern state has to make citizenship the 
primary principle of identity, he refers to the way it must transcend the different 
identities built on class, gender, and religion, replacing conflicting perspectives by 
unifying experience. In an important sense, this transcendent mediation is 
secularism.1 
 
For Asad, then, secularism is analogous to media in that they both mediate social 
differences towards homogenous omnipotent signifiers in distinct realms: the former 
towards the imagined nation and the latter towards the making of the citizen. I wish to 
follow Asad’s conjectures about the implicated relationship between secularism and 
media by volunteering an instantiation of the collusion of these tangential trajectories in 
the context of a nation state whose founding principle is arguably secularism. Turning to 
1949, I will demonstrate how cinema, at the moment of its evolution as an industry 
proper in Turkey, emerges as a medium through which not simply a secular national 
community is imagined, but also ideal forms of citizenship gets articulated. Moreover, in 
this account, cinema participates in the disciplinary project of secularism that shapes the 
sensibilities, behavior, and disposition of national imagination, knowledge, and 
                                                
1 Talal Asad, “Introduction: Thinking about Secularism,” Formations of the Secular.  
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subjectivity strikingly without state ownership and sponsorship. 
This chapter is centered on Lütfi Akad’s Vurun Kahpeye to show how cinema, 
through the grammar of melodrama, enables a certain kind of mobilization that is 
essential to secular nationalism. 2 The possibility of such mobilization, I argue, entails, 
first and foremost, a laying out of a prototypical distribution mechanism that ensures the 
film’s widespread dissemination throughout the country. Thus, narrating the distribution 
history behind the exhibition of the film, I will demonstrate how the cinematic 
infrastructure built around Vurun Kahpeye mediates the project of secularism through 
engendering affects on a national scale. In this, I will uncover a debate around the release 
of the film that reveals an emotionally divided audience by focusing, on the one hand, on 
the exuberant celebration of the film in the mainstream, and, on the other, on the sense of 
injury it causes within the Islamist circles. The dismissal of the calls for the censorship of 
the film, in essence, plays out Vurun Kahpeye’s narrative of national genesis that 
designates the kinds of bodies improper, unworthy, and obsolete with respect to the 
secular nation. 
 Telling the story of Vurun Kahpeye with attention to this infrastructural history 
brings to light the moment in which cinema emerges at the epicenter of social conflict in 
the nation. For the first time ever, the moving image matters with stakes that are worth 
fighting for such that cinema appears as a fault line across which the difference between 
the secular and religious is consolidated such that they translate into identity categories of 
                                                




secularists and Islamists.3 That the pious subjects of the nation refuse to be mediated as 
per the image in this instance proves, as it were, that secularism is doing its job of turning 
religious belief into identity: the Islamist. This is the very moment of the production of a 
mass public and another that draws attention to the mediatory nature of the political 
through the instance of media. In this respect, cinema appears as a medium through 
which not the projection of a nation produces its own population. Thus, it can be argued 
that Vurun Kahpeye occasions the materialization of the imagined community of the 
nation. Scholars, like Umut Tümay Arslan, have long noted cinema’s, especially 
melodrama’s, centrality to the nation as it configures a collective memory and identity by 
providing the images and sounds that we deem “us” and that produce the feeling of “us” 
at once.4 Much as cinema is undeniably the primary factory for the production of a 
national imaginary and belonging, it also, as the story of Vurun Kahpeye instantiates, 
functions as a technology to assemble a national body politic by shaping sensibilities, 
mobilizing subjects, and consolidating affiliations. By attending to the infrastructural 
development, industrial transformation, and institutional formation of cinema to which 
Vurun Kahpeye gives rise, I examine the conditions of membership to this body politic in 
order to historicize the process by which certain bodies count as “us” and others fail to do 
so.  
                                                
3 Indeed, cinema had previously incited religious sensibilities. For instance, a group of dervishes from the 
Bektashi order had raided the set of Muhsin Ertuğrul’s Boğaziçi Esrarı / Nur Baba during its production in 
1921 based on a hearsay that a film against the Order was being shot. Rakım Çalapala, “Stüdyoya Baskın,” 
Yıldız, August 1, 1944. However, the reaction in this example is not mediated by the cinematic image itself. 
As will be demonstrated below, I am referring to a particular critical relationship with the image.   
 




 My discussion runs through three different scenes that structure this chapter. The 
first section of the chapter, entitled “Lynching,” provides a reading of Vurun Kahpeye as 
a sensational melodrama that conceives of a paranoid male audience through the 
figuration of female precarity. The next section, “Shooting,” focuses on the distribution 
system that enables the film’s encounter with this audience, resulting in Vurun Kahpeye’s 
momentous mass popularity and canonicity. “Injury,” the final section of this chapter, 
unearths the undermined adverse reactions to the film in the Islamist press that stem from 
the depiction of the treacherous turbaned figure. Before I proceed, I wish to frame my 
discussion of the film with a few words of clarification on secularism in Turkey, its effect 
on cultural politics of the state, and its unrecognized kinship with cinema.  
 Roughly understood as the separation of church and state, secularism defines the 
redefinition and replacement of religion in modern society. Secularism takes a unique 
shape within the foundational ideology of the Turkish nation state, Kemalism, which 
aims to establish Turkey as a modern country belonging to the western world. To do so, 
Kemalism, derived from the name of the founding father Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, 
attempts to severe all the ties with the former Ottoman Empire that the new Turkish 
Republic replaces.5 This, of course, includes a revised relation to Islam, the official 
religion of the Ottoman Empire, by adopting and implementing a strict and hard form of 
secularism, a version of French secularism, laïcité. Accordingly, Kemalist state policies 
have since the foundation of the Republic targeted the removal of Islam from public to 
private sphere by means of social, legislature, and legal reforms regulating the way 
                                                




religion is practiced in the modern nation state. In the words of Charles Taylor, 
secularism operates as an “authoritarian programme designed to diminish the hold of 
religion on masses” in Turkey.6 Taylor’s description aptly points to a tension between a 
secularist ruling elite and the Muslim populace, a tension that has been played out in 
favor of the secularists owing to the Turkish army’s hold over politics until very recently 
in the longer history of the nation. As the history of coups in Turkey illustrate, secularism 
is militantly enforced by the army that is the absolute guardian of the Kemalist ideology.7 
 It must be noted that there is a fundamental paradox in the enactment of Turkish 
secularism. The problematic inherent in Turkish secularism is that it emerges as the 
conflation of two historical modes of secularism that Taylor follows in his important 
study. On the one hand, the state claims to occupy the site of “political morality” neutral 
to religious differences.8 Indeed, an axis that extends from the Edict of Gülhane (1839) 
and Ottoman Reform Edict (1856) of the Tanzimat to the abolishment of the Caliphate 
(1924), to the removal of Islam as the official religion of the Turkish Republic from the 
constitution in 1928, and finally to the introduction of secularism to the constitution in 
1938, the Ottoman-Turkish history attests to de-Islamization efforts en route to the 
separation of church and the state. And yet, on the other hand, the state to this day 
continues to sanction Islam as the official religion of the country through the Presidency 
                                                
6 Charles Taylor, “Modes of Secularism,” Secularism and Its Critics, 37. 
 
7 This history of coups indeed precedes the nation-state, dating to the Young Turk revolution of July 1908 
when the army raised arms to Abdülhamid and restored constitutional monarchy, entering the scene as a 
secular political force. Even as allegedly organized by the religious leader Fethullah Gülen, the recent coup 
attempt on July 2016 was put in motion in the name of secularism.  
 




of Religious Affairs that produces a version of Islam in line with the agenda of the 
various social reforms that privatize Islamic religious practice.9 Thus promoting an 
institutionalized legitimate Sunni identity defining Turkishness, the state invalidates its 
claims to neutrality vis-à-vis religious difference. Therefore, to go back to Taylor’s 
historiography of secularism, we note the deployment of “the independent ethic” 
(political morality) approach as a means to achieve secularism as “the common ground” 
model insofar as it is only based on a strictly regulated moderate form of Islam. In short, 
in Turkey, secularism signifies redefinition and repositioning of Islam as endorsed by the 
state.  
 The secularist interventionism of the state is also evident in the cultural domain, a 
domain considered not only reflective of a national mold but also instrumental in the 
disciplining of national subjects. The Kemalist regime was extremely keen on 
redesigning the cultural milieu of the new Republic as much to create a secular national 
culture as to shape public sensibilities.10 Thus, Kemalist cultural politics involved a 
                                                
9 Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, Presidency of Religious Affairs, was founded in March 1924. Historically 
speaking, the Presidency replaces the Shaykh al-Islam of the Ottoman State in the new Republic. The 
Presidency was founded to carry on the mission of the previous institution in administrating “the affairs 




10 A letter sent to Walter Benjamin by Erich Auerbach from İstanbul, his exilic home, documents the 
situation through the eyes of an outsider:  
 
Yet [Ataturk] has had to accomplish everything he has done in a struggle against the European 
democracies on the one hand, and on the other against the old Muslim, pan-Islamist sultan 
economy, and the result is a fanatical, antitraditional nationalism: a renunciation of all existing 
Islamic cultural tradition, a fastening onto a fantasy ‘ur-Turkey,’ technical modernization in the 
European sense in order to strike the hated and envied Europe with its own weapons. Hence the 
predisposition for European exiles as teachers, from whom one can learn without being afraid 
that they will spread foreign propaganda. The result: Nationalism in the superlative with the 
simultaneous destruction of the historic national character. This configuration, which in other 
 
 104 
systematic disposal of traditional aesthetic forms and a cultural heritage belonging to a 
linguistic, ethical, and spiritual standards of a bygone era, in addition to the cultivation 
and institutionalization of modern aesthetic and cultural practices.11 This was the 
Kemalist cultural nationalism that had been formulated by sociologist Ziya Gökalp from 
the second half of 1910s onwards. Gökalp proposed a synthesis between hars and 
medeniyet, culture and civilization, a binary signifying a national tradition and morality 
purged from Arabic and Persian influences (content) and a West reduced to its science, 
technology, and means and methods (style).12 The domain of music was the ultimate 
playing ground of Gökalp’s theories as the regime took a keen interest in its regulation. 
For instance, alaturka, Ottoman classical music, was first withdrawn from the curriculum 
of the state conservatory in 1926 and later banned from radio broadcasting for eight 
months in 1935.13 In the meantime, the state began to sponsor the education of what 
would later become the nation’s first Western classical music composers in Europe 
                                                                                                                                            
countries such as Germany, Italy, and indeed also in Russia (?) is not yet a certainty for 
everyone, steps forth here in complete nakedness. The language reform —at once fantastical 
ur-Turkish (“free” from Arabic and Persian influences) and modern-technical— has made it 
certain that no one under 25 can any longer understand any sort of religious, literary, or 
philosophical text more than ten years old and that, under the pressure of the Latin script, which 
was compulsorily introduced a few years ago, the specific properties of the language are rapidly 
decaying. Auerbach to Walter Benjamin, in “Scholarship in Times of Extremes,” PMLA 122, 
No. 3 (2007), 751. 
 
11 For a detailed analysis of the Kemalist cultural policies, see Orhan Koçak, “1920’lerden 1970’lere Kültür 
Politikaları,” Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce, 370-418. 
 
12 Ibid., 374-380. Like many scholars who note the significance of Gökalp, Koçak suggests that “Ziya 
Gökalp formed the program of Turkish cultural revolution.” Ibid., 376. Koçak demonstrates Gökalp’s long-
lasting influence in cultural policies after providing the terms to debate the historical tensions around 
culture. While Gökalp is commonly cited in literature on Turkish cultural history, a selection of his essays 
is available in English. See Ziya Gökalp, Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization, 1959.  
 




through bursaries.14  In this case, state censorship and sponsorship worked hand in hand 
to mold the national characteristics and social dispositions with regards to musical taste. 
As Martin Stokes emphasizes, “the state invested heavily in the production of a 
new national music” especially by means of national radio and television throughout the 
experience of republican modernity.15 Considering the intensified efforts to shape the 
acoustics of the nation, cinema’s unnoticed relationship to secular nationalism is not 
unwarranted: cinema had no place in the creation of a national culture. It is plausible to 
argue that because the Kemalist regime failed to take note of the potentiality of images, 
its cultural politics did not directly target cinema. In fact, for a long time, the state had no 
real interest in cinema, as registered by the title of a disproving essay published by 
Tuncan Okan as late as 1973: “The Only Art Form Deprived of State’s Interest: 
Cinema.”16 The Turkish film industry was subject to a rudimentary regulation of cinema 
through what Savaş Arslan defines as “a continually changing and politically volatile 
system of control and censorship.”17 And yet, as Arslan notes,“cinema in Turkey, despite 
governmental control and censorship has not been made into an instrument of the 
government.”18 Thus, as the cries for state support for cinema demonstrate, we cannot 
                                                
14 Ibid., 406. 
 
15 Martin Stokes, The Republic of Love, 17. 
 
16 Tuncan Okan, “Devletin İlgisinden Yoksun Kalan Tek Sanat Dalı: Sinema,” Milliyet Sanat Dergisi, 
October 1973. 6-7. 
 
17 Savaş Arslan, Cinema in Turkey: A New Critical History, 9. It was not until 1939 that censorship was 
centralized with a board of controllers comprised of public officials. Despite changes introduced to the 
regulation at various times, the board was technically in effect until 1986. Ibid. 51-2.  
 




really speak of the deployment or promotion of cinema for visualizing secular nation 
state.  
In fact, as Arslan mentions, the lack of state sponsorship of cinema lent a leeway 
for cinema to develop “outside the purview of the conventions of cultural westernization 
that limited other arts.”19 While private sector enabled a certain kind of autonomy for the 
industry whereby audience taste prevailingly shaped cinematic aesthetics, the practice of 
auto-censorship provides significant clues about the ideological leanings of those who 
were primarily involved in cinematic production. Arslan suggests that “[o]fficial 
censorship policies were strengthened by a self-censorship born of the ideas of tutelage 
and loyalty to Kemalist principles, especially during the early years or foreign film post-
synchronization (dubbing).”20 That cinema in Turkey was initially produced by those 
committed to republican ideology and norms has a historical explanation that we can find 
in Okan’s article. The genealogy of cinema in Turkey that Okan and others provide for 
this neglected art bespeaks cinema’s secular lineages. Cinematic production originates 
with the army, the secularist backbone of the nation since 1908 and the guarantor of the 
secular republic to this day. In 1914, Fuat Uzkınay, dubiously identified as the first 
Turkish director, was commissioned to establish “The Central Army Cinema 
Department” by the decree of the Minister of War and Commander in Chief of the period, 
                                                
19 Ibid., 53. Still, to what extent the censors influenced this autonomy is still debatable. Arslan takes note of 
a double standard in the practices of the controllers: “while foreign films were loosely controlled, strict 
oversight of domestic films began with the film script, and the board's verdict on them was permanent.” 
The board’s focus on the script more than the image and a lack of oversight during screenings arguably 
provided some freedom for filmmakers. It is also possible to assume that filmmakers in time developed a 
visual grammar to bypass the board. Still, there were cases when this was impossible; as Arslan remarks, it 
was mostly the social realist and leftist films that were most strictly censored. Ibid. 53.  
 
20 Ibid., 52.  
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Enver Pasha. The sole control of cinematic production remained with the army until 1922 
when the founders of Kemal Film, the first private film production company, obtained the 
only available equipment in the country discarded in an abandoned room. From a 
materialist point of view then, the means of cinematic production, transferred from the 
hands of the military to the private sector during the passage from an empire to the nation 
state, bears a secular legacy, one that that films preceding it inherit but Vurun Kahpeye 
illustrates most emphatically. 
Indeed, Vurun Kahpeye was not the first film to showcase this legacy; its direct 
heir was the stage director and actor Muhsin Ertuğrul who began his cinematic career 
with Kemal Film in 1922.21 Ertuğrul shot several War of Independence-themed films, 
originating with the adaptation of Halide Edib’s Ateşten Gömlek [Shirt of Flame] the very 
year the Republic was founded. With the appearance of the first female cast of Turkish 
cinema, Neyire Neyyir Ertuğrul and Bedia Muvahhit, the film was one of the more 
successful productions of Ertuğrul whose monopoly of the industry led the description of 
the years between 1922 and 1949 as the era of the dramatists. Still, the underdevelopment 
of the cinematic infrastructure resulted in the dissemination of these films mostly within 
urban circles. In 1923, for instance, there were only thirty theaters in Turkey,22 which 
reached up to 129 in 1932.23  A year before Akad’s debut, Vurun Kahpeye, there were 
                                                
21 Arslan, Cinema in Turkey, 53. 
 
22 Nezih Coş, “Türkiye’de Sinemaların Dağılışı,” Akademik Sinema, August 1969. 
 




228 theaters across the country.24 Akad’s success was that he was able to make use of this 
infrastructural expansion with a cinematic language that resonated with the masses. With 
Vurun Kahpeye, Akad broke the hegemony of Ertuğrul and his entourage who used 
cinema for the advancement of their primary occupation, theater, by catering to the 
expectations of an audience trained by domesticated Egyptian melodramas since 1938.25  
 
Lynching: Vurun Kahpeye as a Sensational Melodrama 
Adapted to screen for the first time from Halide Edib’s eponymous novella, Vurun 
Kahpeye visualizes a narrative of victimization faithful to the plot line of the story. Set in 
a small Anatolian town during the Turkish Independence War fought against the Greeks, 
the film recounts the story of a recently-appointed teacher from Istanbul, Aliye, who 
becomes an active proponent of the nationalist cause in her new town. Aliye’s promotion 
of the secular nationalists threatens the waning power of the leading clergyman of the 
town, Hadji Fettah. To put an end to her growing appeal and influence, Hadji Fettah 
incites the locals against Aliye by slandering her as an immoral kafir, a non-believer, due 
to her unveiled face and active public visibility. On account of Aliye’s recent engagement 
with the local militia leader Tosun, Hadji Fettah resorts to a plot to remove Aliye and the 
nationalists by secretly inviting the Greek army into town in the absence of the nationalist 
                                                
24 Ahmet Gürata, “Tears of Love: Egyptian Cinema in Turkey (1938-1950),” New Perspectives on Turkey 
30 (Spring 2004), 57. 
 
25 In Turkish film historiography, the film is treasured for terminating the era of the dramatists by 
introducing an innovative director with a cinematic vision outside the theater circles that until then 
monopolized Turkish filmmaking. As film theorist and director Halit Refiğ notes “[a]fter Akad’s situation, 
the idea that one does not need to be a dramatist to make a film became more acceptable.” Halit Refiğ, 
Sinemada Ulusal Tavır: Halit Refiğ Kitabı, interview by Şengün Kılıç Hristidis, 69. 
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militia. The Greek invasion of the town requires Aliye to interact with the Greek 
commander to help the Turkish forces save the town. Soon as the town is cleared from 
the Greeks, Hadji Fettah takes advantage of the chaos to put in motion his ploy to kill 
Aliye. Accusing her of alluring the Greek commander into town and later sleeping with 
him, Hadji Fettah incenses the public and rallies a mob to lead the lynching of Aliye in 
the name of moral cleansing with the chanted imperative that marks the title of the film.  
Despite this shared plot line, screenwriter and director Lütfi Akad provides an 
ideological rendering of this shared plot line through a re-figuration of Aliye. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, Halide Edib’s Vurun Kahpeye lends itself to a feminist 
reading that exposes the opposing ideologies of Islamism and secularism as both 
heteropatriarchal. Edib’s story, more than anything else, is Aliye’s melodrama as a 
woman in the face not only of the oppressive backward forces that act in the name of 
Islam but also of the demands of the emerging secular nation-state. Akad abandons 
Edib’s feminist critique that subtly undermines the secular politics of her text and the 
ethos of its time. This discrepancy lies at the moment when Aliye takes the risk of 
reciprocating the Greek commander’s interest in order to cease the surveillance of her 
house and thus facilitate Tosun’s escape from entrapment. In the novella, this moment 
marks Aliye’s devastating realization that their love is impossible because Tosun is first 
and foremost dedicated to the nationalist cause. Tosun blames “this selfish love” for his 
secret visit to Aliye that risks “the life of my country, my army, and thousands of 
Turks.”26 The novella vocalizes Aliye’s consternations in the aftermath of this accusation. 
                                                
26 Halide Edib, Vurun Kahpeye, 173. 
 
 110 
Consequently, Aliye, driven at once by guilt and sorrow, decides to sacrifice her purity 
and life for the man “I love more than my country.”27 This personal-over-political 
message of the novella disappears thanks to the lack of this dialogue, as Aliye without 
hesitation willingly volunteers herself for the trick in Akad’s Vurun Kahpeye. In the film, 
Aliye explains her decision as follows: The nation is a higher entity than us. To sacrifice 
oneself for it is something honorable.” Indeed, the stark division in the interpretation of 
this scene emblematizes the repression of the feminist inconsistencies of the literary text, 
turning Aliye from an unwilling conscript of secular nationalism to its complete agent 
and martyr.  
Akad essentially translates Vurun Kahpeye into a sensational melodrama wherein 
gender exclusively designates the paradigmatic fault line amplifying the irreconcilability 
between secularist and Islamist worldviews. In this section, I will provide a reading of the 
film as a melodrama of the secular nation state with an emphasis on gender. I argue that 
on the one hand, the film fantasizes a desensitized and desexualized femininity 
embellished with virtues such as patriotism, bravery, and independence, exposing the 
patriarchal demands of the nation. On the other hand, it also assigns a precarity to this 
femininity that entails a patriarchal guardianship whose incarnation I trace in the 
reactions to the film in the following section. I will ultimately demonstrate that Akad’s 
linking of gender and secular nationalism is based on sensationalizing the melodramatic 
features of Vurun Kahpeye. As will be shown, Akad’s use of the soundtrack plays a 
pivotal role in imagining the nation through gender in a way that audiences bodily 
                                                




First, it is important to comprehend the Manichean opposition that structures this 
melodrama. The division is graphed onto the secular nationalists and their enemies, each 
group collected around its representative central figure. On the one hand, we have Aliye, 
and her recently adopted parents in town, a sidekick student named Durmuş, and her 
fiancé Tosun. Against this grouping, the film positions Hadji Fettah who allies with the 
leading gentry Uzun Hüseyin as well as the Greeks. Aliye appears as an object of desire 
for all the characters, even for those in the opposite camp except Hadji Fettah. It is the 
female body –its visibility in public, or more precisely, its degree of public visibility– that 
catapults an ideological conflict. Aliye’s transgression of the traditional local Islamic 
wardrobe, namely her unveiled face without a black niqab, taken as a political challenge 
accounts for Hadji Fettah’s enmity: It is because of the nationalists that women like Aliye 
can go unveiled in public in defiance of the Islamic law and tradition, a development that 
symbolizes his waning power in his community. Through this antagonism, the narrative 
animates the power struggle between the emerging secular order and the dying regime of 
Islam. 
 Interestingly, the struggle between these ideological positions are staged for the 
public in search of their body, as exemplified in a scene of encounter at the town’s square 
foreshadowing the scene of lynching. The scene begins with Hadji Fettah giving a speech 
to a crowd, provoking his audience against “the foes of religion,” the nationalists “who 
would violate the sacred word as soon as they have the power.” “They will not only cause 
the demise of the Sultan,” says Hadji Fettah, “but also lead the enemy to dishonor and 
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loot us by enraging them,” suggesting that it is the nationalist resistance that renders the 
Greeks more hostile towards people. The talk is interrupted with Aliye’s arrival to the 
square with her students. Hadji Fettah immediately directs his anger at Aliye: “You see 
strangers with their unconcealed faces and eyes wander around singing songs to breed 
bad blood amongst men. These are accursed; do not entrust your children to them. Unless 
you want to see the enemy within us one day, dismember these women!” Hadji Fettah’s 
call to violence is cut short due to Tosun who turns up on horseback with his men back to 
town. The moment that could become Aliye’s death miraculously turns into a love at first 
sight as Aliye and Tosun chance upon each other. 
The scene plays out the clash between the representatives of secular nationalism 
and antinationalist Islamism through two distinct rhetorical modes: the march as a vehicle 
of indoctrination and the vaaz, an Islamic form of sermon, as a means of incitement. 
Having provided them with flags and organized them into a procession, Aliye shepherds 
her students through the town. An accompanying anthem sung by the students increases 
the volume of the public display of nationalism of the march, which collides with Hadji’s 
vaaz. If Aliye is authoritatively, or better yet militaristically, dictates her rule to a body of 
students, Hadji Fettah engages the public in a more affective way through a deployment 
of politics of fear in an attempt to convince his audience that the nationalists pose a threat 
to Islam, the Sultan, and their women and possessions. In this way, Hadji Fettah assumes 
the role of the custodian of Islam, just as Aliye functions as the agent of secular 
nationalism. At the moment of its appearance, Aliye’s body serves both as evidence for 
moral corruption and as harbinger of a revolutionary transformation that would result in 
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the end of a social order of which Hadji Fettah is in command. No sooner he sees the 
march than is he aware of Aliye’s control over the future generations; poisoning the 
Muslim children, she embodies the threat to Islam. And thus, Aliye becomes the source 
of the fear that Hadji Fettah incites through a projection of a future –a doomed degenerate 
Muslim society. Therefore, Hadji Fettah orders Aliye’s destruction in the name of Islam. 
The film’s staging of this ideological conflict before an audience implicates the 
viewer. As per its melodramatic structure, the film guides the audience through a laying 
out of a moral polarity between Aliye and Hadji Fettah. What defines Aliye is her 
dedication to the nation, as delivered by her mantra initially heard as a voice-over at the 
beginning of the film and later repeated in the diegesis a few times: “Your land is my 
land, your home my home; I will be a mother, a light for this place, for the children of 
this land, and I will fear nothing; I swear by Allah!” It is due to this dedication that Aliye 
goes to Anatolia to teach, not only democratizing the classroom by bringing justice to a 
corrupt order privileging the children of the gentry, but also modernizing the methods of 
education with satisfying results for the parents. As we have already seen, Aliye’s 
dedication to the nation is selfless, risking her chastity for the liberation of the nation 
when needed, a virtue that she protects like a vow having turned down the Uzun 
Hüseyin’s and the Greek commander’s interest in her. Whereas Aliye can gladly consign 
the ring that is the only token from her deceased mother to pay for the fabric she would 
use to embroider a flag in support of the nationalists, Hadji Fettah provokes the public 
against the nationalists in protest of the militia forces collecting money in support of their 
campaign against the enemy. For his own selfish interest, Hadji Fettah goes far as 
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collaborating with the Greeks while slandering Aliye as a slut through scenes of rumor 
that are available to the viewer but not to Aliye. This knowledge difference –what we 
could consider as melodramatic irony– is a significant mechanism to clarify the moral 
opposites that these characters represent.28 The above-mentioned scene serves a critical 
purpose in graphing this moral polarization onto the Manichean positions of the good and 
the bad, once Aliye, upon the pleas of town wives, dissuades Tosun from punishing Hadji 
Fettah for inciting the public against her. That Aliye saves the life of her lyncher does not 
simply add a melodramatic twist to the storyline, but further accentuates her innocence, 
of Hadji Fettah’s deeds against her behind the scene, as well as his accusation about her 
promiscuity. 
At its climax, the scene of lynching most powerfully conveys the affective hold of 
the melodrama that Vurun Kahpeye is by translating moral positionalities into moral 
identities. It is thanks to the rendering of the antagonism in terms of a victim and a 
perpetrator that the film can appeal to the feelings of the audience. The visualization of 
the unjust treatment of the innocent –presumably the first depiction of public lynching in 
the history of Turkish cinema– evokes sympathy and outrage at once. The scene is once 
again staged this time in a way to orchestrate a dialectic of precisely these feelings. 
Dragged with a rope tied around her hands by Hadji Fettah who is leading a mob, Aliye is 
taken onto a higher platform. From there Hadji Fettah speaks to the crowd, inflaming 
them against Aliye who refuses his allegations and exposes Hadji Fettah’s ploy, begging 
                                                
28 I refer here to what Christine Gledhill describes as “the rhetorical structure of melodrama in which 
narrative and mise-en-scene offer the audience the privileged insight necessary to the functioning of 
pathos.” Christine Gledhill, “Christine Gledhill on ‘Stella Dallas,’” Cinema Journal 25, no. 4 (Summer 
1986), 48.  
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the crowd to stop and instead punish Hadji Fettah and Uzun Hüseyin. Once again, the 
film positions a group of addressees that implicate the audience. The pathetic affect 
operates through another gap between our privileged knowledge and the townspeople’s 
ignorance of Aliye’s innocence. In this way, the characters indirectly appeal to the 
viewer, intensifying the emotional reach of sympathy and outrage as Aliye, rather 
theatrically like an actress from her stage, addresses and implores the crowd to stop and 
instead punish the actual betrayers. Once Hadji Fettah invites the crowd to “strike the 
slut” and hits Aliye’s face with a stone, the camera pulls back to reveal the crowd 
swarming to attack her with the echoes of Hadji Fettah’s words. As the aerial shot, 
subsequent to the reverse angle shot of Aliye taken down by Hadji Fettah, illustrates, 
Aliye disappears amidst a hysteric host of men violently lynching her. After a fade to 
black, we see Aliye’s mutilated body covered in blood lying on the ground. Akad’s 
prolongation and dramatization of the scene is noteworthy. 
Clearly, Vurun Kahpeye’s affective range is not constrained to the feelings of 
sympathy and outrage. In Peter Brooks’ established account on the form, melodrama’s 
main function is the restoral of moral clarity in a world absent from religious and 
monarchic authorities.29 Indeed, the entire politics of melodrama is hinged upon this 
transition from moral chaos to moral clarity. Dating the dramatic roots of the form back 
to the French Revolution, Brooks talks about the ideological work melodrama performs 
for the emerging regime in a post-sacred world; melodrama assuages anxieties about the 
                                                




new secular order that it raises.30 Following this logic, Vurun Kahpeye removes the 
lingering sense of injustice that defines the moral crisis, the victimization of the innocent, 
with the hanging of Hadji and his accomplice when the Turkish army takes the town back 
and dispels the Greeks from Anatolia. From a Brooksian point of view, Akad’s Vurun 
Kahpeye then can be said to do the ideological work for the newly independent secular 
nation state by overcoming the moral chaos engendered by political indeterminacy –due 
to the lack of authority within the framework of war and occupation. Simply put, political 
order – the secular regime– restores moral order by reinstating justice.  
Key to this formula of restoration is the dialectics of victimhood whereby 
victimization first grants righteousness which then activates and justifies –usually 
violent– political action.31 With this dialectics in mind, the visual rendering of each 
corpse is noteworthy for us to expand on the ideological working of Vurun Kahpeye. 
Aliye’s disfigured body is found by her adopted mother and Durmuş who cover it with 
the flag she embroidered with the fabric she purchased after selling her mother’s sole 
memento. The sorrowful note of a violin in the background complements the mourning 
figures. Compare this to the disguised scene of hanging of Hadji Fettah and Uzun 
Hüseyin who are brought near a tree by three soldiers. As they stop and their faces 
express shock, the camera cuts to a pair of nooses dangling from a branch. After three 
additional shots that capture the terror on their faces, the film hard cuts to the final shot of 
the sequence that depicts the two suspending bodies from knees below. The prolonged 
                                                
30 Ibid. 
 
31 See Chapter I for a longer discussion of this process. 
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melodramatization of Aliye’s butchery from her capture to her corpse wrapped in a flag 
targets to animate the feelings previously discussed. Conversely, the short and unseen 
scene of capital punishment and the image of the corpses are structured to block 
emotional association. In this way, Vurun Kahpeye operates as a pedagogy of secularism 
designating the kind of bodies to be sorry while abjecting the others from the nation.  
Moreover, Vurun Kahpeye’s training of sensibilities within the secularist ideology 
manifest itself as prominently also outside the diegesis. As noted earlier, Akad makes a 
sensational melodrama out of Edib’s Vurun Kahpeye, weaving together visual, literary, 
and audial extra-diegetic elements to create a multimedia experience for the entire human 
sensorium. The most conspicuous example is the interlude used to bridge the sequence of 
lynching and that of the capital punishment, allowing for the transition from moral crisis 
to moral clarity. Akad inserts a montage of documentary footage of the Turkish cavalier 
presumably taken from the archives of the War of Independence –various cuts of 
marching that bookends a few soldiers landing a flag on a hilltop. With the soundtrack of 
the anthem that sings “Ye patria, cease your tears, for we have arrived,” the footage 
heralds the arrival of the Turkish army to correct the wrong, to punish the crime. Akad’s 
decision here can be read as an attempt to bring his feature closer to a vérité, linking both 
the narrative of victimization and its resolution to historical truth for his audience.  
In fact, the same gesture is noticeable with the dedication that frames the film. 
The opening credits, which appear on the pages of Vurun Kahpeye defined as “the 
National Novel,” end with a freeze frame of a meadow involving an inscription that 
reads: “This film is dedicated to the souls of the Turkish women who fell martyr during 
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the War of Independence.” Such instances of extradiegetic components help the film 
invoke and channel the past to heighten its emotional impact on the audience. A closer 
look would also suggest that they simultaneously engage in a project of reimagining the 
past for its audience. As the dedication literalizes, Akad conceptualizes and promotes 
Aliye’s victimhood in terms of martyrdom. And yet, if Aliye is a martyr, she is martyred 
not by the Greeks against whom the Turks are giving their fight, but by her fellow 
countrymen. Counterintuitively and strikingly, Vurun Kahpeye presents a narrative of 
national genesis that points both to the enemy within, the religious zealot, as the major 
threat to the nation.  
I am suggesting that Vurun Kahpeye harnesses cinema’s possibilities to merge 
secularism and nationalism through a deployment of gender. As mentioned, it does so 
with an interplay of diegetic and extradiegetic elements that produce an assemblage of 
secular nationalism. Its most pronounced instantiation is the epilogue where the film’s 
pedagogical ambitions come close to didacticism. The epilogue begins with Durmuş 
sitting where Aliye was slain, as the crippled Tosun returns to the town unaware of her 
tragic demise. Once Durmuş breaks the news, Tosun asks first of Aliye’s last words and 
then of what the mob was saying when they were slaughtering her. The juxtaposition of 
Aliye’s mantra and the call “Strike the slut!” in the mouth of Durmuş once again 
emphasizes the distinction of the right from the wrong. In the background we hear a 
somber harmonic note, soon to become an intro to a musically modernized hymn of a 
Yunus Emre poem, “Ne Zaman Anarsam Seni” [Whenever I Remember You] that 
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accompanies Durmuş taking Tosun to Aliye’s burying ground.32 Here, Tosun gives a 
eulogy that provides a commentary on her legacy:  
Aliye, I will devote my life to loving like you, to being self-sacrificing like you, 
doing the things you did. In the same way you were the emblem of love, 
compassion, and goodness; in the same way you were brave against the 
destruction of this abode by the deceitful, I will not be afraid, just like you. I will 
keep your dear memory, along with that of all the Turkish women who fell martyr 
for this nation, in my heart until I die. The lips that would repeat the degree of the 
torment you suffered, of the self-sacrifice you exercised are now forever silent. 
But you vowed to me, a vow bigger than everyone’s. 
 
As though to negate Tosun’s prophecy, Aliye, in the form of a voice over, repeats her 
mantra: “Your land is my land, your home my home; I will be a mother, a light for this 
place, for the children of this land, and I will fear nothing.” With this, a women’s choir 
starts singing the national anthem, whose first phrase “Do not fear,” as though in support 
of Aliye, refers back to her words. Through an intricate use of the soundtrack, the 
epilogue connects multiple discursive registers bracketed between an invocation of 
folkish Islam and the citation of the national anthem. In between, Tosun addresses Aliye 
not exactly as his fiancé but as a national martyr, devoid of any personal terms of 
endearment. The tone of his address is not romantic, but heroic, as it demonstrates not 
love but respect, glorifying her exemplary qualities of bravery and unselfishness. Aliye’s 
                                                
32 Yunus Emre (1238-1320) was a significant Turkish Sufi mystic poet who has been influential in the 
Anatolian culture of a folkish Islam. Scholar of Turkish literature Talat S. Halman explains Yunus Emre’s 
secularizing impact in terms of Turkish humanism with a universal reach:  
 
The tradition of Turkish humanism is best represented by Yunus Emre. His poetry embodies the 
quintessence of Turkish Anatolian–Islamic humanism. He was the most significant literary figure 
of Turkish Anatolia to assimilate the teachings of Islam and to forge a synthesis of Islam’s primary 
values and mystic folk poetry. Yunus Emre, the first great Turkish humanist, stood squarely 
against Muslim dogmatists in expressing the primary importance of human existence. Talat S. 
Halman, A Millennium of Turkish Literature, 16.  
 
Thus, in addition to the rendering of the hymn, Akad’s choice of Yunus Emre is in and of itself noteworthy 
and telling.  
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words that segue into the national anthem with the word “fear” convey, like a torch 
passed on next generations, that Aliye’s legacy will outlive her body.  
In this, the film strives to construct an ideal image of a desexualized secular 
femininity that is selflessly and blindly devoted to the nation. And yet, Aliye’s grave and 
the disembodied voices that haunt the screen highlight the challenges awaiting this 
womanhood. As implied earlier, Vurun Kahpeye imagines the nation through a kinship 
formation, and positions the enemy outside of this make-shift family that the emerging 
nation is. Indeed, the underlying family under attack motif is integral to the film’s 
melodramatic modes of appeal, and, obviously, the most precarious member of this 
family is the woman under the threat of the fanatics. Therefore, Vurun Kahpeye defines 
its idealized female subjectivity with a sense of precarity that flashes now and then when 
Aliye is paralyzed with terror during her encounters with her enemies. In the 
confrontation scene, for instance, before Aliye reaches to the square with her students, 
Uzun Hüseyin’s intimidating gaze stops her dead and his menacing words leave her with 
a terrified look. Durmuş steps forward and says, “Don’t be afraid, Hoca Hanım, I would 
slay whoever lays a hand on you,” words that encourage her to restart the march. In the 
following scene, Hadji Fettah’s orders to attack her are interrupted with Tosun and his 
men’s timely arrival. These scenes not only associate the female body with precarity but 
also link female agency to male protection. It is not a coincidence that the same look of 
shock and horror we have observed in Aliye’s body are replicated in Uzun Hüseyin and 
Hadji Fettah in front of the nooses, a mirroring produced once again as a result of the 
paternalistic intervention of the army. Therefore, especially considering the finale where 
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it is the father and the son, Tosun and Durmuş, who survive the imagined family, my 
point is that the film not only determines the terms of secular femininity but also calls 
forth a male subject in defense of this femininity. 
 
Shooting: Vurun Kahpeye As a Sensation 
Hailed as the best War of Independence-themed film produced by then, Vurun 
Kahpeye resonates with audiences like no other Turkish film before as evidenced by the 
palpable exuberance in the press. “The Only Successful National Film,” reads the title of 
a review, one, the author argues, “that deserves the title National Film amongst those 
done under the same rubric.”33 As the newspapers and journals passionately sang the 
praises of the film, Vurun Kahpeye became a true national phenomenon. Recording that 
“There was a scene of holiday in Taksim,” another critic mentions the difficulty he had 
getting tickets for the film due to a crowd one could only wish for other Turkish films.34 
Indeed, any piece on the film from the period takes stock of crowds of people flocking at 
the theaters in numbers unwitnessed before for a domestic production. The first reviewer, 
on the other hand, confesses that “I was watching a local film without getting bored and 
with great attention for the first time,”35 signifying the aesthetic superiority of foreign 
films that dominated the market by then. Essential to this interest is the film’s emotional 
impact on its audience as the viewers were moved to tears by the memory of the war 
                                                
33 Selçuk K. Emre, “Muvaffak Olmuş Tek Milli Film: Vurun Kahpeye,” Halk Dergisi, March 1949. 
 
34 Turhan Ediz, “Bir Filmin Tenkidi: Vurun Kahpeye,” Son Saat, March 21, 1949. 
  




days, of sacrifices made and prices paid. In addition to this sense of nostalgia, the film 
was lauded for channeling those days for the new generations, enlivening a spirit 
compared to the one that moved the nation to victory in its fight for independence. As a 
news report on the film attests to, Vurun Kahpeye turned out to be a living proof that “the 
spirit of Kuva-yi Milliye [National Forces] is not dead in our people.”36 All in all, the 
film stirs up the nationalist feelings of the public that seems to develop a new relationship 
with a local film in unprecedented terms in a market hegemonized by imports, especially 
those from Egypt between 1938 and 1948.37    
The emotional reactions to the film register, in the words of the above-mentioned 
quote, “the enthusiastic display of the spectacular national feeling and excitement that the 
film has engendered in its viewers.”38 One such instance to which the title of this section 
refers effusively exemplifies the affective efficacy of the film vis-à-vis its audience. In an 
interview, the renowned producer Hürrem Erman relates a memorable anecdote regarding 
a screening of Vurun Kahpeye in the northern Anatolian town of Bafra in the spring of 
1949: 
Our film is going to be exhibited in a summer garden. The garden is 
extremely crowded. The summer garden cinemas then would host more than 
a thousand people. In the evening, we ran the film and tested the copy. In the 
meantime, the audience was slowly coming. Before it was too late, they 
jammed the space. The film began. Already in the beginning there were 
                                                
36 “Bir Filim Münasebetiyle,” ANT, April 6, 1949. 
  
37 On the dominance and domestication of Egyptian cinema in Turkey, see Gürata, “Tears of Love: 
Egyptian Cinema in Turkey (1938-1950).” In this ten-year period of what Gürata defines as 
“Egyptomania,” there were 130 Egyptian films screened in Turkey as opposed to 60 films that were locally 
produced with 20 of them being shot in 1947-48. Ibid., 56. 
 




applauses. I am also watching the film with the audience at the side, 
sometimes observing them. I take note of where they react and such. During 
one of the most dynamic scenes of the film when Hadji Fettah and Uzun 
Hüseyin invite the Greek army into the town in order to realize their own 
ploy, a voice broke from the very back of the garden: “Enough with you 
Hadji Fettah!” followed by unmentionably vulgar curses. Before I figured out 
what was going on, there were gunshots. When I jumped on my feet to see 
what was happening, a bulky man with an ugly face was firing at the screen 
from one of the back rows. Suddenly, a commotion broke out in the garden. 
We stopped the screening of the film. Otherwise, things were going to get 
worse. Next day, I had an argument with the exhibitor. The viewer was an 
important man from the gentry. He had completely perforated the screen. 
Leaving most of the profit to the exhibitor, I kind of ran away from Bafra.39 
 
We may easily dismiss this anecdote as harking back to an outdated model of 
spectatorship. One is inevitably reminded of the founding myth of cinema, that of the 
purportedly fleeing audience in panic at the sight of the train moving towards them 
during the first screening of the Lumiere Brothers’ “The Arrival of the Train at La 
Ciotat.” And yet, fifty-four years later, this stunning memory rather reveals cinema’s 
affective lure. Far from mistaking and submitting to the image as real through fear, the 
viewer in Erman’s anecdote defies the image as a consequence of rage. That is, he acts in 
protest of the extent of the villainy Hadji Fettah demonstrates as he surreptitiously and 
treacherously colludes with the enemy. At the moment when the clergyman’s villainy 
gets articulated through treason, the viewer, shocked, is moved in both senses of the 
words: first, emotionally through anger and secondly, physically to interact with the film. 
The curses and the gunshots he fires at the screen in the face of this unfathomably 
horrendous act cut the film short of the point before Aliye’s lynching. Considering that 
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Hadji Fettah as well as his accomplice are hanged at the end of the film, we can argue 
that the infuriated viewer preemptively restores order and dispense justice for the secular 
nation state to come. In other words, the film interpellates the viewer to act in the name 
of the secular state, positions him as its guardian, but above all, renders him as its subject. 
My point is not that the film in some miraculous way ideologically proselytizes 
the viewer. Rather, what I am suggesting is that this anecdote marks the film’s imagined 
encounter with its desired audience. I would emphasize the significance of the cinematic 
medium in this anecdote that embodies the successes of cinema as a relay of secularism 
as translating social positions into identity formations. Cinema thus concretizes social 
fractures by providing shape, form, and body to their constituents in the social imaginary. 
I argue that this kind of mobilization essential to the secular nationalist project could only 
happen through the work of the cinematic medium. Cinema plays a central role in the 
affective animation of secularism in the public sensorium in a way that, say, literature 
cannot, especially in a context like Turkey where literacy had belonged to a limited 
group. As mentioned earlier, Vurun Kahpeye was adapted from a novella by notable 
feminist Halide Edib originally serialized in Ottoman Turkish between 1923 and 1924 
and later printed as a book in 1926, a decade when literacy rates were estimated to be 
around 10 per cent with stark differences between urban and rural and male and female 
populations.40 Even when the book was translated into modern day Turkish in 1943, 
fifteen years after the so-called language revolution jettisoning the Perso-Arabic script 
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and adopting the Latin one instead, official literacy figures were below 28.45.41 Given 
these literacy rates in which we need to situate Vurun Kahpeye’s print history preceding 
its incarnation as a film, it is possible to surmise that Vurun Kahpeye does not generate 
any comparable reaction –in both shape and size– due to its relatively limited reach in 
print. Indeed, to make this claim we must pay heed to alternative reading practices that 
take place in communal and informal spaces such as coffeehouses. And yet, such 
gendered and urban circuits of literature cannot compete with a more democratic media 
literacy that images require. As I will show below, Vurun Kahpeye actualizes the 
democratic potentiality of the cinematic medium through an infrastructural innovation by 
making cinema accessible across the nation, thereby closing the gap between 
geographical social differences.42 It is therefore cinema’s demotic nature that popularizes 
Vurun Kahpeye’s story as interpreted by Akad to a large audience that had hitherto been 
unavailable, mediating the nation in a capacity that its print cannot. 
Released six years after the transcription of Edib’s text into modern day Turkish, 
Akad’s Vurun Kahpeye signals the populist propensities of Turkish cinema that Yeşilçam 
                                                
41 According to the official figures by the Turkish Statistical Institute, literacy rates escalated from 18.70 
per cent in 1935 to 28.45 per cent in 1945 when the literacy rate for the male population was 44.25 per cent 
as opposed to 13.51 for the female population. In 1950, a year after the release of Vurun Kahpeye, 31.8 per 
cent of the total population was literate. It remains unknown but highly possible to me that literacy is 
defined with the knowledge of modernized Turkish, not Ottoman Turkish. Therefore, these figures very 
likely only signify the population who would have access to Edib’s Vurun Kahpeye in modern day Turkish 
after its transcription. Turkish Statistical Institute, “1.17. Adult Population Literacy Rate by Sex,” 
Statistical Indicators 1923-2011, 19. 
 
42 It is of great importance to note that the population in Turkey was concentrated in towns and villages 
rather than provinces or district centers until the middle of 1980s. Between 1945 and 1950, more than 75 
per cent of the population was living outside urban centers. Turkish Statistical Institute, “Share in Total 





institutionalizes in the 50s. For the first time for a domestic film, Akad’s debut 
instantiates cinema as an aesthetics of popular by developing a cinematic language for the 
masses analyzed in the previous section. As film theorist and director Halit Refiğ 
observes, “Akad’s Vurun Kahpeye was a very big success. But this success was largely 
stemming from its subject. Lütfi Akad’s success there was to narrate that subject in a 
shape that the audience of the day could easily follow.”43 In creating an accessible 
cinematic language to masses, Akad recognizes the emergence of a new audience trained 
by the Egyptian melodramatic singer films with an indeginized soundscape that had for 
the last ten years dominated the market and by its rivaling secondary American adventure 
films. While Akad’s grammar caters to this audience attuned to sensationalism, by 
combining the melodrama and action of these respective cinemas, Vurun Kahpeye 
anticipates the two genres around which Yeşilçam would be built.  
This aesthetic appraisal notwithstanding, the mass publicity of Vurun Kahpeye 
first and foremost entails an infrastructural renovation that renders the film’s widespread 
circulation possible. An account of the mass publicity of the film must begin with the 
pioneering distribution system laid out by the producers of the film, one that evinced and 
actualized cinema’s popular and thus capitalist potentialities. I argue that Vurun 
Kahpeye’s significance lies in its seminal role in the institutionalization of cinema by 
assembling a rudimentary distribution mechanism known as the “percentage system,” a 
precursor to the fully formed distribution infrastructure model known as Regional 
                                                
43 Halit Refiğ, Sinemada Ulusal Tavır, 68. 
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Management [Bölge İşletmeciliği] that was at the heart of Yeşilçam until the 1990s.44 
Thus, just as Vurun Kahpeye’s aesthetic influence in Yeşilçam is undeniable, the 
industrial innovation it brings about sets it apart as the building block of the cinematic 
infrastructure and market through which Yeşilçam emerges.  
Before the details and consequences of this crucial transformation, it is important 
to take note of the single most significant change in the superstructure that provided the 
conditions for a local cinematic market to emerge. In 1948, the year before Vurun 
Kahpeye’s release, the changes in the municipality legislature reduced entertainment 
taxes on domestic productions from 75 per cent to 20 per cent upon the demands of the 
Local Film Producers’ Association,45 a decision commonly viewed as the first instance of 
state’s reinforcement of cinema. Understandably, this was a big blow to a cinema culture 
formed around imported films comprised largely of Egyptian productions, which filled 
the gap left by the shortage of imported American films in the 1940s due to the blocked 
major routes of film traffic as a result of the war.46 The 41 per cent tax deducted from 
each ticket sold for imported films, as opposed to the 20 percent for domestic 
productions, made domestic productions more desirable than imported films, resulting in 
a drastic decline of film imports and increase in the demand for Turkish films.47 Through 
                                                
44 Regional Management Model was a system in which regional distribution companies had the upper hand 
in the industry as the link between producers and exhibitors, shaping film production as per the demands of 
the audiences. For more on the Regional Management Model, see Chapter IV.   
  
45 Gürata, “Tears of Love,” 75. 
 
46 Ibid., 58-9. 
 




the removal of the prevailing Egyptian films and the exhibitors’ demand for Turkish 
films, the entertainment tax regulation promoted local film production as a lucrative 
investment and thus led to a dramatic increase in the number of local film production so 
as to enable the birth of the Turkish commercial film industry Yeşilçam. Vurun Kahpeye 
not only thematized this turn to the nation with its War of Independence setting, but also 
capitalized on the fledgling market for Turkish film with the percentage system. 
In these novel circumstances, Vurun Kahpeye’s producer, Hürrem Erman, was the 
primary figure to explore, expose, and reap the economic potentialities of cinema as a 
product from which to be profited. Identifying an opportunity in the shifting trends of the 
market, the founder of Erman Film undertook an act of entrepreneurship with his second 
production Vurun Kahpeye. Prior to Vurun Kahpeye, the undistinguishable processes of 
production, distribution, and exhibition were integrated within companies that primarily 
focused on importing international films.48 These companies imported, dubbed, 
produced, exported, and distributed films all at once, and in some cases even managed 
theaters. Within this structure, copies of films were for the most part sought and bought 
by the theaters themselves. The integration of these vectors meant a limited and delayed 
circulation of films that largely remained in the metropolises where these companies were 
stationed. Thus, the primary orientation of distribution was centrifugal as films trickled 
down across Anatolia from these cities, privileging and thus promoting the tastes of the 
urban audiences whose predilections informed the kinds of films to be imported and 
produced. Inspired by the surge of interest in and demand for local productions, Erman, 
                                                
48 For a reliable source on the history of the industrial developments of Turkish cinema of the period and 
beyond, see Arslan, Cinema in Turkey: A New Critical History, 2011. 
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with Vurun Kahpeye, put to test “percentage system,” the first step to separate the stages 
of film industry in a format unique to the Turkish cinema. Instead of selling copies of the 
film, which minimized the profit margin, Erman began to rent his films on a percentage 
basis per the number of purchased tickets, an irrefutable initiative that clearly took 
advantage of the market’s need for local productions due to the recent tax regulation.49 
To reliably facilitate this system, staff under the title of “the percentage officer” was 
commissioned not only to find theaters or makeshift exhibition sites –such as the 
“summer garden” of the anecdote– to rent the films to, but also to keep track of the 
number of tickets sold. And because more purchased tickets meant more money for the 
producer, with Vurun Kahpeye onwards, these officers traversed all across the country 
both to promote their films and in search of sites of exhibition for them.50 Vurun Kahpeye 
then was the first film to travel to every corner of Anatolia, reaching to an audience 
greater than any other film before.  
It is thanks to its mass publicity enabled by the innovation of the percentage 
system that Vurun Kahpeye hits many milestones and marks important landmarks within 
                                                
49 Hürrem Erman,“Yapımcı Hürrem Erman’la Konuşma,” 23. In fact, in this interview, Erman suggests that 
it was with his first film Damga in 1946 that he experimented with the percentage system in Anatolia first 
time and expanded its use with Vurun Kahpeye. Ibid., 24. However, Akad, the then accountant of Erman 
Film who also served in the production of Damga as a substitute director, designates Vurun Kahpeye as the 
first instance of the percentage system. Ömer Lütfi Akad, Işıkla Karanlık Arasında, 91. Regarding this 
question, Erman’s biographer too points out a discrepancy between Erman’s recollection and Erman Film’s 
employers accounts Rıza Kıraç, “Türk Sinemasının Bir Dönüm Noktası: Vurun Kahpeye,”51. 
 
50 In his memoirs, Akad relates that as a percentage officer he checked tickets at the gate of Azak theater in 
İstanbul. Furthermore, just like Erman, he traveled outside İstanbul to locations like Adana, Eskişehir, 
Bilecik, and Geyve with films at hand finding sites of exhibition and collecting the percantage in cash. Ibid. 
While such producers and directors served in the role of a percantage officer, showing the rudimentary 
phase of the institutionalization of cinema without a clear line of division of labor, this novel profession 
also provided an entryway into the industry for some, most notably the leftist Kurdish actor and director 




the history of Turkish cinema. First and foremost, as a first true local box office hit Vurun 
Kahpeye epitomizes cinema’s capital-making prospects clear. In an interview in 1973, 
twenty-four years after its release, Erman claims that Vurun Kahpeye’s box office record 
remains unmatched.51 Secondly, its mass popularity sparks a novel interest in Turkish 
films within print media. A film literature consisting of reviews and critiques began to 
materialize for the first time around Vurun Kahpeye in both the local and national press 
the examples of which we have seen above. Thirdly, the film occasions the shining of the 
female lead Sezer Sezin, who appears in the role of Aliye, as the first truly cinematic star 
with an emerging fan base.52 Fourthly, the first Turkish film to be selected and screened 
internationally, Vurun Kahpeye features at the International Edinburgh Film festival.53 
Finally, the film’s epoch-making success guarantees its status as the first remake of 
Turkish cinema in 1964,54 with another one to follow in 1973. Thus canonized within the 
history of Turkish cinema, the 1949 version of Vurun Kahpeye lays the imagistic 
foundation of the secular martyrdom gradually mythfied within national consciousness 
with, as I will discuss in the next section, some turbulent social backlash that was 
                                                
51 Erman, “Yapımcı Hürrem Erman’la Konuşma,” 24. The film was screened at Taksim theater for five 
weeks, and from the second week onwards Erman four-walls the theater, and act he describes as 
“unprecedented.” The entire cost of the film, Erman also notes, was 36,000 TL, and he makes 33,000 TL 
with the film’s screening only in primary theaters in Ankara. Ibid. 
 
52 Indeed, Sezer Sezin was not the first female lead of Turkish cinema. By this point, Cahide Sonku had 
proved her credentials as a star especially in her trademark role of the femme fatale. However, Sonku built 
on her stage career in cinema, unlike Sezin who began and continued her career as a film actress. Just as 
Akad breaks the hegemony of the dramatists in filmmaking, Sezin provides the first true model of acting 
before the camera as noted by many reviewers from the era and historians of Turkish cinema. Akad himself 
names Sezin as “the first actual star of Turkish cinema.” Akad, Işıkla Karanlık Arasında, 91. 
 
53 “Beynelmilel bir festivale giren ilk Türk filmi: Vurun Kahpeye,” Yıldız, August 15, 1949.  
 






Injury: Secular Sensations versus Religious Sensibilities 
Vurun Kahpeye’s mass trafficking across the nation has wider implications and 
consequences. In his prominent account of the nation as an imagined community, 
Benedict Anderson argues that social transformations like print capitalism give rise to 
new ways of imagining society.55 Modern social imaginary, for Anderson, inheres in a 
sense of simultaneity that conceives of society as a unit consisting of disparate 
simultaneous events, in essentially a notion of horizontal-secular temporality without any 
higher reference point.56 My point is that it is Vurun Kahpeye illustrates the significant 
potentiality of cinema in mediating the nation in a context where the written word does 
not have so much primacy.57 It is with Vurun Kahepeye that cinema for the first time 
takes an active part in the making of a horizontal understanding of society. In other 
words, the infrastructural innovation that the film occasions homogenizes time and space 
of the nation by leveling the field of distribution for films. This immediacy of access 
connects people into a single collective unit enabling channels of participation in and 
belonging to the nation. As cinema imagines the nation through Vurun Kahpeye, the 
nation also begins to imagine itself through cinema.  
                                                
55 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, 2006. 
 
56 Ibid., 37. 
 
57 I have in mind the low literacy rates that limit the efficacy of print capitalism. Perhaps, it is precisely 





And yet, we know that the imagined community of the nation is phantasmagoric, 
reveling in its own fantasy of a unitary vision. A survey of responses to the film within 
the marginal press allows us to see how Vurun Kahpeye also reveals the fantasy that the 
nation is as always imagined but never fully actualized. As I have already demonstrated, 
the moment of ecstasy that the viewer firing at the screen embodies captures the 
championing of the film that proved to be a sensation all across the country. Behind this 
façade of national celebration, in the shadow of the Turkish flags that don the streets of 
Istanbul, and amidst the tears, jeers, and claps of an emotional crowd, however, there 
lingers a note of resentment within the Islamist circles outside of the mainstream media. 
In one of the most established and leading Islamist journals of the period, Sebilürreşad,58 
a series of reader contributions expressing a sense of injury appears, an injury that stems 
from the representation of the turbaned pilgrim, Hadji Fettah, as the religious fanatic who 
betrays the nationalist cause.  
Initiating a chain of letters of complaint in the April of 1949, a reader in the name 
of Cevat Rifat Atilhan, speaks of his sadness at the sight of the audience who “watched 
this film in rapture, in excitement, in tremor, and with claps.”59 Against the backdrop of a 
festive Taksim square filled with an exhilarated crowd, Atilhan leaves the theater with a 
                                                
58 The significance of the journal goes beyond the period. Dating back to the Abdülhamid era, the journal 
was founded in 1908 as the primary periodical of the Islamist movement. Shut down under the Law on the 
Maintenance of Order in 1925, the journal remained inactive until 1948 when it began its publication in 
modern day Turkish. The journal went out of print in 1966 but was revived in 2016. “Sebilürreşad Kaldığı 
Yerden Devam Ediyor,” Hürriyet, August 12, 2016. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/seb-lurresad-
kaldigi-yerden-devam-ediyor-40191062. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan supported the journal with an 
article he penned on the Turkish-Chinese business partnership. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, “Türkiye-Çin 
Stratejik İş Birliği,” Sebilürreşad, Jan 2017. 
 




sigh “that is unleashed from his lungs and that aches his insides.”60 Atilhan contends that 
the film is set against Muslim Turks, for it insults and humiliates the pious subjects of the 
nation with the figure of the turbaned man who does all the evil that no Muslim could 
ever imagine doing –uniting with the enemy against the nationalist cause, going to the 
feet of the commander of the foe, inciting the public against the nationalist struggle, and 
perpetrating all the vile and fraud against a decent lady teacher.61 Providing historical 
examples of heroism shown by turbaned subjects like hodjas, müftüs, and müderrises 
during the War of Independence, Atilhan, himself a veteran of the same war, denouncing 
the film for distorting historical facts.62 Citing, wrongly, the case of Oliver Twist (1948) 
allegedly banned from display on the grounds of anti-Semitism upon a haham’s request, 
Atilhan calls for the censorship of the film that has the impact of a horrible propaganda.63  
Atilhan’s rhetoric is repeated in three other letters that appear in the subsequent 
issues of the journal. At times more aggressively, readers continue to convey the offence 
they take at the film, to condemn its historical distortion, and to insist on their call for 
censoring of the film.64 These reactions that we observe in the pages of Sebilürreşad are 
comparable to the visceral response that we have noted in Erman’s anecdote. If the film’s 
narrative of victimization triggers a vigilant secular subjectivity, the secular image regime 
                                                




62 Ibid. Müftüs are appointed officials in charge of Islamic affairs in districts and provinces while 
müderrises are scholars of Islam. 
 
63 Ibid. 250. 
 
64 An important element to note about the rhetoric of some of these reviews is their anti-semitism and anti-




of cinema that Vurun Kahpeye establishes is injurious and offensive to the pious subjects 
of the nation. Available also to the pious populace, Vurun Kahpeye convinces Muslim 
audiences of the power of motion picture. Far from demonstrating an Islamic sensibility 
towards the representative claims of the image generally understood in terms of 
blasphemy,65 Muslim viewers experience a resentment that has a basis in a faith in the 
potency of images. Noted instead is a critical awareness of the real effects of cinema, an 
awareness that registers, in Asad’s words opening this chapter, “media are not simply the 
means through which individuals simultaneously imagine their national community; they 
mediate that imagination, construct the sensibilities that underpin it.”66 Cinema does not 
simply represent the world but recreate that world, the world of the nation in which 
religiously marked bodies are stigmatized. In this respect, it would not be an 
overstatement to suggest that Muslim audiences anticipate the violent encounter between 
the image and the viewer firing at the screen, the hyperbolic embodiment of Vurun 
Kahpeye’s desired viewer.   
 Thus, for the first time in the history of Turkish modernity, moving images come 
to matter and become worth fighting for. Vurun Kahpeye then occasions cinema as a 
modern medium whose representative force has high stakes for the public that 
experiences it. The pious viewers contest the film’s claims on historical truth, defy the 
film’s attempts to cast an ideological conflict over gender, and question the verisimilitude 
of the turbaned subject, reinscribing themselves into the imagined world from which they 
                                                
65 For a sharp analysis of blasphemy, see Saba Mahmood, “Religious Reason and Secular Affect: An 
Incommensurable Divide?,” 836-862. 
 




are abjected. Most of all, they address the avatars of the state –namely, the general 
attorney, the government, the ministry of education, and the Directorate of Religious 
Affairs– to intervene by means of censorship. In this, they practice the promise of the 
state in its mediatory role apropos disparate religious sensibilities. In the anniversary of 
the film’s release, Sebilürreşad reprints an editorial from a local newspaper whose author 
was heard by the Directorate of Religious Affairs.67 As a result, the film, as Akad 
remarks, underwent the inspection of the Film Control Commission second time after its 
release.68 Reapproved for exhibition, this time the governor of a central Anatolian 
province banned the exhibition of the film in his vicinity, a decision revoked by the 
Ministry of the Interior.69 Consequently, the calls for censorship of the film remained 
unanswered in the las year of the ultra-secularist İnönü regime. In fact, on the contrary, 
finding these reactions silly, Hürrem Erman’s brother, co-producer Hasan Erman argues 
that the film translates the feeling of the entire Turkish nation, and thus, invites the very 
institutions addressed for censorship demand to retaliate these anti-Kemalist 
publications.70  
Uninterrupted by the state, the cinematic medium and its infrastructures therefore 
become a successful relay of secularism. Vurun Kahpeye actualizes cinema’s potentiality 
in mobilizing masses, defining ideological positions, and consolidating political 
affiliations. What the controversy around the film makes clear is that the formation of 
                                                
67 Numan Sabit Osmançelebioğlu, “‘Vurun Kahpeye’ Filmi Bizçe [sic] Niçin Kötüdür?,” March 1950. 
 




70Alim Şerif Onaran, Lütfi Ömer Akad’ın Sineması, 28n8. 
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cinema as an industry proper begins through a process of exclusion where by cinema 
privileges certain bodies while dismissing the feelings of the others. Vurun Kahpeye then 
marks the moment at which cinema steps in as a conduit of secular nationalism at the 
expense of the nation’s religious subjects. Furthermore, this same story will repeat itself 
in 1964 when director Orhan Aksoy revisits Vurun Kahpeye in the first remake of 
Turkish film history only to push to limits both the melodrama and the sensationalism of 
its predecessor.  
So, what happens when one is insulted by images so much so that one’s body 
hurts? What does one do when one’s wounds are rubbed against the salt, let alone healed? 
Where does one go when the state fails to fulfill its promise? The answer is simple: one 
hijacks the images that injure oneself. This solution becomes clear in 1973 when, for the 
fiftieth anniversary of the Republic of Turkey, film critic and director Halit Refiğ turns to 
Vurun Kahpeye to put to test his theory of National Cinema, an anti-western cinema that 
aims at redefining the Turkish identity. In this remake, Refiğ not only reimagines Ömer 
Effendi as a foil to Hadji Fettah as the embodiment of true Islamic piety, but also places a 
Quran as a central motif to his story as emphatically revealed in a close-up in Aliye’s 
palm after her massacre. This close-up congeals the potency of images for an Islamic 
cinema whose theoretical discussions Refiğ’s theory would inspire in 1973. The story of 
Vurun Kahpeye then not only tells us the marriage of secularism and cinema without 
significant state manipulation, but it also becomes a harbinger of an Islamic cinematic 





FROM A POPULIST-POPULAR TO A NATIONAL-POPULAR AESTHETICS: THE 
REMAKES OF VURUN KAHPEYE IN YEŞİLÇAM AND THROUGH NATIONAL 
CINEMA  
 
 This chapter puts Halit Refiğ’s 1973 production of Vurun Kahpeye into dialogue 
with Orhan Aksoy’s in 1964.1 As the theorist of National Cinema that would embody and 
promote an anti-western Turkish cultural identity, Refiğ puts his theory to practice with 
his decision to direct the film’s second remake. In this chapter, I read Refiğ’s 
interpretation of Vurun Kahpeye as a social realist melodrama in conjunction with 
Aksoy’s adaptation from the previous decade and Refiğ̆’s own writings on cinema. In the 
first part of the chapter, I contextualize and analyze Aksoy’s Vurun Kahpeye, suggesting 
that the film is representative of the industrial characteristics of Yeşilçam, a star-driven 
populist and commercial cinema with a primarily melodramatic mode of address shaped 
as per the market demands. I explore this cinema further in the second part of the chapter 
where I summarize and examine Halit Refiğ’s conceptualization of National Cinema. 
While Refiğ’s theory takes its force from the industrial organization of Turkish cinema 
that he identifies as “the people’s cinema,”2 his search of an ideologically coded national-
popular cinema reads as revisionist of the populist aesthetics of the Yeşilçam cinema 
devoid of politics. In the last part of the chapter, I examine Refiğ’s Vurun Kahpeye in 
light of his theory and argue that Vurun Kahpeye allows Refiğ to reimagine the nation 
                                                
1 Vurun Kahpeye, dir. by Halit Refiğ, 1973 and Vurun Kahpeye, dir. by Orhan Aksoy, 1964.  
 
2 Halit Refiğ, “Selections from The Fight for National Cinema,” 9. For my references to Refiğ’s theory of 
national cinema, I rely on Melis Behlil and Esin Paça Cengiz’s translation of selections from Halit Refiğ’s 
Ulusal Sinema Kavgası [The Fight for National Cinema], the collection of his writings on the theory from 
1971, published in Cinema Journal. Halit Refiğ, Ulusal Sinema Kavgası, 2013. 
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through a Muslim Turkish identity always under the risk of the hostility of the West. 
Very much like Halide Edib’s Vurun Kahpeye, Refiğ’s social realist melodrama 
investigates the tension between individual desire and social constraint in times of war, a 
tension I locate in the dialectics of social realist and melodramatic registers of the film. 
Overall, this chapter continues to trace the unexpected aftereffects of each iteration of the 
film. In the same way Aksoy’s Vurun Kahpeye leads to Refiğ’s reactionary remake, the 
circulation of Refiğ’s Vurun Kahpeye in the demotic medium of TV results in the 
transferal of the title in the vernacular as an idiom animating the political antagonism 
counterintuitive to Refiğ’s project.  
 
Yeşilçamization of Orhan Aksoy’s Vurun Kahpeye (1964) 
Much has changed in Turkey between 1949 and 1964, the period between Lütfi 
Akad’s Vurun Kahpeye and Orhan Aksoy’s remake. Aksoy’s rendering of Vurun 
Kahpeye cannot be understood without taking into account the tremendous political 
transformation that took place in this period. I am mostly referring here to the first coup 
d’état in the history of Republic of Turkey, the 1960 coup d’état, which terminated the 
ten-year rule of the Democratic Party (DP), both marking the failure of the first attempt at 
multiparty democracy and definitively designating the army as the guardian if not the 
owner of the state. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the DP had come to power with 
a sweeping victory in the general elections in 1950, a year after the release of the first 
Vurun Kahpeye, ending the single party rule of the Republican People’s Party (RPP) for 
twenty-seven years since the birth of the Republic in 1923. As the founding party of the 
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Republic established by Mustafa Kemal, the RPP became the ultimate apparatus to 
realize the Kemalist ideology in the making of a modern secular nation-state. This 
inevitably entailed, especially at a time when single party state formation signified 
fascism in the political climate of the World War II, the transition to a multiparty system 
leading to the formation of the DP, the prototype of the right in the political spectrum. As 
opposed to the military-based elites of the RPP who continued the legacy of Kemal, the 
DP embraced an Islamic populism, discursively exploiting the gap between the RPP and 
the people, as exemplified by its slogan “Enough! The millet [nation] has the word” used 
in the 1950 election. The DP’s message resonated with the masses, evinced by its 
landslide win by gaining the 55% of the votes against the RPP’s %39.6, followed by two 
victories in the ensuing elections of 1954 and 1957. A lot can be said about the 
ideological and political differences between the RPP and its rival, but, for my purposes, 
suffice it to say that the DP’s Islamic populism entwined with economic liberalism was 
the main point of division between the two parties that was marked by the rise of a new 
Anatolian bourgeoisie.  
 On May 27, 1960, a faction in the army consisting of thirty-eight subordinate 
military officers acting outside the chain of command under the name National Unity 
Committee (NUC) led a bloodless coup overthrowing the DP government in the name of 
democracy. The coup took place at the height of the DP’s growing despondency amidst, 
on the one hand, increasing socio-political unrest and economic recession, noted in the 
censorship of the press and the attacks against the RPP, and, on the other, Ankara’s 
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growing affinity with Moscow.3 Thus, the declaration of the coup cites preventing 
“fratricidal strife” and justifies the intervention “due to the depression that our democracy 
has fallen and the recent deplorable events,” while pledging allegiance to the UN, NATO, 
and the Baghdad Pact.4 In this regard, the members of the NUC can be said to have 
reinvented the army as a force of counterbalance in the regulation of political power, 
institutionalizing the army as the ultimate ward of the Kemalist Turkish state. Following 
the coup, the NUC ruled the country as a junta regime with edicts for about eighteen 
months until the 1961 elections. In the interim, the junta regime detained and tried the 
members and associates of the DP, chief amongst which were President Celal Bayar and 
the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, in what is known as the Yassıada Trials for 
unconstitutional rule and treason.5 In addition to the alleged suicide of two prisoners, six 
others died during their imprisonment. But what left its indelible imprint in the social 
memory of Turkey was the execution of, along with two ex-ministers, the charismatic ex-
prime minister of the DP years Adnan Menderes. The junta stepped down from power 
with the 1961 election that resulted in the coalition between RPP and the Justice Party 
(JP), the successor to the suppressed the DP.  
The socio-political events of this period provide the backdrop against which we 
                                                
3 For a thoroughly researched and objectively analyzed study of the DP era and the coup, see Mogens Pelt, 
Military Intervention and a Crises of Democracy in Turkey: The Menderes Era and Its Demise, 2014. 
 
4 “TSK’nın 27 Mayıs 1960 Bildirisi,” T24, September 17, 2008, http://t24.com.tr/haber/tsknin-27-mayis-
1960-bildirisi,7371. The announcer of the coup, Colonel Alparslan Türkeş, would later become a politician 
as the founder and leader of Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi [Nationalist Movement Party] in the far right 
between 1969 and 1997. Today, the party is in coalition with the JDP.  
 
5 Recently renamed as the Democracy and Freedom Island, Yassıada is an island off the coast of İstanbul 
where the trials and the hangings of the DP members were executed. 
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need to situate Orhan Aksoy’s Vurun Kahpeye in 1964. It could be argued that they lend 
an almost allegorical quality to the film, something that Akad’s version did not possess. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Akad’s Vurun Kahpeye can be claimed to perform 
the ideological work for the ultra-secularist İnönü regime on the eve of the impending 
electoral shift; it participates in the shaping of a structure of feeling of paranoia for the 
secular sensorium in the paranoid subject’s futural orientation. Aksoy’s remake, however, 
inevitably evokes the socio-political upheaval of the previous decade. Hadji Fettah’s 
selfish politicization of religion, the malleability of the masses, the influential and 
destructive power of slander, the military intervention to eliminate chaos and injustice 
and restore order, and the hanging of the perpetrators of Aliye’s lynching, all find a social 
body and meaning in a not too distant past. In addition to its associability, Vurun 
Kahpeye’s chief ideological project can be seen as recasting the nation through a 
competing narrative of secular victimization at a time when the political right has its own 
actual victims. Soon after the political right pays a huge price with the execution of Prime 
Minister Menderes and his ministers, Aliye’s lynching serves in a sense to redeem the 
secular guilt and to redefine the terms with which the nation sees itself.  
Vurun Kahpeye’s relevance in its contemporary political climate should also be 
assessed beyond the borders of the nation, given the film’s highlighting of the Greek 
threat. The 60s bore witness to a dramatic volatility in Cyprus soon after it gained its 
independence from the British Empire at the beginning of the decade under the protection 
of Britain as well as Greece and Turkey. The intercommunal violence that erupted 
between the Greek majority and the Turkish minority in the island in 1963 gave rise to 
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anti-Greek nationalism in mainland Turkey. In response to the ongoing violence, Turkey, 
as the guarantor mother-state, even threatened to invade Cyprus in 1964, but American 
intervention deferred the invasion of the island for another ten years. The anti-Greek 
sentiment of the 60s must be read in conjunction with the Istanbul Pogrom of 1955 
targeting the private and public properties belonging to the Greek minority by a furious 
mob of Turkish nationalists.6 The pogrom was set off because of the false news 
disseminated about the bombing of Mustafa Kemal’s house in Thessaloniki serving as the 
Turkish consulate by the Greeks. The propaganda campaign triggering the attack is 
commonly attributed to the Menderes government not only in response to the burgeoning 
of Greek nationalism in Cyprus but also as a way of scapegoating a minority amidst 
increasing social and economic instability. The pogrom, which had to be suppressed by 
the army with the declaration of a martial law, culminated in the displacement of a 
significant number of Greek ethnics and the confiscation of their properties. Both inside 
and outside then the Greek came to represent the ultimate enemy by the mid-60s. As a 
result, the words Aliye says to Greek commander Damyanos –this time openly named 
after the character he is based on in the novel– “You [Greeks] are a nation used to 
treacherously stabbing in the back,” acutely resonate with the audience, as do the images 
of Greek violence during the invasion of the town.  
Released in the aftermath of a coup that put to death a Prime Minister and at the 
height of anti-Greek nationalism, Aksoy’s Vurun Kahpeye reforms the nation in response 
to the contemporary anxieties of the nation. Thus, Aliye’s martyrdom is configured in a 
                                                
6 For a recent work that situates the pogrom in the longer history of systemic violence in the making of the 
nation state, see Dilek Güven, 6-7 Eylül Olayları, 2017.  
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way to consolidate the nation against the clearly designated outsiders representative of 
their respective social bodies: Hadji Fettah and Damyanos. Another significant moment 
for the sedimentation of the martyrdom myth for the nation, Vurun Kahpeye nonetheless 
proceeds with the project of secularizing this martyrdom as vigorously as its predecessor. 
At the time of Cyprus crisis, Vurun Kahpeye’s storyline ultimately turns to the real threat 
within, given the dispensability of the Greek danger enabled by no less than Aliye 
herself. In fact, even Damyanos’ characterization in a way undermines the Greek threat 
as opposed to the villainy of Hadji Fettah who acts as the mastermind orchestrating 
Damyanos’ weakness for Aliye for his own scheme, just as he manipulates Uzun Hüseyin 
with the promise that Aliye will become his once the nationalists are defeated. When 
Damyanos proposes to Aliye, however, he also offers to leave the Greek army and retreat 
with her to a rich life afar. Of course, Aliye deals with Damyanos, just as the Turkish 
army expels the Greek forces. And yet, Hadji Fettah remains pestilent as the cancer 
within, the fatal tumor that needs to be removed by force. 
Aksoy remakes Vurun Kahpeye as a suspense-driven and action-filled melodrama 
building up to the Turkish independence by virtue of Aliye’s heroism. What the relative 
salience of the Greek representation allows is Aliye’s increased female agency, literalized 
through her transformation from a teacher to an agent. In this Vurun Kahpeye, Aliye, 
brought to life by rising star Hülya Koçyiğit’s impressive performance, is as active as, if 
not more than, Fuat,7 as she secretly captures the hidden map depicting the Greek arsenal 
in the vicinity for the nationalists to cut off the Greeks’ supplies before their assault to 
                                                
7 Aksoy renames Tosun as Fuat while Refiğ would opt for Tahsin instead of either. 
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take back the town. Similar to the first film, when Fuat gets trapped during his secret visit 
to Aliye –at which point she hands the map she could not deliver earlier due to 
surveillance– it is once again Aliye who steps forward to leave for Damyanos in order to 
lift the watch in exchange for her acceptance of his proposal by declaring herself a 
soldier: “One day you told me that the most beautiful and the biggest love is the love of 
the nation, and now I am a girl, a soldier in love with the nation!,” a proclamation 
introduced by Aksoy. Against Fuat’s protest, Aliye reminds him that the nation takes 
priority over them, referring to her mantra of her dedication to the land and of her lack of 
fear while promising that she will keep the enemy busy without any damage to herself. 
Aliye’s conversion from a secret agent to an active soldier is realized not only when the 
Turkish army marches into the town, but also when she kills Damyanos after he assaults 
to rape her once he figures out her ploy with the arrival of the Turkish army. Therefore, at 
the moment of a supposed resolution, Hadji Fettah’s villainy displaces the Greek 
animosity as the ultimate source of evil. 
What I have been describing is the dialectics of action and pathos that makes up 
the melodrama of Aksoy’s remake,8 one that inheres in the unjust killing of a war 
heroine, in the very moment when the soldier Aliye turns into a martyr in the hands of a 
zealot and his followers. The division between the affective registers of action and pathos 
is graphed onto their respective temporal codification. The commotion that heralds the 
arrival of the Turkish army takes place “in the nick of time:”9 What was supposed to be 
                                                






the night of consummation for Damyanos and Aliye turns out to be the night of liberation 
for the nation. Fuat, on the other, is welcomed to town with a “You are too late, son,” 
marking the irreversible damage always framed within a belatedness.10 What takes place 
in between, the lynching, is a blow to a relieved audience, channeling the cathartic 
release into a pathetic discharge by which Aliye emerges as a victim-hero.  
This dualism between action and melodrama is also palpable in the soundtrack of 
the film. Most noticeably, Aksoy opts to use not one but two narrators, Aliye and Fuat, 
whose voice-overs stylistically diverge from each other. The film begins with Aliye’s 
narration of her new life, her experiences in the town, conveyed in a prose communicated 
rather mellowly. With perplexing decision, half way into the film Aksoy drops her voice-
over completely and instead begins to use Fuat’s pompous and thunderous speech to 
deliver his intervals using documentary footage from the War of Independence. Neither 
of these two intervals involving scenes of Mustafa Kemal serve so much as a bridge for 
the story, except for linking the local story to the national struggle. Providing information 
on the historical details of the Turkish advancement in the war, Fuat’s glorifying rhetoric 
that breaks the narrative, the superfluity of this montage reveals the film’s propagandist 
tendencies.  
A similar dualism exists also in the background theme that employs romantic and 
heroic registers, the dialectics of which drive the melodrama. A case in point is the 
previously mentioned scene of Fuat’s visit to Aliye in which the romantic encounter of 
the longing couple transitions into a heroic moment of separation with the realization of 
                                                
10 In other words, in the “too late” of Linda Williams. Ibid. 
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Fuat’s entrapment. The theme tracks this transition that allows for Aliye’s transformation 
from a fiancé to a soldier, punctuating the range of feelings that the series of events 
engender. The melodic opening celebrating the reunion of the couple is abruptly taken 
over by the high-pitched strings that convey tension as soon as Aliye’s breaks the unison 
with the news of the entrapment. Upon Fuat’s verbalized desperation and Aliye’s 
moment of reflection, she determinedly says “Do not worry, Fuat. You will leave this 
place soon.” The rhythmic tension of the strings, interspersed with repeated emphatic 
motifs building up suspense, gradually gives way to a crescendo with the addition of bells 
and horns. The emergent valiant tune progresses into an anthem-like march, as Aliye 
assumes the identity of the soldier, marked by Fuat’s kiss in her forehead.  
Aksoy’s cinematography reflects this dynamism on the level of images, a 
dynamism that Akad’s static camera lacks. With location shooting and its use of light in 
the outdoors scenes at night, platforms, and rain effects, Akad’s Vurun Kahpeye was 
celebrated for its cinematic execution of mise-en-scene. Aksoy’s remake, however, 
stands out for its camerawork that complements and augments the dynamism of its 
melodramatic use of sound and acting, typical of the well-established conventions of the 
60s Yeşilçam melodrama. I would argue that Aksoy’s signature in this film is his 
deployment of zoom. Generally speaking, a pattern can be recognized here: Aksoy begins 
a scene with a serene medium-long or a long shot only to quickly zoom into a close up of 
the faces of his subjects in the plan. Juxtaposed with the initial shot, the effect of the 
zoom, accompanied by an upbeat tempo, is somewhat jarring, heightening the pertinent 
emotion of the scene. Aksoy continues to register the scene in medium close-up or close-
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up, capturing the hyperbolic mimics and gestures of his subjects, until he pulls back to 
leave the scene. 
Considering the dialectics and dynamism produced through juxtaposition in 
register, sound, and shot, I would argue that Aksoy’s rendering of Vurun Kahpeye is the 
most melodramatic version in the series. As discussed earlier Akad’s melodramatization 
of Vurun Kahpeye as a secular collage serves as a pedagogy of structure of feeling of 
paranoia with its paternalistic configuration of its viewers. Key to this collage is an 
attempt to circumscribe a correct Islam for the nation. Aksoy’s remake does not seem to 
be preoccupied with this endeavor at all. Islam has already been colonized under the 
national identity, as emblematized by the ultimate condition on which Aliye feigns to 
accept Damyanos’ proposal, namely, that she will remain as a Turk and as a Muslim 
when the two are married. Curiously enough, Vurun Kahpeye recognizes that remaining 
as a Turk does not necessarily mean to remain as a Muslim. In other words, this statement 
is an acknowledgment that the two identity markers are not coterminous, although the 
film attempts to approximate them. In an earlier scene of separation of the couple, for 
instance, Aliye walks in front of the camera, brings herself to a medium-close up, and, 
gazing into the border between the lens and the frame perpendicular to the audience, 
utters this wish: “My Allah, may you protect Fuat, the Turkish army, and their 
commander in chief Mustafa Kemal.” Fuat’s narration responds to this call over the 
documentary montage to which the film cuts by saying “Yes, Allah’s protective angels” 
were indeed on the side of the Turkish army. Without any engagement to fashion an un-
Arabized folkish Islam like Akad, Aksoy is at ease with a superficially understood Islam 
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lendable to the national project, as epitomized by the jarring note of “Allah’s protective 
angels.” Despite Islam’s adoptability, Aliye’s condition to Damyanos reveals that to 
remain a Turk is prior to remain a Muslim.  
Overall, the symbols and motifs of Islam recede in Aksoy’s interpretation of 
Vurun Kahpeye, the paradigmatic example of which is the scene of Mevlid that the 
director glosses over with a soundtrack that combines Aliye’s narration and a recitation 
of the poem over the images of people flocking towards the mosque. And yet, it is this 
mosque that gains symbolic significance as the backdrop for the evil on screen. Even in 
this scene of Mevlid, Aliye notices and interrupts a group of women harassing a young 
infamous widow –a significant character from the novella Aksoy introduces to the series 
albeit in passing– in the courtyard of the mosque. By the same token, the mosque appears 
in the background when Hadji Fettah incites the public against Aliye through slanders or 
devises his scheme deceiving Uzun Hüseyin in the act of ablution. More importantly, 
unlike Akad’s decision to take Aliye’s lynching outside the town, Aksoy’s Hadji Fettah 
stages the killing in front of the mosque in the square of the town.   
All of this takes us back to the initial point I made about comprehending Vurun 
Kahpeye in the context of the ethos of its period. As a film thematizing the Turkish War 
of Independence fought against the Greeks, this Vurun Kahpeye addresses the anti-Greek 
nationalism of the 60s and assuages anxieties about the increasing tension in Cyprus. By 
reminding the Turkish audience of a foundational saga of victory over the age-old enemy, 
the film, in a way, assures them of an imminent triumph in the event of a future conflict. 
That the mosque becomes the landmark for discrimination, corruption, and violence, on 
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the other hand, evokes the memory of Menderes years in which religion has been 
politicized for gain according to the official national historiography that accounts for 
Menderes’ populism. I do not wish to push to limits my reading of Vurun Kahpeye as an 
allegory, but it would be interesting to entertain Hadji Fettah’s villainy as representing 
the past that could have become a reality without the coup and Menderes’ execution. 
While it may be an insupportable stretch to argue for the film’s justification of the coup 
and the execution, it is certainly plausible to suggest that the fresh memory of both 
incidents haunt the viewing experience of the audience for whom the film may or may 
not act as reconciliatory, therapeutic, or reparative. 
In this respect, the final scene of the film is telling for the ideological compass of 
the film. Aksoy radically reimagines Akad’s privatized service for Aliye in the bucolic 
setting of a cemetery by rendering it social in the square in front of the mosque where 
Aliye was lynched. Wrapped in a Turkish flag, Aliye’s coffin is perched on a platform 
framed in a square by a group of soldiers and students standing to attention. At each end 
of the coffin stands Durmuş and Aliye’s adopted mother as Fuat, with his arm suspended 
from his head in cast, delivers a monologue in which he declares Aliye as a martyr of 
whom the entire nation is proud and who became a leader to Turkish women and 
mothers. At the end of his farewell, he slowly raises his hand and salutes her coffin, as 
the camera pulls back, and an anthem picks up for the final cut. In addition to the 
literalization of Aliye’s martyrdom with an official military funeral service, the scene 
represents the symbolic takeover of the public space now exposing the mosque in the 
background through the final long shot. And yet, there is no public to speak for, except 
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for the children representative of the new generation and soldiers who act as their 
guardian. Aliye’s martyrdom therefore clearly stands for a particular social body, the 
prevailing secular-national body politic of the era. 
 
Yeşilçam Contested: Halit Refiğ’s National Cinema 
To say that the reviews of Aksoy’s Vurun Kahpeye were disparaging is not an 
overstatement. Such names as Selmi Andak, Giovanni Scognamillo, and Tuncan Okan 
agree that the remake compares unfavorably with Akad’s original adaptation filmed and 
produced under primitive circumstances in the absence of an industry.11 More 
significantly, for these reviewers, Aksoy’s Vurun Kahpeye signifies the current aesthetic 
degeneration of Turkish cinema of the 60s in an industry dictated exclusively by growing 
market demands. By this decade, Yeşilçam became a giant factory with 171 film 
productions on average; only in 1964 when Vurun Kahpeye was released, there were 181 
locally produced films screened in Turkey.12 In a market in dire need of source materials, 
Vurun Kahpeye inaugurates a new trend as the first remake in the history of this cinema. 
Thus, Aksoy’s remake crystallizes the very fact that Yeşilçam turned into a fully 
commercialized industry that now began to recycle its own products off the assembly line 
at the expense of aesthetic originality, innovation, and quality.  
These concerns of these reviews are symptomatic of a larger conceited attitude 
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towards Turkish cinema observed in the intellectual and critical film circles, especially of 
the left, in the 1960s. The formation of this clique and its relation to Turkish cinema 
coincides with the emergence of the New Cinemas around the globe. It could be assumed 
that as viewers the members of this circle were trained by the examples of contemporary 
world cinema and that the populist nature of the Turkish film industry did not appeal to 
their acquired sensibilities. They became more vocal about their dissatisfaction with 
Turkish cinema prior to the meeting of the first Film Council in the fall of 1964 
occasioned by the surprising prizing of Metin Erksan’s Susuz Yaz [Dry Summer] with the 
Golden Bear in the 14th Berlin International Film Festival the previous summer.13 The 
Film Council brought to table minister representatives, intellectuals, and professionals 
from the industry to address the state, which showed a tangible interest in cinema for the 
first time at the level of ministry, about the ways in which state could play a role for 
cinema. The intellectuals came to the table to propose the establishment of a national film 
center, modeled after the Centre National Cinématographie (CNC), but the professionals 
offered to begin the sessions first with the description of the industry to determine its 
needs. Rejected by the intellectuals, the filmmakers left the table even before the talks 
began. 
 The uncompleted momentous Film Council cemented the existing tensions 
between the intellectuals and professionals from the industry. In the wake of the failed 
Council, the intellectuals, funded by the private sector, established the Turkish 
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Cinémathèque, Türk Sinematek Derneği, in 1965.14 The following year, Sinematek began 
the publication of the journal Yeni Sinema [New Cinema]. Both venues served as new 
channels for these intellectuals to pursue their interest in world cinemas, sometimes 
dismissing and other times vilifying Turkish cinema and its creators. Meanwhile, 
filmmakers concentrated their efforts to help institutionlize the Turkish Film Archive 
center, Türk Film Arşivi, by donating their films to the founder Sami Şekeroğlu.15 A 
representative of the professionals at the center of this very contestation, critic and 
director Halit Refiğ responds to the failed Film Council in a collection of essays written 
between 1965 and 1971 called Ulusal Sinema Kavgası [The Fight for National 
Cinema].16 In these pieces, Refiğ renders what could be conventionally viewed as the 
struggle between high art proponents and low art practitioners in terms of an ideological 
opposition of the West and the East. Amidst the conflict between the elite-popular and 
populist-popular, Refiğ is able to advance a theory for the national-popular.   
Refiğ’s treatise can be summarized with two central issues or lines of argument 
that motivate his essays, which I will detail out in the following. First, in response to the 
intellectuals and film critics formed around the Sinematek, he drafts a defense of Turkish 
cinema, defining it in its own terms, finishing the job left undone in the Council. In this 
defense, he analyzes the material conditions that bring forth a true form of people’s 
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cinema. According to this materialist analysis, the infrastructure through which the 
Turkish film industry evolves defies the available models around the world, especially 
the Western ones. Thus, those who approach to seriously think about cinema in Turkey, 
let alone to reform it, must first and foremost take into account the singularity of Turkish 
film industry. On the contrary, however, while the state is in complete disinterest, the 
intellectuals continue to not only assess Turkish cinema through the values of the West, 
but also impose these values on to the industry. For Refiğ, then, these intellectuals 
perpetuate the project of Kemalist westernization, although cinema offers a mode of 
resistance to the West and especially to the top-down models of Westernization.  
Secondly, Refiğ develops a theory of cinema, National Cinema, which actualizes 
the non-western propensities of Turkish cinema. Refiğ’s National cinema is based on a 
historicist account of fundamentally unbridgeable two worlds, the West and the East, as 
rooted in the development of disparate social structures: a capitalist society ridden with 
class warfare and a classless society with a state-owned capital: the former paving the 
way for the rise and the privileging of the individual and the latter sanctifying the state 
and thus the social signify distinct world views, visions, sensibilities, and ways of being. 
Therefore, the highly-prized notions such as humanism and individualism, notions that 
emerge from the history of the West, have no correspondence and worth in a statist 
society like Turkish people. For Refiğ, cinema, exempt from the interventionist cultural 
policies of the state, then first provides the unique opportunity as a means, or rather, a 
method to explore this people. Secondly, cinema also functions as a political or 
ideological tool to address the needs of this people and the nation by depicting their 
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reality. And finally, Refiğ’s cinema is a site for an aesthetic theory that draws inspiration 
from traditional Turkish art forms.  
To fully comprehend Refiğ’s discussion of Turkish cinema, let us begin by his 
materialist account of the development of Turkish film industry that yields to one of the 
earliest efforts of a comprehensive and systematic historicization of Turkish cinema. 
Refiğ emphatically states that “Turkish cinema is not a ‘cinema of imperialism,’ as it was 
not established by foreign capital; not a ‘bourgeois cinema,’ as it was not established by 
national capital; and not a ‘state cinema,’ as it was not established by the state. Turkish 
cinema is a ‘people’s cinema,’ since it was born directly out of the cinema-going needs of 
the people, and because it does not rely on capital but on labor.”17 Here, Refiğ points to 
the industrial development of Turkish cinema whereby cinematic production is both 
determined by the demands of the audiences and is funded by the very same audiences 
paying for the product. This needs explanation: “People’s cinema” essentially inheres in 
the leverage the distribution infrastructure gained in the history of Turkish cinema since 
the late 40s when films led by Akad’s Vurun Kahpeye, as discussed earlier, exposed the 
economic potentialities of cinema through the entrepreneurship of its producers exploring 
new methods for circulating their film. The following decade bore witness to the birth of 
Yeşilçam on the shoulders of an ever-growing regional distributors while the production 
companies four-walled sites of exhibition in İstanbul. Operating in six regions and based 
in six cities –İstanbul, Samsun, Adana, İzmir, Ankara, and Zonguldak–  these regional 
distributors eliminated competition and economically monopolized over film distribution 
                                                




in their respective region.18 As the demand for films and the pace of film production rose 
to unmanageable levels by production companies by the end of the decade –due to the 
increasing expenses vis-à-vis cast, personnel, and taxes– these regional companies 
moreover stepped in as financers of film production by issuing long-term bonds. 
Accordingly, these bonds would fund film production, which would be paid back at the 
time of its exhibition, creating, in Refiğ’s words, a “hermetic economic structure”.19 With 
the lack of state support and private capital, “these bonds are being issued based on 
expectations of the money to be paid by the audiences,” and thus, “the true owners of the 
bonds were audiences of the Turkish films.”20 
This was not the only sense in which Turkish cinema was a people’s cinema. The 
growing significance of regional distributors entailed these companies to acquire 
unconventional roles and characteristics beyond their primary purpose. Gradually in the 
50s, these companies began to register and relay audience reaction and channel “the 
spectatorial demands thanks to information gathered from theater owners.”21 Besides 
serving as a feedback platform, once the bonds system became a standard practice, 
distribution companies began to take active participation in the mode of production. 
Because the box office numbers were now vital also for regional distributors with a much 
greater stake in a film’s financial success, these companies wanted to ensure that 
                                                
18 Arslan, Cinema in Turkey, 106. 
 
19 Refiğ, “Selections from The Fight for National Cinema,” 10. 
 
20 Ibid., 9. 
 




audience expectations were met. As a result, they started to also serve as conveyors of 
audience preferences and demands, with the distributors visiting Istanbul during the 
spring to make deals with producers, and thus influencing all aspects of film production 
including “the number of films, genres, and stars for the upcoming season.”22 Therefore, 
thanks to the economic structure of Turkish cinema, audience input, via the conduit of the 
regional distribution companies, would inform, shape, and determine the artistic 
production. As Refiğ notes, “Stories people loved, stars people admired, popular songs of 
the period became the points of departure for all films. During this period, films 
resembling one another started to proliferate, and a star system emerged in Turkey for the 
first time.”23 Thus, Turkish cinema was also a people’s cinema in the sense that its 
audience had a hold on the aesthetics of this cinema through indirect participation in its 
production. This cinematic practice can be referred to as “people’s cinema,” to sum it up 
in Refiğ’s words, “because these films aren’t financially dependent on private capital or 
state institutions, and their artistic characteristics are conveyed in an ‘anonymous’ 
manner.”24  
By conceptualizing Turkish cinema as a people’s cinema, Refiğ approximates it to 
traditional Turkish folk arts. Cinema is clearly distinguishable from other arts forms like 
theater, music, and painting that are socially cultivated by westernization programs of the 
state. Without any support or aid by the state “Turkish cinema relies entirely on its own 
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people” and “takes whatever comes from the people and returns it to the people” very 
much like folk arts with which it shares a self-sufficient hermetic economic structure.25 
This allows for Turkish cinema to “share similar sentiments and attitudes with traditional 
Turkish arts (such as Anatolian folk paintings, Turkish folk stories, public storytellers, 
traditional comedies, and shadow plays).”26 As a result of its intimacy with these art 
forms, cinema materializes as an ethnographic practice, opening “a window onto the 
thoughts, tastes, and enthusiasm of the people.”27 Thus, Turkish cinema, just like folk 
arts, offers itself as an incredibly rich resource for national arts through which “one can 
understand what moves Turkish people and in what way, understand how they express 
their reactions, opinions, and enthusiasms regarding specific issues.”28 Refiğ’s concept of 
national cinema is then predicated on the populist propensities of Turkish cinema rooted 
in its industrial development.  
Like Yeşilçam gave way to and was superseded by a people’s cinema, national 
cinema would emerge out of people’s cinema, however, only with a conscious attitude. 
Although Refiğ’s concept of national cinema has its basis in the folkloric and populist 
characteristics of the Turkish cinema industry, his relationship to people’s cinema is more 
complex than it initially appears to be. In essence, national cinema must be reformist in 
relation to people’s cinema given its gradual deterioration owing to the increasing 
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Western influences that came to define its populism. For Refiğ, the problem with 
people’s cinema is that it has reproduced “stereotypical narratives due to screen personas 
of the stars and its openness to foreign influences to the extent that its national 
characteristics are substantially (even if not completely) dissolved.”29 Instead of the 
historical merits of Turkish society, people’s cinema relies on Western populist patterns. 
Consequently, we need to understand national cinema as an attempt to find the national 
populist vein of cinema that is essentially non-Western. 
Much as it is revisionist in relation to people’s cinema, the concept of national 
cinema emerges also out of the reaction “against the admiration of Western cinema,” as 
professed by Turkish intellectuals and film critics. Refiğ considers that this group is 
shaped by the administrative class –the Kemalist elite– alienated from the realities of the 
people whom it despises. Thus, for Refiğ, there is a social division that defines the 
contemporary Turkish society: “the wider classes of people who take refuge. . . in the 
nomadic Turkish traditions, Islamic law, the mosque, and the religious community” and 
“the newly trained administrative class [who] has become a colonial trooper for Western 
thought and art in its own land.”30 The metaphor Refiğ uses is very telling; he views 
Kemalist westernization as a colonial project in which people who think about and write 
on cinema participate. These intellectuals and critics look down on Turkish cinema 
through the prism of ideas, values, and paradigms alien to Turkish history, society, and 
culture and borrowed from the West chief amongst which is humanism. They deride 
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Turkish cinema for lack of humanism, but humanism is the end product of a very 
particular economic and social history germane to the West. Thus, this group deprecates 
Turkish cinema with terms that have no valence and relevance within the socio-historical 
development of Turkey.  
At the core of the aesthetics of Refiğ’s Turkish national cinema is this 
civilizational discourse about the incompatible and even opposing evolutionary 
trajectories of two worldviews: Western individualism and Eastern statism. Refiğ argues 
that at the root of humanism is the class war between the bourgeoisie and the feudalists, 
both of which were governed by the logic of private ownership. Thus, he compellingly 
claims that “Humanist art, harping on about ‘the human, the human!,’ is the bourgeois 
cry of victory at the conclusion of this class war.”31 The history of class warfare on 
private land property, however, does not have its equivalence within Turkish history. By 
contrast, the Turkish seizure of Anatolia resulted in a land reform “based on old Turkish 
nomad traditions and the conquest law of Islam, replacing private land ownership with a 
system of state ownership.”32 The Turkish society is therefore historically class-free 
without an aristocracy and landless people. Hence, Refiğ conjectures that “Just as the 
essential foundations of individualist Western thought lie in Greek philosophy and 
Christian theology, the main sources for statist Turkish thought are nomadic Turkmen 
traditions and Islamic canon law.”33 National cinema must become an aesthetic 
                                                








exploration and expression of this statist thought.  
While Refiğ is not prescriptive on the level of style, he lays out the fundamental 
aesthetic principles of this cinema with his discussion of the development of realism in 
Western and Turkish arts, as demonstrated, for instance, by the comparative examples of 
Western theater and Turkish performance arts. “Turkish arts,” says Refiğ, “do not reflect 
worldly realities as they are, but instead contain an interpretation of these within a divine 
order represented by the state. Unlike the Western arts, which reflect nature the way it is, 
Turkish arts (like other Eastern arts) thus rely on strict formulas of style and 
expression.”34 However, he warns against slavishly copying from the past, like lifting 
from Western modes of representation, “without any consideration of the cultural needs 
or the condition of our society today.”35 People’s cinema already embodies the statist 
thought and attitudes of the people: “The formulaic story lines, formulaic hero 
archetypes, and formulaic behaviors in Turkish cinema are attempts to convey the virtues 
and beauties of a divine order that has disappeared, perhaps never to be seen again.”36 
But it is incumbent upon the scholarly and creative minds help people counter “the 
present-day worldly realities. . ., while containing an interpretation of these realities.”37 
Thus, in addition to its anti-individualist, collectivist, and allegorical predispositions, it 
can be inferred that Refiğ’s national cinema is in essence a social realist art.  
                                                










Finally, considering the historical moment that Refiğ pens and collects his 
writings, national cinema is conceptualized not simply as a theory of cinema, but also as 
an urgent political need. In a world torn and partitioned between two superpowers at the 
height of Cold War, Turkey is gradually integrating with the West. Refiğ interprets this as 
Turkey’s economic and political dependence on the West, the final stage of Turkey’s 
Westernization efforts over two centuries. For him then Turkey’s sovereignty is in 
question.38 Therefore a turn to national arts is “a means of resistance and rebellion for the 
protection of national sovereignty in the face of the imperialist expansion of superstates,” 
as intimated by the principle of “universality,” which is invented in the West and 
colonialist by nature. Likewise, “contemporary,” “new,” “free,” all belong to the 
vocabulary of the superstates.39 In this context, national arts becomes a means of survival, 
for “the only option for turkey to avoid being pulverized between the blocs is to use the 
shield of nationality against all movements of universalism.”40 The power of national 
cinema lies in its ability to unite the peoples’ sentiment and enthusiasm, in as well as 
beyond its borders.41 Further, National Cinema, if realized, has the potential to lead to a 
Middle Eastern cinema thanks to the dominant and unifying role of the Turkish 
element.42 
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From a critical standpoint, Refiğ’s views on the contemporary state of Turkish 
cinema are visionary. From within the industry, he is one of the first people to 
systemically historicize the development of Turkish cinema with attention to its 
infrastructure. What’s more, he situates this history within its social context whose 
analysis anticipates sociologist Şerif Mardin’s influential reading of Turkish society as 
formed by a center-periphery cleavage inherited from the decentralized system of 
Ottoman administration.43 The processes of modernization and nationalization 
transformed what once stood for an organized division between sedentary and nomadic 
populations, between the Sultan and his officials in Istanbul and the segmented nature of 
Anatolian provinces. Key to this process was the pushing into the periphery of the 
religious institution, which served as “the hinge between center and periphery.”44 
Mardin’s analysis is insightful because it reads this transformation as cultural beyond 
solely as political. Thus, for him, Kemalist regime’s hold onto the center against the 
periphery results in “cultural alienation of the masses from the rulers, of the periphery 
from the center” such that the periphery emerges as the locus of “a counter-official 
culture.”45 Mardin contends that Kemalists’ failed project of national integration is not 
realized until the political cooption of the Turkish countryside by the DP that stood for 
the culture of the periphery by changing “the master-servant relation between patron and 
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client”.46 DP then paradoxically “produced a national unity in the sense of provincial 
unification around common themes.”47 I allude to Mardin’s analysis because it seems to 
me that Halit Refiğ tells us the same story as refracted through the arts, especially cinema 
about a decade before Mardin. It is no coincidence that the emergence of Yeşilçam, the 
cradle of people’s cinema, concurs roughly with DP’s rise to power. As Yeşilçam films 
meet with the audience in Anatolia, the infrastructural changes Refiğ discusses, namely 
the expansion of and mutation within the distribution mechanism, renders possible a 
centripetal cultural formation. People’s cinema, then, democratizes the cultural field of 
the nation by bringing the center and the periphery on a level plane.  
With that being said, there are apparent shortcomings to Refiğ’s concept of 
national cinema grounded in the social theories of Turkish exceptionalism of his 
ideologue author Kemal Tahir. It would not be an overstatement to suggest that Refiğ’s 
statist nationalism is not only essentialist but also reductive with such statements that 
convey a romanticized mythic past as “Turkey had a unique social harmony and order”48 
or “[D]espite certain differences in sentiment, a difference of worldviews has not 
occurred between state and folk arts.”49 To say the least, his idealized homogenous 
Ottoman world seems phantasmagoric. And yet, perhaps, it is his vision of the world as 
divided into two independent entities that is most unconvincing. It seems as though Refiğ 
                                                
46 Ibid., 185. 
 
47 Ibid., 187. 
 
48 Refiğ, “Selections from The Fight for National Cinema,” 7. 
 




does not fathom any cross-cultural contact, traffic, and exchange possible until the 
twentieth century. As worlds closed onto themselves, Refiğ’s East and West are sterile 
and rigid constructs exempt from interaction with each other outside an antagonistic 
framework.  
In addition to such ideological drawbacks, Refiğ’s theorization of National 
Cinema raises questions about its practicality, as captured by his revelation that “the 
people’s cinema exists in practice whereas national cinema is largely theoretical.”50 Refiğ 
acknowledges that “there is no support for a national cinema either from people or from 
the state.”51 Given that there is not a class that could risk material loss, he suggests, it is 
incumbent upon the state to support this cinema. “And,” he adds, “this is only possible if 
the state, or rather, the rulers of the state, possess a certain consciousness of the state.”52 
These remarks reveal a dilemma in the way of the actualization of national cinema. After 
all, it was the withdrawal of the state that allowed for a particular cinema to emerge, a 
cinema that Refiğ can name as people’s cinema, which is at the basis of a national cinema 
to emerge. Receiving state funding for a national cinema risks a national cinema to turn 
into a state cinema. Refiğ’s proposition to inculcate into state a consciousness of the state 
will not eliminate the risk when we consider the ideological contestations around the 
meaning of the state. In a democratic system where rulers periodically change, often 
through their definition of the state in this contestation, the notion of the state is also 
likely to change accordingly such that this notion might set the tone for a national cinema 
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that the state agrees to fund. Refiğ does not address the question of how a support system 
can be established to ensure the autonomous place of national cinema between people 
and the state.  
Perhaps most significantly, there is a fundamental conundrum inherent to the 
concept of national cinema based this time on the tension between the people and the 
artist. Refiğ’s dissatisfaction with the productions of the people’s cinema suggests the 
susceptibility of the people to the outside influences. As a result, Refiğ charges the artist 
with the mission of channeling the masses back to their material reality through cinema. 
In this case, some questions that need answers arise: How are the artists supposed to 
position themselves before and present their work for the masses without mimicking the 
Kemalist administrator? And, what would it mean if this cinema did not resonate with the 
people and if people turned to films outside this cinema? These and similar questions cast 
doubt on the viability of the national cinema’s promised populism by inquiring into the 
nature of the relationships between this cinema and audiences.    
 
Halit Refiğ’s Vurun Kahpeye (1973) through National Cinema 
 Despite these challenges, especially an unaccommodating market and a lack of 
financial backing, examples of national cinema materialize by the sheer ingeniousness of 
directors like Refiğ himself and Erksan who are able to turn such industrial disadvantages 
into their favor. In 1973, for instance, Hürrem Film approaches Refiğ with their desire to 
once again remake Vurun Kahpeye this time in color in the absence of a film that honors 
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the fiftieth anniversary of the Republic.53 Even though Refiğ had reluctantly made a 
handful remakes due to industrial pressures and the fear of falling out of the market by 
this point in his career, the offer presents an invaluable opportunity for the theoretician of 
national cinema to exercise his theory. Perhaps no other story than the one that defines 
the nation at the moment of its foundation as mediated through cinema would have given 
the director the chance to reimagine the nation as per his vision. Refiğ accepts the offer 
on the condition that the company would not intervene in his artistic choices, and 
producer Hürrem Erman agrees with the condition that the Mevlid scene remains intact 
because it is an audience pleaser, a demand that fits well into Refiğ’s project anyway.54  
 Refiğ’s main critique of the previous films is based on the projection of the 
enemy: The backward forces have been highlighted while the foreign enemy remained 
obscure.55 In recalibrating the antagonistic elements of the story, Refiğ declares his 
reference point as the poem of the “İstiklal Marşı” [Independence March],56 the national 
anthem of the Republic, penned by Mehmet Akif. Akif’s poem represents the spirit of the 
national struggle through which Refiğ embarks on to refract Vurun Kahpeye, as captured 
by its fourth stanza:  
The horizons of the West may be bound with walls of steel, 
But my borders are like the faith-filled bosom of a believer. 
Let them howl, fear not! How can this faith ever be extinguished 
                                                










By that single-fanged monster you call ‘civilization’?57 
Akif imagines a nation united against the Western enemy in and through faith that 
overpowers even the advanced weaponry of the West. Islam thus grants freedom “[F]or 
independence is the right of my God-worshipping nation.”58 Refiğ thus renders Islam as 
the shared value of the nation, and he does so not through an elimination of “the bigot 
type” but through a refiguration of Tahsin,59 Ömer Effendi, and Aliye. Crucial to this 
process is a motif whose idea Refiğ confesses to adopt from Aksoy. In lieu of a medallion 
that Fuat hands to Aliye as a souvenir, Tahsin, Fuat’s counterpart, gives Aliye a mini 
Quran, saying “Do not forget about; do not diverge from Allah’s path.” Aliye responds 
that she “will keep it as the token of my dedication to you and Allah,” a promise she 
keeps until her lynching. Revealed through a close up inside Aliye’s palm when Tahsin 
finds her corpse, the striking reappearance of the Quran affirms Aliye’s loyalty to Islam, 
to Tahsin, and through him, to the nation. 
 The motif of the Quran sums up Refiğ’s undertaking of Vurun Kahpeye as a 
project to reconcile nationalism and Islam against the common enemy in line with the 
ideological worldview of his theory of national cinema. Refiğ realizes this project 
through a social realist methodology as per his vision for a national cinema, situating its 
story within the material historical conditions of its setting and providing its 
                                                
57 The poem was originally published in Hakimiyet-i Milliye and Sebilürreşad on February 17, 1921. The 
poem, along with the history of its publication and adoption and composition as the national anthem can be 
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interpretation. This unavoidably brings about a de-melodramatization of the story, 
palpably perceivable in the shrinkage of soundtrack in terms of both quantity and 
purpose. The use of extradiegetic sound is minimal, most notable by the removal of 
narrator and anthems, in comparison to the previous incarnations. In cases where 
extradiegetic music is deployed, the limited and repeated repertoire sets up the mood of 
the scene, instead of serving as punctuation cuing the audience. The paramount example 
of this is the use of same guitar arpeggio in scenes involving Aliye and the Greek 
commander this time named Çorbacı where Refiğ’s primary goal is to thematize romance 
far from soliciting sympathy.  
Indeed, in Refiğ’s Vurun Kahpeye emotional identification is secondary to an 
intellectual connection the film seeks to establish with the audience. It seems as though 
the director presents an analysis and an argument predominantly through a dialectical use 
of montage in which a shot makes sense in reference to the preceding shot that it undoes. 
A montage of negation, the shot succession, to be more precise, proceeds with the logic 
of thesis followed by its antithesis that negates the previous shot or the sequence of shots 
in communicating the argument that the nation must stand united in the face of outside 
advisory. This intellectual approach, particularly visible in montage, establishes the 
predominant social realist mode of the film, the goal of which is to elucidate national 
crisis as the real drama of the film. As a result of this anti-melodramatic attitude, the 
conditions that render the addressing of issues in social or national terms become 
oppressive for the doomed romance of Aliye and Tahsin. Abjected into both mise-en-
scène and acting, the melodramatic excess cannot be accommodated in this historical 
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drama. Thus, the stylistic abjection of melodrama performatively mirrors the oppressive 
social conditions that render impossible the love. In what follows then, I will provide an 
analysis of Refiğ’s Vurun Kahpeye as a social realist melodrama that subtly stages the 
tension between the social and the individual through the interplay of the social realist 
and melodramatic modes.  
 Within the world of Vurun Kahpeye, reimagining the nation united entails 
reconsidering the place of Islam within the national struggle, instead of pushing it to the 
periphery, to once again invoke Mardin’s discussion. Refiğ brings Islam to the center as a 
progressive force especially through Aliye’s adopted father Ömer Effendi while 
marginalizing Hadji Fettah’s regressive position in terms of pseudo-religiosity. Thus, the 
organization of shots or elements of a shot attests to this tension through a clash whereby 
the latter invalidates the former. The first two sequences of the film play out this 
dialectics. The first image of the film is a low angle shot of a mosque. The camera pans 
from its minaret down to street as Aliye enters into the frame. In the subsequent shots, we 
follow Aliye on her way to the Office of the Superintendent accompanied with her 
mantra echoed in the background. She walks past her soon-to-be archenemy and his 
accomplice, as Hadji Fettah holds the “half-naked” woman responsible for all the evil 
that falls upon them. Framing Aliye between the mosque and Hadji Fettah’s religious 
morality, the film seems to be perpetuating the stereotypical representation of Islam. And 
yet, in the next sequence we are introduced with a pious family welcoming Aliye not only 
to their home but also into their family, proving the Superintendent’s description of them 
as “extremely honorable Muslims.” The kinship structure is formed in two juxtaposed 
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scenes: in the former, Aliye is told the story of their late daughter as she is given her 
room, while, in the next scene, Aliye tells of her orphanhood in the living room under a 
window frame that has a view of the minaret of the mosque in distance. The conversation 
ends with “Allah took one daughter and sent another,” religiously officializing Aliye’s 
adoption. The looming presence of the mosque in each sequence helps for its 
transvaluation, which will be completed, as I will demonstrate, in the Mevlid scene, if we 
especially recall how it signifies in Aksoy’s Vurun Kahpeye.  
Important to note here is Refiğ’s portrayal of Ömer Efendi as a foil to Hadji 
Fettah. Depicted older than his predecessors in the previous versions, he is also 
religiously marked with his taqiyah. Challenging Hadji Fettah’s orthodoxy, he provides 
an immanent critique with Islamic terms, representing the antithesis that dismantles the 
thesis in the montage composition. A case in point is when, early on, the film pits against 
Aliye and Hadji Fettah and their representative ideologies in two sequences. In the first 
series of shots, Aliye leads a dictation exercise in the classroom in which she reads out a 
passage praising the nation and the national struggle. The following sequence challenges 
this mode of indoctrination by picturing Hadji Fettah engaging in anti-nationalist public 
incitement in a coffeehouse. This time, Refiğ provides the antithesis within the shot by 
providing a counter religious discourse from Omer Efendi’s mouth. Quoting the Müftü of 
Denizli, Ömer Efendi refers to his proclamation that when the land of the Muslims is 
conquered, Muslims attack the enemy. Hadji Fettah responds to this with reference to 
Sultan’s fatwah that the nationalists must be stopped, but Ömer Efendi reminds him that 
the Sultan is in the hands of the British and thus cannot speak his mind. Refuted, Hadji 
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Fettah changes the topic, asking the older man why they began to host this stranger of a 
girl, to which he responds that they have in fact adopted Aliye, designating her a social 
legitimacy in public. By including the voice of another source of Islamic authority, Refiğ 
here exposes the fallacy of Hadji Fettah’s logic through an immanent critique in an 
attempt to merge the nationalist project with Islam against the common enemy. Another 
significant example takes place before the attempted lynch cut short when Hadji Fettah 
incites the public in the square. The nationalists fighting the Greeks, Hadji Fettah 
contends, are enemies of religion ready to reject the rule of the sacred word, to remove 
the veil from women, and to defy the Sunna and the Fard. Thus, their blood is that of a 
Kafir and can be shed. He advises the people that they should follow whoever protects 
the mosque, the religion. However, Omer Efendi refutes once again by reminding him 
that the first rule of Islam is jihad against the actual infidels, which is what the nationalist 
are doing.   
Consequently, Omer Efendi emerges as the synthesis of a Muslim and a 
nationalist. In this, he serves a vital role, perhaps more than Aliye, for Refiğ’s project of 
realignment of Islam, nation, and the people against an antagonistic outside force. This is 
clearly pronounced when Tahsin tells Omer Efendi that it is not solely the Greeks that 
they are fighting, but the Greeks are backed up by the West, a point repeated several 
times with reference to the British and evinced by the “Made in England” sign branding 
the boxes of weaponry in the Greek arsenal. Thus, as much as the film contests the 
monolithic notion of Islam, it strives to represent a totality of the West that is set against 
the Turk. “Since the Crusades,” rejoins Omer Efendi seated under a rug picturing Kaaba 
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on the wall, “this has been the fate of the Turk, son. The place of the Turk in history is to 
be the sword of Islam.” The linking of the Turkish and Muslim identities is thus 
predicated upon this totalization of a Christian West. To this effect, Refiğ has the Greek 
foray into the town during the scene of Mevlid commemorating the martyrs of the nation. 
In a decision that reverses Aksoy’s, Refiğ takes the camera inside the mosque –an actual 
mosque unlike Akad’s chamber– registering Aliye’s immersion in the service through a 
series of eyeline matches depicting Islamic signs and symbols. The religious affect of the 
scene is interrupted by the explosions signaling the Greek assault. In the most violent 
portrayal of the attack, the Greek army fires at the crowd running out of the mosque 
responding the strike with sticks and stones, even killing women and children. 
Understandably, these images visually echo the Greek massacres in Cyprus circulating 
within the popular discourse almost a year prior to the invasion of the Turkish invasion of 
Cyprus. Released shortly after the military action, the film dialogues with the crisis that 
led to the invasion. Similar to Aksoy’s Vurun Kahpeye, the film might strike us as an 
allegory for the recent Cyprus crisis. And yet, considering the film’s attempts to lay out a 
universal civilization enmity since the Crusades, the film rather seems to situate the 
Greek attack within a historical continuum, as emblemized by the banner in the Greek 
headquarters that reads “MEGALI IDEA” [Great Idea] connecting the Greek conquest of 
Anatolia and the Greek aspirations in Cyprus. Channeled in an irredentist utopic project, 
these events are mere instantiations of a timeless civilizational conflict between the 
Christian Occident and the Muslim Orient.  
Cast in these terms, this opposition redefines Turkish nationalism as a fight for 
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Islam and Turkish nationalists as guardians of Islam. Dismantling the stereotypical binary 
between secular nationalism and Islamist antinationalism, this redefinition marginalizes 
Hadji Fettah and Uzun Hüseyin whose motives now stand distinctly selfish and 
capricious, not necessarily emerging out of the social context in which they are 
enmeshed. Their outsidedness to Islamic morality is conveyed with the film’s meticulous 
attention to historical details made legible also through the use of montage. Such 
historical precision that almost acts as an organic exposé informing the audience about 
the conditions of the guerilla warfare the Turks are giving against the Greeks. While 
Hadji Fettah believes that “these beardless men” do not stand a chance against an 
advanced army, Tahsin informs Omer Efendi that their goal is to buy time before the 
Great Offensive whilst Mustafa Kemal is forming a new army in Ankara in which they 
will join. Because as a gang they materially rely on the townsmen, they invite the 
notables, along with Hadji Fettah, for a meeting.  Tahsin debriefs them about the annual 
expenses of his sixty men which he asks to be funded by the invitees on the basis of a 
volunteered amount. Omer Efendi asks him to name the amount himself. He does so to 
meet with the protests of Hadji Fettah who names this incident as a Bolshevik theft. 
Later, when Aliye visits Tahsin to save Hadji Fettah from his imprisonment, she finds out 
that he was jailed because he tried to incite the crowd against the nationalists and herself, 
not because he has rejected to give money. He explains further that “Only enthusiasm or 
men won’t be enough to win a war. Guns and armory are also necessary. And these can 
only be bought by money.” Despite Tahsin’s advice against pitting Muslims against each 
other before his departure, Hadji Fettah conspires with Uzun Hüseyin whose motivation 
 
 174 
lies in his injured masculinity after Aliye socially castrates him by admonishing his son in 
class and by rejecting his proposal. Promising to commit Aliye to Uzun Hüseyin, Hadji 
Fettah aims not only to escape from having to give money and to get rid of Tahsin, but 
also to seize Omer Efendi’s properties. Aliye’s adopted mother Gülsüm’s statement about 
Hadji Fettah and his followers is therefore validated: “These foul men are neither afraid 
of Allah nor ashamed of the prophet.” 
Under such dire conditions, the relationship between Aliye and Tahsin can only 
develop through their shared commitment to the nation; romantic love seems unthinkable 
and impossible. The expression of their interest is thus communicated through a mutual 
admiration of their service for the nation. Asked whether she would wait for him until 
after the war, Aliye can only reply with a formal “I would be honored to wait for you.” 
For their engagement, Refiğ takes the couple to a decrepit building that conveys the out 
of time and place-ness of this relationship, considering Walter Benjamin’s suggestion that 
time and space collapse into each other in the formation of a ruin.60 The ruinous house 
embodies the current state of the nation explained by Tahsin as “The homeland/nation 
has been destroyed, destructed. A new state is being formed.” Without a home(land) for 
their romance, literalized by the house in disuse, the setting captures the true melodrama 
of the love that they cannot live. The consummation of their love is thus predicated upon 
national salvation. As seen in their second meeting in the building when Tahsin secretly 
visits the town under occupation, the house serves as the backdrop against the future 
home for which they are fighting. The interlocking fates of the individual and the social, 
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the personal and the national is verbalized in a better future “for both us and the people.”  
It is indeed the stifling national crisis that characterizes the Fassbinderian acting 
noticeable throughout Refiğ’s Vurun Kahpeye. One of the most anti-melodramatic 
impulses of the film lies in the rigidity with which the actors navigate the screen, 
highlighting the constraining social conditions of the war-ridden days. The melodrama of 
the impossible love, however, exposes surfacing of the repressed emotions. Consider, for 
instance, the farewell scene in their second meeting at the decrepit house next to Tahsin’s 
kiss in the forehead. Here, the couple is this time driven to intimately embrace each other 
with Tahsin placing a hesitant and shy kiss into Aliye’s cheek, triggering Aliye to 
respond with multiple kisses back on his cheek. Her hand on the nape of his neck, Aliye 
begins rubbing their cheeks against each other when finally, they part ways with 
goodbye. The prolonged intimacy delivered in a shot reverse shot reveals a worried 
Tahsin and a nervous Aliye. The subdued eroticism and the repression of feelings are 
further accentuated by the rising of a violin harmony. It seems as though what is 
repressed here comes to surface, albeit intimated, in an ellipsis during Tahsin’s secret 
visit this time to Aliye’s house. This sequence contains the film’s only dissolve 
transitioning out of Tahsin kissing a joyous Aliye and back in to Tahsin waking up with 
his head in Aliye’s lap. In between two dissolves, Refiğ takes the camera to the Greek 
headquarters where Çorbacı orders to encircle Aliye’s house upon receiving the report of 
Tahsin’s sighting. The transitioning between these two scenes is indeed suggestive for the 
risking of the social for the personal, signifying a moment of rupture or excess breaking 
free from social and personal repression. That the revelation of Tahsin’s entrapment takes 
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place after this scene framed between two dissolves increases the forbidden fruit theme of 
the moment for which Tahsin risks the national mission for personal pleasure. 
The removal of melodrama from innocent Aliye’s unjust victimization to the 
doomed love between two young people is evident also in the lynching scene. Aliye’s 
lynching is perhaps the most violent in the series in its depiction, and yet its 
melodramatization is missing mostly because of the curt rendering of its grief. Despite 
the clear self-designation of Aliye as a soldier and her act as a sacrifice, she is not 
socially inscribed as a martyr for the nation. After Tahsin discovers the Quran in Aliye’s 
hand, the two perpetrators are sent to hanging, which for the first time in the series gets to 
be fully represented. Following a hard cut, we see Tahsin walking towards the camera in 
the schoolyard where Aliye is buried. While, looking at the ground, he quietly wipes his 
tears, Aliye’s mantra is heard against the children singing an anthem. The camera zooms 
out to reveal her burial ground covered in Turkish flag, and with a tilt, it reveals another 
Turkish flag hanging at a pole. Thus, without a glorifying ceremony and with a man 
living his pain alone, Aliye’s lynching is translated almost as a deserved and damning 
penalty to pay for the breaching of an invisible national contract. Repressed into a 
longing gaze at a bridal gown, resisting shivering bodies in resistance to desire, an ellipsis 
that dissolves the act of consummation, and two wiped drops of tears, Vurun Kahpeye’s 
melodrama lies in the clash between individual and the social. Traceable in its dynamic 
tension between the social realist and melodramatic modes, Refiğ’s interpretation of 
Vurun Kahpeye gets closest to the central concern animating Edib’s novella, bar her 
feminist vision.  
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 Although Refiğ’s highly stylized social realist melodrama was a box-office failure 
and unnoticed in the press, it was welcomed and celebrated by the right and the Islamist 
circles.61 Emblematic of this celebration, the Islamic-nationalist journal Hareket 
dedicates the cover of its November issue in 1973 to it with the title “The Sum of 50 
Years and Vurun Kahpeye again,” beckoning to Selim Yağmur’s piece inside.62 Yağmur 
sings the praises of the film for deconstructing a false binary that the “anti-Islamic” 
previous versions perpetuated and reads the Quran motif as Refiğ’s message that “those 
who want to realize a revolution in Turkey grip the Quran before anything else.”63 In this 
respect, twenty-four years after Akad’s Vurun Kahpeye, Refiğ seems to repair the injury 
that the original film had engendered in this audience. Vurun Kahpeye also became an 
addendum to the dialogue Refiğ’s national cinema inspired between the filmmakers and 
the Islamists in search of their own cinema. Earlier in 1973, Refiğ was invited for the 
National [Milli] Cinema Convention organized by National [Milli] Turkish Student 
Association. Refiğ’s reflections on cinema since the middle of the 60s had been 
influential in thinking about an Islamist cinema in the late 60s. As part of the process of 
defining and distinguishing their cinema, the members of this circle extended the 
                                                
61 This contrast in the reception of the film can be captured by two reviews that appear in ideologically 
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well told, nonetheless, a redundant story. Refiğ, being very far to the problems of 1973, looks at the history 
from the ‘right’ front.” “Değerlendirme,” Yedinci Sanat, October 1973.   
 






invitation to Refiğ to analyze his theory and filmic production. Refiğ appreciates this 
dialogue, but the convention serves an occasion to identify in more pronounced terms his 
separation from them, 64  as emblematized by each side’s embracing of either of the 
synonyms of “national.” Whereas Refiğ’s ulusal is a Republican retrieval of an ancient 
Turkic word, milli is the Arabic word originally denoting religion or religious community 
that in the 19th century evolves into the national body. Thus, while the former refers back 
to a pre-Islamic Turkic past, the latter strikes a religious chord that stems from its Arabic 
origins. Refiğ summarizes the distinction between the two sides in terms of ideological 
priorities: For him, the primary issue is the danger, threat, pressure from the outside, and 
to stay strong against them inside, but those who represent the National Vision [Milli 
Görüş] give precedence to an Islamic morality.65 
 It may even be possible to argue that Refiğ’s project in Vurun Kahpeye results in 
perhaps a more unlikely and an equally unintended outcome in the following decades. In 
the middle of the 70s, due to industrial shrinkage and his dissatisfaction with the 
industrial dynamics, Refiğ orients himself to TV, specifically, to the only existing 
channel, the state station, Turkish Radio Television (TRT).66 As a result of his tenure at 
the state television, Refiğ was able to broadcast some of his films on TV. Refiğ maintains 
that as a result his connection to TRT, his Vurun Kahpeye was the one to be broadcast the 
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most on TV.67 Considering the new televisual publicity of Vurun Kahpeye since 1975, we 
can draw a connection between Refiğ’s Vurun Kahpeye and the idiomatic appearance of 
vurun kahpeye in the following decades.  
A significant media event must be noted for the emergence of the title as an 
idiom. In March 1990, popular news magazine Nokta came out with a controversial 
headline with reference to what came to be known as the activation of the scandalous 
“reduced rape law:” “Justice Gave Permission, Strike the ‘Slut.’”68 A sex worker was 
kidnapped and raped by four women in Antalya in 1986; however, by the beginning of 
1990, the penalty of the rapists was decided to be reduced by two-thirds of the duration 
due to the profession of the woman as per the notorious article 438 of the Turkish Penal 
Code. The appeal for the invalidation of the law by the Antalya Attorney of the Criminal 
Court for the Major Cases was rejected by the Supreme Court on the basis that an 
unchaste woman cannot be put in the same pot with a chaste woman.69 Nokta’s headline, 
then, compares the Supreme Court decision to the blows Aliye receives in Vurun 
Kahpeye, pulling the focus back to the gendered nature of the lynching that Edib in her 
novel emphasized but the male directors deemphasized. Through this feminist rerouting, 
the idiom vurun kahpeye demek [to call strike the slut] has come to signify attacks or 
efforts to prevent an otherwise useful or pioneering idea, person, or cause, perpetuating 
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the tension between the progressive and regressive social forces as mostly graphed onto 
the political division between the secularists and Islamists within reference to gender. 
Thus, counterintuitively, Refiğ’s Vurun Kahpeye can be said not only to rekindle the 
long-forgotten feminist desires of Edib’s text, but also to help cement the social divisions 




CONCLUSION: THE PAST AS EPILOGUE 
This dissertation investigated the experience of Turkish modernity through a 
culturally reproduced aesthetics of victimhood germane to the idea of a nation delineated 
by a secular social body. Rooted in the Western dramatic tradition, the imported form of 
melodrama is adapted to imagine the Turkish national identity through the victimization 
of a secular population in the face of Islamic orthodoxy. I have demonstrated the 
melodramatization of victimhood in the secularist imaginary by examining the extended 
social life of Vurun Kahpeye across media between 1923 and 1973. In this history, mass 
media, especially cinema, plays a significant role in the forging of nation and victimhood, 
evident in the sedimentation of a secularist paranoia about the Islamic subject construed 
as a potentially zealous, bigoted fanatic. Vurun Kahpeye’s impact therefore reaches far 
beyond the first fifty years of the Turkish Republic, as its title cements this paranoia in 
the vernacular in the form of an idiomatic phrase. Indeed, the event that the idiom vurun 
kahpeye conjures up – the violent treatment of the innocent individual at the hands of a 
mob – animates the tension between the supposedly progressivist and backward social 
forces of the nation, namely the secular moderns and religious masses. As a meme, the 
fantasized mutilated female body of Vurun Kahpeye foments secularist fears about the 
imminence of the Islamist threat that have structured social and political sensibilities, 
attitudes, and praxis in modern Turkey.  
As Charles Hirschkind reminds, “the affects and sensibilities honed through 
popular media practice are as infrastructural to politics and public reason as are markets, 
 
 182 
associations, formal institutions and information networks.”1 Thus, the repetition of 
Vurun Kahpeye allows us to approach melodrama as a political technology of victimhood 
within a social economy of affect. As Chapter 2 demonstrates, however, a preemptive 
secularist paranoia is only one side of the distributive and disciplinary effect of 
melodrama. My work in this chapter illustrates that Aliye’s body blots out the injury that 
the representation of the turbaned male incites during the formation of cinema as mass 
media. This chapter anticipates the emergence of a proliferated and magnified affect of 
resentment whose study will serve as an appendix to The Melodramatics of Turkish 
Modernity. If melodrama is the medium to channel secular affects around victimhood, 
arabesk emerges as a populist expression and cultivation of the suffering of the 
oppressed, those figures who are concealed by the national victim. As the counterculture 
of the domestic rural migrants experiencing hardships in the urban landscape, arabesk 
appears as a transmedial outlet for the victimization of the –conservative, rural, working 
class– masses under the –secular, urban, bourgeois– elite since the 70s through an 
outburst of music and filmic production. Arabesk, as musicologist Martin Stokes 
explains, primarily refers to a hybrid popular music style mixing “‘Arab,’ Turkish 
popular classical, Turkish folk, and Western pop and rock.”2 As discussed by Stokes, this 
hybridity is audible in the composition of these songs which remain unsynthesized to 
produce the affect of anguish through their interruptive elements.3 Most of all, referring 
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presumably back to its origins in architecture as arabesque, the musical form arabesk is 
notoriously characterized by overwrought vocal and tonal prolongations in mostly high 
notes as well as emotive punctuations and exclamations that make up of its excessive 
ornamentations. Such stylizations determine the wide affective range of the contested 
messages of arabesk, which as Meral Özbek points out, “is a field both of resistance and 
submission.”4 The affective repertoire of arabesk spans between the fatalistic 
submissiveness of the ascetic self of dert and çile and the defiance of the protesting 
subject of itiraz and isyan.5 Through the growing channels of mass media and new social 
networks such as cassettes, films –musical films, especially singer films, in the genre of 
arabesk– VHS, tabloids, and the people’s concerts, arabesk’s messages were embraced 
by a broad scope of socially disenfranchised groups disenchanted with modernity that 
range from Kurds to queers. 
In contemporary Turkish cultural hierarchy, as an alternative or a counter 
aesthetics of victimhood, arabesk occupies a lowly position. What Stokes observes about 
the arabesk debate of the 80s is in fact still a prevalent attitude today despite arabesk’s 
mainstream status:  
The intelligentsia initially saw arabesk in unambiguously negative terms and 
monopolized representations of it. For them, it revealed an inner Orient in a 
supposedly Western country, and a cultural tangle of insufficiently suppressed 
‘Arab’ influences and traditional elements that flourished amongst poorly 
integrated rural migrants in the squatter towns. It showed the painful limits of 
                                                
4 Meral Özbek, Popüler Kültür ve Orhan Gencebay Arabeski, 27. 
 
5 Given all of these words have a metaphysical ring to them, their incorporation into the popular provides 
another instantiation of arabesk’s popularization of Islamic rhetoric that I mention below. While the 
previous set of words can roughly be rendered as “affliction” and “ordeal,” the latter would can be 




the Turkish state’s efforts to become ‘modern.’6  
 
The elitist and Kemalist perception of arabesk today, the most vocal proponent of which 
is the celebrated pianist-composer virtuoso Fazıl Say, rests upon an old “critical cliché,” 
to borrow from Stokes, that “arabesk was fatalistic and masochistic, encouraging a 
passivity that had no place in a modernizing republic.” Furthermore, to follow Stokes, 
“[t]he accusation of fatalism was linked with arabesk’s complicity in religious reaction 
(irtica) and the Islamization of the Turkish public sphere.”7 Indeed, arabesk’s connection 
to religion is not far-fetched as intimated by Stokes. In the wake of the 1980 Turkish 
coup d’état when religious mass media productions were withdrawn underground, 
“Arabesk hinted at these suppressed archives of popular religious emotion, though it 
never spelled them out explicitly.”8 I would further stress this connection and argue that 
arabesk popularizes an Islamic discourse on suffering and victimization found within the 
cultural reservoir of the conservative right. The cultural lineage of arabesk goes back to 
the poetry of Mehmet Akif Ersoy (1873-1936) and Necip Fazıl Kısakürek (1904-1983) 
who serve as the ideologues of political Islam in Turkey. The Muslim subject that these 
poets draw on in their work is one who is downtrodden but self-righteous in anticipation 
of the day of reconciliation –against the imperial West in Mehmet Akif’s poetry and 
against the secular Republic in Necip Fazıl’s– corresponding to the çilekeş [ascetic] and 
isyankar [rebellious] registers of arabesk’s message outlined above. Considering the 
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large diverse social body of arabesk, this ultimately means that through arabesk political 
Islam found a counterpublic with which its increasingly populist message would resonate. 
As arabesk translates Islamic suffering into a sweeping populist discourse, it cultivates a 
competing structure of national feeling of resentment suitable for non-Kemalist political 
affiliations led today by the JDP. As Stokes notes,  
Prime Minister Turgut Özal’s political party, the Anavatan Partisi (ANAP, or 
Motherland Party), co-opted arabesk in the mid-1980s in moves consonant with 
Özal’s promotion of a laissez-faire economy and the dismantling of the state’s 
patrimonial role. . . The promotion of Islam as a public virtue that accompanied 
this process antagonized the secular left, for whom arabesk’s visibility was yet 
more worrying evidence of this new ‘hegemony of the periphery.’9 
 
Thus, I would argue that arabesk laid the foundation for a discursive platform for the 
coalition of those we could deem as the victims of modernity.   
Just as melodrama, as an affective aesthetic form, arabesk too, registers politics as 
feeling. Distributing and depositing a competing structure of a national feeling of 
resentment, it challenges the kinship between melodrama and the project of secular 
national modernity. Thus, this dissertation gestures towards an impending genealogy of 
an alternative account of victimhood that would complement its project by mapping the 
divergent itineraries of melodrama and arabesk, their encounter with each other, and their 
entanglements with politics. While such a project is beyond the scope of this dissertation, 
I will briefly sketch out an example that epitomizes the efficacy of arabesk as a 
transhistorical affective hinge. The injurious resentment that the Islamists and the rural 
populace share signals the unforeseen political alliances embodied nowhere better than in 
                                                




the trans diva Bülent Ersoy’s intimacy with the conservative right, especially the 
Motherland Party in the nineties and the JDP in the new millennium. Şöhretin Sonu [The 
End of Fame] (1981)10, a singer film that stages Ersoy’s fall from an educated, 
effeminate, and bourgeois singer-actor type of melodramas into a miserable and 
undesirable arabesk singer against the backdrop of her sex reassignment surgery as an 
unrecognized legal subject, is symbolic.11 The film marks the rise of a new political body 
of the dispossessed that later finds its political expression in Islamist conservatism, 
anticipating the unlikely alliances that we would soon see within Turkish modernity.  
Ersoy has forged a link between transsexuality and conservatism by channeling 
the affects of the dispossessed in the forging of her Muslim Turkish identity on account 
of the banning of her public performances throughout the 80s by the secularist Turkish 
Armed Forces after the military coup in 1980. Today, Ersoy is a vocal proponent of 
President Erdoğan and his JDP, participating in the recent global phenomenon of the 
counterintuitive marriage between transsexuality and conservative politics, epitomized 
till recently by Caitlyn Jenner in America. The conditions of possibility of this marriage 
are encapsulated in two contrasting scenes from the summer of 2017. Hours after the riot 
police raided İstanbul Trans Pride and brutally targeted the trans community, Ersoy was 
shaking hands with Erdoğan as his invited guest at a Ramadan dinner reception at a 
luxurious mansion in the same city. This juxtaposition, I believe, reveals, on the one 
hand, the trans body as the bearer of a new political sensibility that frame the conditions 
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of trans-visibility in an era marked by the turn to the right. Ersoy’s hypervisibility in 
media –with TV performances in such shows as Popstar Alaturka, Bülent Ersoy Show, 
and Dünya Güzellerim– during the sixteen-year-old reign of the JDP attests to how Ersoy 
professes the injured, suffering subject of Necip Fazıl always in retaliation against the 
injustices of the past at the hands of the secular elite. 
The inflections of victimhood in the modern Turkish nation state have larger 
implications for a sense of historical injury. Aliye’s mutilated corpse, Fettah Efendi’s 
hanged body, Erdoğan’s imprisonment, and Ersoy’s abjection– the articulation of the 
Turk as the victim in its various forms and shapes presupposes the dismissal of the body 
and the pain of the ultimate other: the non-Muslim and non-Turk. On January 19, 2007, 
Armenian-Turkish editor-in-chief, columnist, and journalist Hrant Dink was assassinated 
on the street outside his newspaper Agos’ office in Istanbul. In his last column nine day 
before his murder, “I am like a dove,” Dink had recorded, in the face of the death threats 
he had been receiving ever since his third prosecution under the notorious Article 301 of 
the Turkish penal code for denigrating Turkishness.12 “Do you know Ministers what a 
price it is to imprison someone to the skittishness of a dove?,”13 Dink had asked his 
prosecutors, comparing his mental state to that of a fidgety dove, always in distress, 
always in alarm. Still, Dink had refused to leave Turkey, nor had he requested protection, 
because he had faith in his country, in the people of his country. His final words on paper 
attested to this conviction that would prove fatal: “Yes, I can feel myself as restless as a 
                                                







dove but I know that in this country people do not touch and disturb the doves. The doves 
continue their lives in the middle of the cities. Yes indeed a bit frightened but at the same 
time free.”14 Hrant Dink’s seventeen-year-old puppet murderer betrayed Dink’s trust, 
brutally reminding us of those children of the neighborhood who, with their slingshots, 
strike doves to death.     
 Hrant Dink’s assassination has a distinctive ethnocentric quality within the annals 
of state-sponsored nationalist anti-intellectual violence in Turkey. In this respect, the 
devastating incident must be situated in a longer history of ethnic cleansing. Dating to the 
cataclysmic Armenian Genocide of 1915, Dink’s murder adds to a chain of abominable 
crimes enacted for the Turkification of the Anatolian and Thracian land via the 
elimination of minorities and confiscation of their properties: the population exchange of 
1923, the Dersim Massacre of 1938, the Wealth Tax of 1942, and the Istanbul Pogrom of 
1955. Arguably, some version of this bloody past taints the chronicles of more or less 
every nation-state; however, what marks the Turkish case is the absolute denial of those 
crimes whose execution has been the condition of possibility for the emergence and 
existence of a Turkish nation state since the turn of the century. Without an 
acknowledgement of the suffering of the other, not to mention the recognition of 
responsibility or guilt, it is, as though in an exacting exercise of dissimulation in service 
of this denial, the Turk cites himself as the ultimate victim of the history ad nauseum.  
Take, for example, the great catastrophe of the Armenian Genocide, the 
systematic extermination of over one million Armenians through a series of massacres 




and enforced deportation on death marches under the Ottoman rule in 1915. While the 
term genocide was in fact coined after this ethnic cleansing, the Turkish state succeeding 
the Ottoman government of the CUP has vehemently rejected to categorize the events of 
1915 as genocide through what Fatma Müge Göçek names as “the republican defensive 
narrative.”15 Kept alive and perpetuated by the Turkish state not only through scholarship 
and publications, but also through the nationalist machinery of state apparatuses like a 
centralized education and a conscription system, this master narrative codes the atrocities 
as tehcir, “relocation,” as a necessary means for national security and unity, as opposed 
to and divorced from a massacre or a genocide, concealing the pan-Turkist aspirations of 
the CUP. Alternately or concomitantly, this narrative justifies the actions of the CUP as a 
vengeful response to the massacres of the Balkan Turks and Muslims, as a preemptive 
measure against the influence of Armenian nationalists or Russians on the Armenian 
population during the World War I, and as a natural consequence of mutual killings 
between the communities in the same war.16 In this counter knowledge production, then, 
The Turk appears as the ultimate, the likely, and the essential victim. Thus, in Göçek’s 
words, “the Armenian victims themselves, tragically and ironically, have emerged in the 
Republican narrative, alongside the guilty Western powers, as the main perpetrators of 
the crimes” committed against them.17 This history of violence –not only of the 
aggressions of the past, but also of the ongoing hijacking of the suffering of the other– 
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looms large in the backdrop of this dissertation. 
But in a geography of denied and contested victimizations, we have to ask, is 
there a right way to bear one’s suffering, own one’s victimization? This seems to be the 
question that the anti-melodramatic hero of François Ozon’s 2005 production Time to 
Leave, Romain, provides an answer to.18 Diagnosed with a terminal cancer, Romain 
refuses treatment and determines to die alone, abruptly shunning himself away from the 
people around him without any explanation. Resentful towards the world, he refuses 
sympathy, perhaps in fear of inspiring pity or pain, but his withdrawal confounds and 
hurts his friends and family, especially his boyfriend, Sasha, whom Romain curtly 
jettisons from his apartment and life. It is Romain’s kindred spirit, his grandmother 
Laura, who has sequestered herself after her husband’s death, abandoning her child, 
Romain’s father, that points Romain to an alternative path: “there is no shame in kindling 
tender feelings,” she remarks, because “[i]t could be an opportunity to talk to each other.” 
Talk Romain does, as he henceforth subtly begins to make peace with his life 
companions before his farewell. In his steady march to death, Romain, now mindful of 
the others around him, delicately and maturely navigates his suffering, which, repressed 
or reveled, always runs the risk of causing or silencing other sufferings in reclaiming 
victimhood.  
The embodiment of the new path that Romain embraces is his revised decision to 
help a heterosexual couple have a baby by accepting to impregnate the wife. A young gay 
fashion photographer not too fond of babies –as his relationship with his sister’s children 
                                                




evinces– Romain fathers a baby for the couple in an act of disidentification, which 
appears as a means for Romain to overcome the oppressive potentiality of one’s own 
suffering. Disidentification is also a crucial political exercise by which the individual is 
divorced from the regulatory norms of difference for mobilizing politics towards “the 
rearticulation of democratic contestation.”19 The unforeseen and unprecedent reactions to 
Hrant Dink’s assassination in his funeral service is a testament to the indispensability of 
disidentification as an ethical political praxis in the face of the victimization of the other. 
Over hundred thousand mourner-protestors gathered in the streets of Istanbul carrying 
and chanting the slogan “We are all Hrant, we are all Armenians.” Providing a historical 
account of a melodramatization of victimhood in the secularist imaginary that frames the 
experience of Turkey’s modernity, my hope is that this dissertation echoes the 
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